Stephen Hoadley: Russian propaganda and its New Zealand audience

A demonstrator holds a placard of Russian President Vladimir Putin covered with a blood-smeared hand during a rally in Budapest. Photo / Petr David Josek, AP

OPINION

Russian propaganda is as audacious and as superficially credible as it is false. It is widely promulgated and believed. Why?

Some of the narratives are strikingly implausible: Ukraine is part of Russia. Most Ukrainians would welcome Russian rule but are misled by criminal and Nazis leaders who, with Nato backing, are planning an attack on Russia. The Ukrainian army shot down the Malaysian airliner, not the Russian-backed separatists, and blamed Russia. The Russian shelling of the nuclear power station was really a stage-managed explosion by the Ukrainian military to bias the Western media against Russia.

These specific narratives are applications of five broad themes: Russia is a victim of "Russophobia" fomented by Western elitists; Russia's conduct throughout history is noble and blameless; the West is decadent; protests in the Middle East, Poland, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, and especially in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, were covertly fomented by Western provocation; and loyalty to Russia is a virtue exemplified by a firm leader (Putin).

These narratives override uncomfortable truths such as the Putin regime's shooting or poisoning of political critics; the subversion by Russian covert operatives of governments in Georgia, Crimea, and Donbas; and the callous bombardment of urban neighbourhoods and hospitals in Grozny and Aleppo, and now Kharkov, Mariupol and Kyiv.

Why does Russian invest so heavily in disinformation? Some historical perspective may be useful.

The Rus tribe used deception to survive, outwit, and finally defeat rival tribes, and then Mongol rule in the 12th and 13th centuries. Successive Tzarist regimes used deception wedded to military force successively to outmanoeuvre the then-dominant Polish-Lithuanian and Swedish kingdoms, the Ottoman Empire, and the Chinese Empire, and to extend Moscow's rule from the Baltic and Black seas to the Pacific Ocean.

The tools developed by the Okhrana (Tzarist secret police) were adopted and refined by Lenin and the Bolsheviks in the Cheka, then embedded in Soviet foreign policy, implemented by the Communist International and associated front groups in target countries.

Vladimir Putin's Russian Federation inherited and extended these tools, making use of 24-hour international TV and ubiquitous social media. They form elements in what is now called "hybrid warfare" which embraces not only propaganda but also espionage, infiltration, co-optation, subversion, sabotage, and assassination.

Instruments of Russian propaganda span a spectrum from overt official outlets such as RT television, Radio Sputnik, RM Broadcasting, and ANNA News to covert "troll farms" that saturate social media channels with deliberate disinformation. The former broadcast in multiple languages using native speakers to add to their local credibility. The latter generate a torrent of false messages masquerading as news and balanced opinion.

Dissemination depends not only on Russian-generated fake accounts and blogs but especially on non-Russian intermediary media and witting or unwitting agencies, NGOs, or bloggers that voluntarily forward the Russian narratives to local audiences.

Even high-ranking Chinese leaders are repeating the baseless claim that the US is sponsoring chemical and biological weapons factories in Ukraine.

Stephen Hoadley. Photo / Supplied

The credibility of even the most extreme messages – that Ukraine is a Nazi-led Nato proxy about to attack Russia with chemical and biological weapons, for example, or that the Mariupol maternity hospital destroyed by Russian shells was a military headquarters – is enhanced by volume, frequency, repetition, apparent variety of sources, and multiplication by proxies or algorithms.

Also, Russian agencies are unhampered by any commitment to truth, accuracy, or consistency, so can be first in the media or cyberspace with a simplified pro-Russian version of a complex new issue, gaining the "first impression" advantage over more conscientious but slower Western agencies, media, and fact-checkers.

Who believes Russian propaganda and why? Less-informed and marginalised groups and individuals, and some political leaders.

This includes New Zealand anti-vaxxers, according to The Disinformation Project.

It is easily consumed as a simplification of complex truths or a convenience to facilitate relations with Russia, as China appears to be doing.

Groups and individuals everywhere who blame their governing institutions for their misfortunes are especially susceptible to the Western decadence-decline-and-aggression trope emphasised by Russian overt and covert media.

Anti-West and opposition political leaders find Russian disinformation useful, as did the US Republican Party leaders, who used it to discredit Hilary Clinton in the 2016 election and to support Donald Trump in 2020.

Older Russians who remember the horrors of Nazi invasion, and who depend on state media, tend to support Putin's portrayal of the "military operation" in Ukraine. Putin's popularity has risen despite sanctions and protests.

Media specialists concur that confronting "hot" emotionally-anchored disinformation with "cool" official factual rebuttals is ineffective, at least in the short run. A 2018 RAND Corporation report urged Western governments to step up the frequency, appeal, and especially promptness of messaging and to tailor it to identifiable audiences.

Rallying the majority to governments' policies with appealing, credible, and sustainable information will be more legitimate and efficient than suppressing Russian propaganda channels or trying to shout down the distorted pro-Russian perceptions of anti-establishment minorities.

Western leaders must communicate better to counterbalance Russia's tendentious narratives.

• Stephen Hoadley is Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Auckland.