In early August, Ukrainian troops mounted a diversionary operation by attacking the Russian province of Kursk. Ukrainian forces swiftly took control of roughly 500 square miles (1290sq m) of Russian territory. In September, Russian units mounted a counterattack but with little success so far. The Kursk offensive has lifted the spirits of Ukrainians and their allies, but so far it has not diverted enough Russian troops to slow down Russia’s advance to Pokrovsk.
Amid the shifting fortunes at the front, Ukraine must grapple with possible reductions in foreign support. The German Government – Europe’s largest donor to Ukraine – has signalled that it plans to reduce aid by 2026, forcing Ukraine to rely, instead, on a $39 billion European Union loan backed by frozen Russian funds. That money – which is supposed to be augmented by a US loan of $20b to $25b ($31b-$39b) – is badly needed by Kyiv but would go a lot further if donor nations viewed the loans as a supplement, rather than a substitute for, their own aid budgets.
It took months of delay for Congress to approve a $61b ($96b) aid package for Ukraine in April. That money will run out by the end of the year, and there is no guarantee Congress will approve another major package. Ukraine could be in especially dire shape if former President Donald Trump were to win. Trump, in his lone debate with Vice President Kamala Harris, declined an invitation to state his support for a Ukrainian victory in the war.
While Ukraine’s continued foreign support remains uncertain, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has been relentless in pursuing the invasion. He has mobilised Russian industry and personnel and won critical support from an axis of autocracies – North Korea, Iran and China. (Iran recently delivered hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.)
Given that Russia is roughly three times bigger than Ukraine economically and demographically, it has a decided advantage in any war of attrition, notwithstanding the staggering losses it has suffered. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that Russia may have lost nearly 200,000 soldiers killed and 400,000 wounded, with Ukrainian losses estimated at 80,000 troops killed and 400,000 wounded.
Ukraine’s situation, though difficult, is far from hopeless. Support has risen in Ukraine for a negotiated solution, but most Ukrainians still support the war effort and want to fight until all of Ukraine’s territory is liberated. The ground war has been largely stalemated, but Ukraine has managed to open up the Black Sea to Ukrainian commerce by using sea drones to damage and drive away Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Meanwhile Ukraine’s domestically produced aerial drones have been conducting long-range strikes into Russia. Last week, Ukrainian drones destroyed major ammunition depots located hundreds of miles inside Russia.
Ukrainian units at the front are badly depleted by non-stop fighting. But since the passage of a new draft law in the spring, Ukraine reportedly has been recruiting 30,000 troops a month – roughly the same number as Russia.
And while Western support for Ukraine is by no means guaranteed for the future, so far it has proven more robust than many observers expected. More than 50 countries have provided aid, and donor countries have been steadily ramping up their production of munitions. The United States is on course to produce 70,000 to 80,000 155mm artillery rounds a month by early 2025, up from only 14,000 rounds a month in 2022.
Ukraine’s allies have formed “capability coalitions” to focus on enhancing specific capacities: air power, air defence, artillery, maritime security, armour, information technology, demining and drones. One recent payoff has been the delivery of F-16s to Ukraine by the Netherlands and Denmark.
The political situation in the West, while admittedly perilous, may also shift in Ukraine’s favour. Kamala Harris has been a staunch supporter of Ukraine and now leads Trump slightly in the polls. If she were to win in November, the Kremlin would have to reckon with the possibility that a pro-Ukraine president could occupy the White House for the next eight years. That, in turn, could prompt Putin to consider seriously negotiating an end to the conflict.
In the meantime, Ukraine’s supporters need to focus on helping it to survive this winter and to emerge stronger in 2025. What will be required? A top priority is more air defences to protect Ukrainian troops, infrastructure and population centres. The Biden administration announced this summer that it would prioritise air defence systems for Ukraine – in particular, Patriot and NASAMs interceptors – over the needs of other US allies. Meanwhile, Romania recently approved the dispatch of one of its Patriot air-defence systems to Ukraine.
Those are important steps. But every democracy around the world needs to dig deep and send Ukraine whatever air-defence systems it can. Israel, for one, should donate its older-model Patriots – as the Netanyahu Government has discussed with the Biden administration.
Ukraine’s allies also need to rush more equipment to repair energy infrastructure and to build fortifications; armoured bulldozers such as the Caterpillar D9 would be especially useful.
To make Ukraine more self-reliant, foreign donors should invest more in the expansion of Ukraine’s own defence industry. Northrop Grumman in July became the first US company to conclude an agreement to manufacture munitions – specifically, medium-calibre ammunition – inside Ukraine. It is imperative that other Western arms companies follow suit.
Ukraine’s most controversial request – which Zelenskyy will surely repeat all week long – has been for permission to use Western weapons systems to strike military targets deep inside Russia. Biden has provided US-made ATACMS missiles (which have a range of around 190 miles, 305km), but he has so far refused permission for them to be used against targets located inside Russian territory.
Biden’s caution is partly fear of provoking Russia and partly concerns that a limited number of ATACMS will not be decisive in such a vast country as Russia. But if Putin has not been provoked to go nuclear after Ukraine invaded Russian territory, he is unlikely to do so in response to enhanced Ukrainian strikes against military targets. ATACMS are no wonder weapon – nothing is – but they can be useful in targeting air bases, army bases, ammunition depots, logistics chokepoints and other important targets, thereby reducing the volume of men and munitions that Russia can deploy against Ukraine. Biden should give Zelensky the permission he seeks.
With more Western support – and more Ukrainian focus on mobilising personnel, expanding its defence industry and building fortifications – Ukraine can continue to more than hold its own and could even create opportunities in 2025 for further counter-offensives. But difficult months lie ahead while Ukraine struggles to hold its front lines and to rebuild its wrecked energy infrastructure. The West must show it will not waver in its support. The Ukrainians – who are bearing the brunt of this terrible conflict – are certainly not wavering.
