It was the attack Britain's police and intelligence chiefs had been predicting, and dreading. Despite spending millions of pounds on counter-terrorism, having some of the world's most advanced surveillance equipment, and a nation supposedly on high alert, the terrorists succeeded in getting through the country's defences.
Until now, police and security services had been congratulated at foiling any terrorism act since September 11. Police say they have thwarted five major plots but that they are struggling to get anything like a full understanding of the al Qaeda threat in Britain.
Lord Stevens, the previous commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, was not thanked for saying last year that an attack by Muslim extremists in London was "inevitable". But the bombings showed just how difficult it is to stop a determined opponent - especially when there are gaps in intelligence.
Knowledge about the overall strength and structure of al Qaeda in Britain is, at best, patchy. Scotland Yard has said that about 200 British citizens and foreign nationals have travelled to al Qaeda training camps and returned to Britain but intelligence officers believe the true figure could be 3000.
Most of these Muslim extremists are known to the authorities but many have almost certainly returned without being traced. This was illustrated by Idris Bazis, a French-Algerian living in Manchester. The 41-year-old came to the attention of authorities only after he travelled to Iraq and made a suicide bombing attack in February.
One of the most alarming developments for intelligence agencies has been the rise in young British-born Muslims. MI5 and the anti-terrorist branch have become increasingly concerned at the number of these would-be terrorists who have no history of violence or extremism.
In March this year Saajid Badat, 25, admitted plotting to blow up a plane bound for America in the first major prosecution of an al Qaeda terrorist in Britain since September 11. The British-born Muslim, with no history of extremism, had planned to detonate a bomb at the same time as the London-based "shoe-bomber" Richard Reid, who is serving a life sentence in the United States. But Badat changed his mind and dismantled his shoe-bomb, which was seized by police at his home in Gloucester in November 2003.
Anti-terrorist officers believe Badat was convinced to become a radical by extremists at a mosque in London in the 1990s after he fell out with his father. He then travelled to Afghanistan and spent two years at an al Qaeda training camp.
In a separate case, yet to come to court, several young Muslim men with no history of extremism have been charged with plotting to make a bomb.
Another problem for counter-terrorism officers is the random structure of al Qaeda groups and supporters in Britain. Some cells are closely aligned to Osama bin Laden, but others are merely sympathetic towards al Qaeda aims. There are also loose-knit affiliations and lone fanatics.
The tactics adopted by extremists are varied and therefore difficult to guard against. Police have long feared an attack by suicide bombers.
Guidelines were drawn up by Scotland Yard in 2003 by the Assistant Commissioner Barbara Wilding, who travelled to Israel and Sri Lanka to gather first-hand accounts from police and intelligence agencies on how to hunt down and guard against suicide bomber cells. Her confidential report in which she in effect calls for a shoot-to-kill policy - has been circulated to chief constables.
One of their biggest operations resulted in al Qaeda supporter Kamel Bourgass being jailed for 17 years in April for masterminding a plot to terrorise Britain with ricin and cyanide. As he was sentenced at the Old Bailey, the court heard that Bourgass, an Islamic extremist from Algeria, had been convicted last year of murdering Special Branch officer Stephen Oake.
Bourgass, who is serving a life sentence for the murder of Oake during an anti-terrorist operation in Manchester two years ago, was convicted of plotting to produce ricin from a flat in north London.
Bourgass was recruited, inspired and guided by Abu Doha, 39, who was living in London and was a member of the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), a terrorist group which has committed widespread atrocities in Algeria.
Information from the United States says that Doha had permission from al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to set up the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan for Algerians and other north Africans.
Doha, carrying a false passport, was arrested at London's Heathrow airport in 2001 trying to board a flight to Saudi Arabia.
He is in Belmarsh prison, south-east London, fighting extradition to the United States.
Since September 11, much of the police and security services' work has been aimed at disrupting and deterring suspected al Qaeda followers and supporters through raids and arrests. These operations have often been aimed at breaking up suspected cells, fundraisers and sympathisers who provide logistical support such as safe houses and forged papers.
Intelligence officers admit privately that sometimes they have had to act prematurely because of the risk of a terrorist act. This has resulted in some suspects being freed without charge or facing relatively trivial charges. Innocent people have also been caught in the raids and that has led to bad feeling among Muslim communities, who increasingly feel victimised.
Of the 702 people arrested under the Terrorism Act since the September 11 attacks in 2001 and the end of last year, comparatively few convictions have resulted. Of those arrested, 119 were charged with terror offences and a further 135 with other crimes. Only 17 have been convicted.
- Independent
Top-rate security lets al Qaeda slip through gaps
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