That said . . .
2) This was an absolutely necessary move for Trump.
The most important currency for a diplomat is their credibility. If they say something will happen and then they are over-ruled by their boss, it's a problem. This, by the way, is one reason that diplomats always seem so cautious and measured in their language.
Trump had undercut Tillerson's credibility on numerous occasions, and the constant leak campaign in the media that Tillerson was on his way out undercut his standing even further.
To put this more simply: If you were a foreign head of government meeting with Tillerson, would you have taken his assurances seriously?
Pompeo clearly has a much closer relationship with Trump and has displayed more public fealty to him. That relationship will give Pompeo more credibility as Secretary of State when he is speaking with foreign interlocutors.
3) Tillerson's legacy will be as one of the most ineffective secretaries of state in modern history.
I have has written a fair amount about Tillerson's incompetence and ineffectiveness as Secretary of State.
He was so incompetent that I called for him to resign in August. I would wager that everything I said in that column holds with greater force today.
His influence within the Administration waned over time. His proposed redesign of the State Department was botched, and botched badly. His incompetent management helped trigger an exodus of seasoned Foreign Service officers and crushed morale among the remaining diplomats.
It seemed as though he could not visit a region without saying something that offended his hosts. There is no signature idea or doctrine or accomplishment that Tillerson can point to as part of his legacy.
He was woefully unprepared for the job on day one and barely moved down the learning curve. His incompetence undercut his ability to advance any worthwhile policy instinct.
Peter Baker and Gardiner Harris pull very few punches in their New York Times write-up of Tillerson's time at State:
"But perhaps the most puzzling part of Mr Tillerson's tenure was his poor oversight of the State Department. As a former top business executive, his managerial skills were thought to be his chief asset.
"But he failed to quickly pick a trusted team of leaders, left many critical departments without direction and all but paralysed crucial decision making in the department.
"He approved one global conclave in Washington just eight days before the event was to start, ensuring that few leaders from around the world were able to attend. He rarely sat for comprehensive briefings with many of his top diplomats and often failed to consult the State Department's experts on countries before visiting.
"Foreign diplomats - starting with the British and the French - said Mr Tillerson neither returned phone calls or, with much advance warning, set up meetings with his counterparts. Strategic dialogues with many nations, including nuclear weapons powers like Pakistan, were ended without explanation."
We live in a politically incorrect age, so let's be blunt: Tillerson was an awful, incompetent secretary of state. Anyone who tells you differently is selling you something.
4) Pompeo has the opportunity to become a good Secretary of State.
A competent Secretary of State needs to cultivate ties with key stakeholders to succeed at the job: The White House, other Cabinet secretaries, Congress, the bureaucracy and the wider foreign policy community. As previously noted, Pompeo is tight with the President and has served in the Cabinet and Congress.
The bureaucracy would ordinarily be wary of someone with his policy preferences. But Pompeo has the opportunity to build considerable goodwill just by, you know, properly staffing the agency and defending its budget a little bit better than Tillerson.
As for the foreign policy community, well, that's a thing, because . . .
5) US foreign policy is about to get even more hawkish.
Pompeo is far more hawkish than Tillerson on an array of policy issues, particularly Iran.
Tillerson's departure follows the exit of Gary Cohn, which means there are now two fewer voices in Trump's Cabinet advocating for the benefits of the liberal international order.
On one level, it will be impossible for Pompeo to be a worse Secretary of State than Tillerson.
But Pompeo might still prove to be a more dangerous Secretary of State by enabling Trump's most hawkish instincts.
- Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
