KEY POINTS:
Few would argue that 2006 was a vintage year for world affairs. Everywhere intractable problems took a turn for the worse, whether it was Israel's deteriorating relations with the Palestinians and its neighbours in Lebanon or the international community's seeming inability to stem Iran and North Korea's remorseless march towards acquiring nuclear weapons.
People in the Middle East tend to view the central problem as the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians. Solve this one, the assumption goes, and everything else, from Baghdad to Kabul, will fall into place.
Western generations of the late 20th century generally shared this perspective, which is why so much time and effort has been spared for the "peace process" and the "road map to peace" even though neither has ever come close to its objective.
For the time being at least, there is a slightly different perspective in Western eyes; finding a solution to the crisis in post-Saddam Iraq is regarded as the number one priority for 2007 and beyond. Even in Washington this seems to have been belatedly recognised with President George W. Bush himself admitting that America is not winning and promising a new way forward.
Although he has yet to say what that might be, he has had plenty of advice. Regrettably, the outlook is not good partly because of the nature of the advice and partly because of the President's historic reluctance to face the realities.
One suggestion, clearly under consideration, comes from the Iraq Study Group, chaired by former secretary of state James Baker, which argues the US should boost its troop numbers in the short term to train enough Iraqi forces to enable it to withdraw all combat forces by early 2008. This would "encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own destiny".
It sounds reassuring, but it is nothing less than an updated version of the Vietnamisation policy of the early 1970s which enabled Washington to disengage from its disastrous misadventure in Indochina. The ultimate consequence of that policy was communist North Vietnam's conquest of the south.
Applying this lesson to Iraq in 2007, therefore, points to only one conclusion, namely the ultimate collapse of American policy. Yet it is far from inconceivable that a President in the dying stages of his term of office might grasp at this straw to extricate himself from an unholy mess entirely of his own making. If so the consequences for the immediate region and the world at large would be grave indeed.
No countries would have more to lose in the short term than Iraq's immediate neighbours, Syria and Iran, which is why the Baker group also argued forcefully for a diplomatic effort on Iraq to include these two.
Of all the potential policies, this one has the greatest chance of success. Despite the many, deep differences they have with the US, it is clearly in Syria and Iran's interests to help. As the Baker group pointed out, "no country in the region will benefit in the long term from a chaotic Iraq".
Unfortunately this is the course of action least likely for the Bush White House. Not only does it have a long track record of trying to solve international problems on its own - which is how it got into this mess in the first place - but it refuses to have anything to do with Iran until Tehran toes the line on nuclear policy.
Thus it is hard to discern any glimmer of hope in the New Year. On the contrary, with one intractable international problem impinging on another, all the portents point to an even more difficult year ahead. Things are likely to get worse before there's a chance they might get better.
