Russian President Vladimir Putin gestures during his annual state of the nation address in Moscow on February 21. Photo / AP
Russia has given Belarus a mobile ballistic missile system capable of carrying nuclear warheads. And they’ve parked them on their border with Poland.
“We defend the security of our allied state. Some of the Belarusian attack aircraft have acquired the ability to strike enemy targets with nuclear weapons,” Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced earlier this week.
The move came just days after Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened to deploy tactical nuclear weapons there in retaliation for the United Kingdom supplying Kyiv with depleted uranium ammunition.
Such Western aid to Ukraine “risks a significant expansion of the conflict”, Shoigu said.
Russian ambassador to Belarus, Boris Gryzlov, added that the Iskander M tactical ballistic missiles would be “moved up close to the Western border”, including Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.
It’s just the latest in a series of escalating nuclear threats since Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine in February last year. Belarus was the staging ground for a failed “rush” by Russian armoured divisions towards the capital, Kyiv, in the opening weeks of the war.
Keir Giles, an analyst at UK research institute Chatham House, says we can expect a steady stream of such threats.
“Fears of escalation to the point at which Russia may resort to nuclear use have constrained the willingness of Western governments to provide war-winning military support to Ukraine, and have shown Russia that nuclear threats – no matter how implausible – work,” he says.
But others argue the bluster is part of mounting evidence Putin is getting desperate.
“Putin’s announcement that Russia will station non-strategic nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil show Putin is searching for any distraction from his embarrassing failures in Ukraine – and any leverage he can get over a far more powerful West,” nuclear proliferation expert Austin Wright says.
Words without power
When Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the Russian leader in Moscow last month, the two publicly declared they would not deploy nuclear weapons beyond their own sovereign territory.
“All nuclear powers must not deploy their nuclear weapons beyond their national territories and must withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed abroad,” a joint communique said.
Weeks later, Moscow and Beijing’s “friendship without limits” is living up to its name.
Their joint declaration has already been discarded.
Now, Moscow has moved nuclear weapons outside Russia’s borders for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union. Putin claimed deploying the nuclear weapons did not violate international non-proliferation agreements, insisting there was “nothing unusual” about the move.
Both Putin and Lukashenko humiliated Xi . Remember, Luka was just treated to a fancy state visit to China. Xi just came to Moscow. Can’t imagine this decision is going down well in Beijing. https://t.co/lyGx93PeDJ
Shoigu, however, is blaming everything from Nato combat training to deliveries of advanced ammunition to Ukraine for the fresh bout of nuclear sabre-rattling.
However, depleted-uranium cannon shells and enriched-uranium warheads are not in the same league.
Depleted uranium has lost its damaging radiation, and the remaining alpha particles aren’t strong enough to penetrate human skin. But the material is helpful in armour-piercing ammunition for its density and strength.
Tactical nuclear warheads, on the other hand, are scaled-down versions of the radiological monsters carried by intercontinental ballistic missiles.
And Russia’s claim to have “given” Belarus nuclear weapons also seems deceptive.
Belarusian capital Minsk says Moscow is “deploying” its own weapons on Belarusian territory and that Belarus has no control over the Iskander missiles or their warheads.
Rocking the boat
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko late last year took to Russian television to offer his Kremlin-based benefactor “the opportunity to return nuclear weapons to Belarus”.
But one inconvenience first had to be removed.
It was unconstitutional for the former member of the Soviet Union to do so.
But Lukashenko quietly had his nation’s constitution amended in February this year.
“Belarus did not formally announce this change to its nuclear status when it posted the changes to the constitution on the presidential website,” observes International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) arms control expert William Alberque. “Indeed, as a deletion from the text, it was difficult to spot, because only the additions were highlighted.”
It’s significant, as it formalises what the world has already long known: Belarus is beholden to Russia.
“The changes also eliminate the country’s neutrality, which had been part of its strategic posture since the end of the Cold War,” Alberque says. “It is likely that the changes to the Belarusian constitution on neutrality and its nuclear-free status were made in exchange for Putin’s support for Lukashenko in a series of recent crises, including protests against his rule, the migration crisis Belarus fomented with its neighbours, the hijacking of a commercial airliner to arrest a dissident and the subsequent European Union sanctions.”
And speculation continues to mount as to whether or not Minsk will join the fight alongside its Moscow masters.
“Inviting Belarusian forces to participate in Russia’s failed conquest would not alter the outcome. It is unlikely Russia would gain any favourable outcomes from such events,” Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) analyst Mark Temnycky says.
While many analysts point to the failure of air power and the supremacy of drones over armour as the main lessons coming out of the defence of Ukraine, others argue it’s the power of nuclear threats that needs the closest examination.
“If Russia is allowed to achieve success in its war against Ukraine through nuclear intimidation, this validates the concept of nuclear coercion, not only for Moscow, but for other aggressive, assertive or rogue states around the world,” Giles writes.
“The inevitable result would be further nuclear destabilisation, accompanied by a probable renewed acceleration in proliferation. In this way, rather than being the safe course of action, being influenced by Russian nuclear threats could, in fact, be the greatest nuclear risk of all.”
Meanwhile, Belarus risks becoming trapped at the centre of a new Cold War crisis.
“While it’s reasonable to believe that Lukashenko will follow a rational path, he only has a certain amount of leeway,” Temnycky says. “Either way, the resulting uncertainty is useful to the Kremlin.”
But by repeatedly wielding the nuclear threat, Putin also risks losing influence.
“While Russia takes a hatchet to the nuclear treaties that have made us all safer, the West continues to explore different avenues of co-operation,” Wright argues in foreign policy. “With his actions, Putin has made it clear that Russia can no longer be considered a superpower.”
He adds: “Putin’s hypocrisy and the contradictions throughout his February speech point to the collapse of Russia’s own position as a superpower.”