Keeping the heat on Iraq

By RUPERT CORNWELL

The plans are on the President's desk. The variants are several, and no final, irrevocable decision has been taken by George W. Bush.

But there is every sign that Washington wants the seemingly inevitable Gulf War II to topple Saddam Hussein to be a nimbler, more focused and even fiercer enterprise than George Bush snr's 1991 campaign to drive him from Kuwait.

A spate of news reports in Washington at the weekend provided yet more details about what is surely the most heavily trailed, unprovoked attack by one nation on another in modern history.

"I am not saying there is no plan on the President's desk," Ari Fleischer, the White House spokesman, declared, confirming a report in the New York Times that General Tommy Franks, head of the US Central Command and the man who would run the campaign, had presented Bush with a detailed set of options for war.

The Washington Post followed up with a blend of leaks and highly informed speculation suggesting that the war would target Saddam's hometown stronghold of Tikrit, held to be the geographical and political intersection between the Iraqi leader, his most devoted and ruthless followers, and the chemical and biological weapons Iraq is said to possess.

Why so much information is emerging now, four months before the shooting is likely to start, is a separate tale. Part of the explanation is the competitive rivalry between the Post and the Times.

But leaks of military plans do not happen by accident. Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary, may fulminate about them in public with the straightest of faces, but they serve the Administration's purpose of keeping the heat on Saddam, convincing him that unless he bows to Washington's will, no amount of prevarication or finessing the Security Council will prevent the US from acting, even on its own.

The Administration hopes that a congressional resolution authorising the use of force can be adopted swiftly, despite Democratic objections. Meanwhile, a picture of a possible campaign steadily emerges.

Unlike the 1991 Gulf War, which was preceded by a six-month build-up, Gulf War II would be much more intense, aimed at decapitating the regime, neutralising Iraq's deadliest weaponry with as little "collateral damage" to civilians as possible.

It would involve fewer than the 250,000 troops first proposed, probably no more than 100,000, possibly as few as 50,000. It would be preceded by an aerial assault far fiercer than those in Kosovo or Afghanistan, destroying Iraqi command and control structures, presidential sites and bases of the Republican Guard, the most loyal element of Iraq's forces.

Simultaneously, commando units would go after the Scud missiles which a cornered Saddam might unleash against Israel in the hope of triggering a wider Middle East conflagration.

That risk has only grown after statements from Israeli ministers that, in contrast to its restraint when Iraq fired Scuds in 1991, Israel this time would retaliate in kind.

That in turn could provoke the wider Arab-Israeli war feared by the dwindling band of US politicians and analysts still urging caution on Bush.

Senator Joseph Biden, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned on television at the weekend that if Israel responded to an attack, no Muslim nation, including such crucial allies as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, could support the American effort against Iraq, even behind the scenes.

"And you would find probably every embassy in the Middle East burned to the ground before it went too far," he added.

To minimise the danger, speed is vital. All along, Rumsfeld has demanded that the planners devise a more unconventional and "creative" blueprint that would give the US tactical, if not strategic, surprise.

The idea which seems to have prevailed is something close to the "inside-out" concept which surfaced in midyear, calling for a blitzkrieg against a few key targets - first among them Tikrit and Baghdad.

The onslaught, it is calculated, would provoke the implosion of the regime and the swift collapse of resistance elsewhere in Iraq.

The US buildup could not pass entirely unobserved by the enemy. But the Washington Post suggested that any attack would be spearheaded by three divisions, two heavily armoured, one a more mobile US Marines unit, totalling about 50,000 men.

A similar-sized force would be held in reserve, to be rushed in as reinforcements if needed.

Other factors, too, work for surprise. A number of US troops have been moved quietly to the Gulf region, others are joining them for "exercises". US strength there may already be 20,000, some observers believe.

Moreover, large quantities of equipment have long been positioned around Iraq. And for all their public opposition to an attack, Jordan and conceivably even Saudi Arabia would turn a blind eye to low-profile commando operations launched from their territories to take out key targets and hunt Scud missiles.

The finishing touches are being put to these plans even as, in New York, Washington and London, US and British officials pursue the parallel diplomatic track, trying to persuade Russia, France and China not to block a new Security Council resolution demanding unfettered access for UN weapons inspectors and setting a deadline for Iraq to comply.

Whether that resolution, or a subsequent one, would contain an explicit warning that the alternative is force is far from clear. In truth, however, debate is quickly becoming superfluous. Saddam declared at the weekend that he would reject any new UN resolution, and his aides hint ominously that the infamous presidential palaces and other "sovereign sites" will remain covered by existing agreements effectively ruling out surprise inspections.

Bush, meanwhile, insists that the US will go it alone, if necessary, to enforce total compliance. His Secretary of State, Colin Powell, warned last week that if UN weapons inspectors were moved back to Iraq under the existing agreements, the US "would find ways to thwart that".

Room for compromise has all but vanished. The assumption is that Bush wants the decks cleared for action by February, or March at the latest, when cooler weather makes it easier for troops to fight in the cumbersome gear protecting them against germ and chemical weapons.

But even though Iraq's forces are weaker than in 1991, and those of the US even better armed today, Franks knows that few military plans survive the start of the fighting.

"We are prepared to do whatever we are asked to do," the general said after visiting US troops in Kuwait.

But he has no more idea than anyone else whether Saddam already has his biological and chemical weapons ready for use (maybe even pre-emptively, to use the vogue phrase).

He cannot judge how hard Saddam's best troops will fight, or whether ordinary Iraqis really would embrace the invaders as liberators, as US hawks believe.

If they do, then the fighting, according to planners quoted by the Post, could be over in a week.

If not, the US could find itself locked in a protracted and bloody battle for Baghdad, damned in the court of world opinion, helpless as whatever grand design it has for post-Saddam Iraq crumbles.

All the plans and all the leaks in the world cannot cover such contingencies.

Further reading
Feature: War with Iraq

Iraq links and resources