Peter Thompson: Another coup with a hidden agenda

A Thai soldier climbs a tank in Bangkok during the military coup. Picture / Reuters

News of the first military coup in Thailand this millennium will have come as a shock to many people who thought such events had been consigned to history.

The "Reform Group under the Democratic System with the King as Head of State", led by army chief General Sonthi Boonyaatglin, has taken control of the Cabinet, the House of Representatives, the Senate and the Constitutional Court.

The caretaker Government of Thaksin Shinawatra has been ousted.

It has been 14 years since the 1991-92 coup saw dozens of unarmed pro-democracy protesters gunned down in Bangkok by the forces of General Suchinda Krapayoon.

"Black May" became a dark chapter in Thailand's history and a hard lesson in why the ballot box was preferable to the bullet.

There is no blood flowing in the streets this time - at least not yet. But these latest events exhibit some striking parallels.

It is important to understand that in Thailand the military has traditionally had close-knit relationships with business interests and political factions. It owns two national TV networks, among other media interests.

The military is therefore far less insulated from the other spheres of Thai society than one would expect - or tolerate - in a Western country.

Thailand averaged a military coup every three and a half years between 1932 and 1991, and despite the obligatory rhetoric about saving King and Country, the ulterior motives are rarely quite so noble.

Both the coup in 1991 and the current one are linked to telecommunications. In 1991, a military coup (led by Generals Sunthorn Kongsompong and Suchinda Krapayoon) ousted Prime Minister Chatchai Choonhavan - ostensibly to remove a corrupt and unpopular administration.

A key motivating factor was the sidelining of military's business interests in the awards of concessions/licences for telecommunication sector developments.

The coup in 1991, like this one, was bloodless and the generals promised to return power to the people after restoring political order.

At first, it was just another hiccup. But a political crisis ensued when General Suchinda, after promising not to take up office, assumed the role of Prime Minister following a dubious, military-run election.

This rekindled memories of the military dictatorships of the 1970s when many student democracy activists were murdered in crackdowns. Now part of the middle class, many former students, took to the streets once more to demand democracy.

Despite the military's blanket media censorship, the English language press continued to publish and protesters with cellphones and video camera managed to get footage of the carnage out to the world media .

In 1992 King Bhumibol eventually intervened and summoned Suchinda and the pro-democracy leader Chamlong Srimuang to the palace to defuse the situation. Suchinda stepped down and allowed elections.

Although subsequent governments have often been fractious, somewhat corrupt and elected into office courtesy of routine vote-buying in the rural provinces, the military's image has remained severely tarnished.

Its bloody intervention in politics had been so widely condemned it seemed inconceivable that the military would ever be able to interfere in the political process again. Until now.

The career of the now ousted Thaksin Shinawatra and the timely expansion of his business interests into telecommunications and broadcasting in the early 1990s saw Shinawatra Corp grow into a major corporation, responsible for developing Thailand's "Thaicom" satellite infrastructure, and pay TV and mobile phone services.

He entered politics in the mid-1990s initially through a highly irregular appointment as (unelected) foreign minister under the Chavalit administration.

Thaksin portrayed himself as one of the new breed of "clean", hi-tech businessman, helping bring corporate acumen to the Thai Government.

He then joined the clean-image Palang Dhamma party, headed by the ascetic leader of the 1991 pro-democracy protests, Chamlong.

He eventually formed his own political party Thai Rak Thai (Thais love Thais). Offering to rebuild Thailand's economic prosperity following the economic collapse of the late 1990s and weak economy of the early 2000s, Thai Rak Thai managed something unprecedented in Thai politics.

In 2001 it secured a majority in parliament without the need to include half a dozen other parties in coalition.

Although coalition governments had been short-lived and prone to acrimonious dissolution, they also served as a check on any Prime Minister who became overly corrupt.

Thaksin's economic policies were criticised among the educated urban classes for being expedient to his own business interests. In 2001 he narrowly avoided being convicted over an asset-concealment scandal.

Thaksin's increasingly autocratic style led him to make two moves which probably led to his downfall.

Firstly, he sanctioned crackdowns on the Islamic separatists in the south which saw hundreds killed and only served to inflame tensions. This also did little to endear him to the military, including General Sonthi.

Secondly, the increasingly convenient alignment between his economic policies and his own corporate interests led him to try to rationalise policy developments favourable to Shinawatra Corp's satellite and telecommunication business as a matter of national interest.

Despite winning a second victory in 2005, Thaksin was increasingly implicated in rumours about interference in political, judicial and religious matters, and critics, including Sonthi, suggested his ambitions put him in opposition to the King. Thaksin's fatal move came in January this year.

After ushering in a new law changing the proportion of shares foreign interests could hold in Thai companies, Thaksin promptly sold off his family's shares in Shinawatra Corp, transferring control of Thailand's satellite infrastructure to a Singaporean state corporation (Temasek) and pocketing billions of baht, tax free.

He claimed to be responding to criticism that his business empire constituted a conflict of interest with his political office. But Thaksin's strategic conflation of his private business interests with the national interest now worked against him.

There was public outrage over the Shinawatra Corp sale, and he was accused of selling the country's "family silver".

After a series of mass anti-Thaksin rallies, organised by the People's Alliance for Democracy (led by Chamlong), Thaksin held a snap election in April to try to regain legitimacy. However, the opposition parties, anticipating the Thai Rak Thai party could buy sufficient votes in the rural provinces to secure another victory, took the unprecedented move of boycotting the election.

Although Thaksin won a majority of the overall vote, some seats failed to secure the minimum quorum of votes, leaving the House of Representatives without its full complement.

The Constitutional Court declared the election void, and thrust the Thai state into political vacuum.

Thaksin was left nominally in charge of a caretaker Government, but recognising his untenable position, he stepped down as Prime Minister and declared he would not contest the next election, scheduled for next month.

With a politically discredited Thaksin, an impotent Government, and still-simmering tensions in the south, the military were provided with the space to act.

It seems that many Thai people are happy to see Thaksin removed, and General Sonthi's actions and assurances that democracy will be restored have now been put beyond public reproach by an unprecedented statement of endorsement from the King.

But misgivings must remain about the manner in which this has been expedited.

On the one hand, Thaksin may have used his financial muscle to win office, and used it to further his interests. In rejecting him, the Thai people have made a crucial distinction between governance on behalf of private capital and governance on behalf of the people.

But on the other hand, the military are involved in an action many people must have dearly hoped they would never see again - and questions must be asked about their ulterior motives.

Despite the ostensible royal nod of approval, Sonthi's reassurances about restoring power to the people are not dissimilar to the rhetoric in 1991-92.

The removal of Thaksin also echoes that of Chatchai for another reason. Both administrations threatened to undermine the traditional power-brokers in the Thai polity, and although the military may have changed its stripes, old connections have not entirely disappeared.

The coup may be bloodless, but that was also the case in 1991-92 - until transition of power negotiations.

However, Sonthi surely does not intend to risk another Black May, and his aim is unlikely to extend to assuming office himself.

It seems probable the military aspires to re-establish its legitimacy and central role in society.

And despite Thaksin's unpopularity, it is hard to see how rehabilitating the military's presence in and in proximity to Thai political processes is anything other than dangerous.

An abandonment of faith in the ballot box in favour of a return to military intervention reveals the fragility of a democratic system prone to subversion by the rich and powerful.

* Peter Thompson lectures in international communication at Unitec. He worked in Thailand from 1992-1997, researching Thai media politics. Research assistance by Glen Lewis.