Iraq was in US sights even before September 11

By MARY DEJEVSKY in London

How the United States Administration moved, after September 11, 2001, from its pledge to hunt down Osama bin Laden "dead or alive" to launching all-out war on Iraq is one of the imponderables of international diplomacy.

But according to new inside accounts, the rout of the Taleban in Afghanistan was less a prelude to the war on Iraq than a temporary distraction from it.

George W. Bush arrived at the White House with Iraq already in his sights.

The US Congress had set "regime change" in Iraq as an objective of American policy, but former President Bill Clinton had neither the inclination nor the opportunity to act upon it. He spent the last months of his presidency in a vain attempt to bring peace to the Middle East.

Mr Bush, who came to office with an "ABC" policy ("anything but Clinton"), wanted as little as possible to do with the Middle East, where he saw the chances of progress as negligible.

Iraq, on the other hand, became a pre-occupation. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon confirmed Mr Bush's view that the greatest threat to the United States was where terrorists and a "rogue" regime come together. Iraq was back in the frame.

When British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited Washington just days after September 11, he found Mr Bush determined to strike not only al Qaeda, which was known to have its main bases in Afghanistan, but Iraq as well.

Mr Bush was persuaded that Afghanistan should be tackled first and only then should planning turn to Iraq. Consequently, after the Taleban was overthrown, the Administration's attention turned back to Iraq.

The White House was divided over the wisdom of seeking international support for this venture, but by last August Mr Bush had decided to take the United Nations route.

The one remaining question was whether he should call formally for a UN resolution that authorised the eventual use of force - and then whether there should be just one resolution, which would automatically trigger an armed response, or two.



Mr Bush makes his decisions, it emerges, rather like a diner contemplating a sushi restaurant conveyor belt. He watches as the various options are paraded before him, then he grabs one that matches his overall view, and another, and perhaps another, even if they are not necessarily compatible.

When he addressed the UN last September 12, it was the 28th draft of his speech. But the crucial sentence, relating to the resolution, was missing from the text in his autocue.

Knowing that it should be there, Mr Bush improvised, with one crucial error. He called for "UN resolutions" in the plural.

What seemed like a tiny distinction later took on huge significance in negotiating the resolution that became No 1441. France and Russia insisted on two resolutions: one to return the weapons inspectors, and the second to authorise military action.

That same dispute, essentially, is what scuppered UN diplomacy this week.

- INDEPENDENT

Herald Feature: Iraq