KEY POINTS:
Barring some unanticipated event, Barack Obama is set to become the 44th President of the United States.
The thirst for change is so strong among the American electorate that voters cannot do otherwise but give this agent of change a chance. However, trouble looms on the horizon, specifically in the area of foreign affairs and international relations, and its presence will be felt early in the Obama presidency. The precipitant could come from an adversary (Iran or Venezuela), from a former and potentially future rival (China or Russia), or from an ally (Israel, Pakistan or Taiwan). If he overreacts and worsens the crisis, he might involve the US in a conflict far bigger than anticipated. Coming on the heels of the George W. Bush Administration, such a debacle could spell the death knell for America's use of hard power in the future.
Yet if Obama underreacts to a crisis, he will appear soft and indecisive, which will embolden adversaries and force allies to strike out on their own or find new alliance relationships to overcome the perceived weaknesses of his administration.
There are precedents to suggest that an inexperienced president will be evaluated early in his tenure by foreign actors.
John F. Kennedy had the Cuban Missile Crisis; Bill Clinton had Somalia and Serbia; George W. Bush had 9/11. The common denominator was that none of these Presidents had a proven track record in foreign affairs before their inauguration.
Obama has sounded off against free trade agreements in order to court domestic constituencies. He has railed against Chinese dominance in the US consumer market and called for measures to stop the export of US jobs. This puts him at odds with Senator McCain and leading sectors of the US business community as well as foreign trading partners such as New Zealand. He will therefore have to reverse the US's commitment to free trade, or betray his protectionist promises and abandon his working class supporters once in office.
The same is true for Obama's stance on Israel. He claims that he will break the deadlock in US Middle Eastern policy by taking a fresh critical look at its relationship with Israel, but then pledges that his administration will never do anything to compromise the special bond that the US has with the Jewish state. He promises to address the Palestinians as full partners in the peace process, then speaks of a unified Jerusalem, contradicting the Palestinian stance on the sacred city. He cannot have it both ways. He will have to backtrack on at least one of his promises which augurs poorly for the prospects of real change in the status quo.
Senator Obama, like so many others, speaks of eliminating oil dependency. Yet he opposes offshore and land-based drilling in the US. Although the Saudis, Kuwaitis and various smaller Emirates understand that election rhetoric destined for domestic consumption does not mean a shift in ongoing relations, it does mean that continuance of these relations could have negative domestic repercussions down the road.
Then there is his proposal of entering a dialogue with adversaries like President Ahmadinejad of Iran and the Castro brothers in Cuba. But what happens if the other side makes public demands or forces ultimatums? Does Obama back down and disengage? That would make the whole exercise seem futile and counter-productive. Does he ratchet up the confrontation because he was upstaged? That would be impolitic and provocative.
Two other factors enter into the troublesome foreign policy equation for an Obama presidency. His foreign policy team is largely made up of Clinton Administration retreads. Although advocates of soft power, human rights, democracy and multilateralism, they were often outflanked or outwitted by foreign actors bent on their own contrary objectives. Having them as Obama's foreign policy team might well leave foreign adversaries salivating at the prospect of staging an early-tenure crisis.
Over-reliance on the military because of the failure of "soft" power or multinational approaches makes the president and his foreign policy advisers beholden to the uniformed command. Obama's limited and tenuous relationship with the US armed forces means that he assumes office having to establish a rapport with the military leadership before asking them to fulfil their obligations to the country and constitution. Obama's refusal to recognise that the so-called "surge" strategy has borne fruit in reducing levels of violence and promoting indigenous political solutions to post-invasion nation-building efforts in Iraq only complicates the picture. This leaves the possibility that the military will obey his commands, but that does not mean that it consents to his authority.
All of which is to say that contrary to the hopes of many inside and outside of the US, an Obama presidency will not necessarily bring with it an immediate change to more positive international relations. The way he handles his first policy crisis will determine whether that becomes fact or fantasy.
* Paul Buchanan is a former US Defence Department analyst and consultant who writes about comparative and international politics.
