I was in an office in Kabul being lectured by a mid-ranking official about the successful work of the Afghan Government.
"Completely off the record, what do you really think of this Government?" I asked him, not expecting a very interesting reply.
"So long as you promise not to reveal my identity, I can tell you that this Government is made up of killers and crooks," answered the official with scarcely a pause.
He gave some examples of Government-inspired killings and corruption.
In this tradition of carefully calculated treachery, the shooting dead of five British soldiers by an Afghan policeman operating with them is hardly surprising.
Afghan leaders have long been notorious for concealing their true loyalties and changing sides.
But the potential political consequences are very serious.
The US and British strategy to build up the Afghan security forces may prove impossible because the state is too weak, too poor, and commands the loyalty of too few.
The reputation of Afghans for always defeating their enemies is based in part on the speed with which they join the winner.
The Taleban advances in the 1990s were notable less for military victories than local warlords defecting to them after receiving a large bribe.
In the US war to overthrow the Taleban in 2001, the CIA bought off the same warlords who sent their men home without a fight.
US political leaders speak of a force of 240,000 soldiers and 160,000 police to be trained in the next few years.
In reality, though, nobody knows the current size of the Afghan security forces. The army is supposedly 90,000 strong, but this figure may be grossly over-stated.
"My educated guess is that such an army simply does not exist," writes Ann Jones, an American specialist on Afghanistan.
"I knew men who repeatedly went through ANA [Afghan National Army] training to get the promised Kalashnikov and the pay. Then they went home for a while and often returned some weeks later to enlist under a different name."
Senior policemen can make money through aiding drug smugglers. General Aminullah Amarkhail, the former head of security at Kabul Airport, who was sacked for his success in arresting heroin smugglers, says that jobs are bought and sold for large sums.
"You have to pay US$10,000 in bribes to get a job as a district police chief," he says, "and up to US$150,000 to get a job as chief of police anywhere on the border - because there you can make a lot of money."
- INDEPENDENT
Murder, bribery at the very top
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