Editorial: US must show it has learned from Vietnam

Opinion

As Americans' support for the war in Afghanistan declines, many are drawing comparisons with their country's entrapment in Vietnam. On one aspect they have a point. The United States' involvement in Vietnam was blighted by corrupt and illegitimate partners in Saigon. These regimes never enjoyed widespread support among the South Vietnamese and were deplored by the international community. In time, it became impossible to justify the loss of American lives to prop them up. Now a similar situation must be avoided in Kabul, after the decision of United Nations-backed fraud investigators to throw out nearly a third of President Hamid Karzai's votes from Afghanistan's disputed elections.

That setback came at a particularly difficult time. President Barack Obama is considering a request from General Stanley McChrystal to send 40,000 extra troops to Afghanistan to combat an increasingly aggressive Taleban. His decision will be pivotal to the outcome of a struggle that more people in the US and Europe not only oppose but regard as unwinnable. Evidence of a turn of the tide must be produced quite quickly if that sentiment is to be reversed. Crucial to that will be the standing of a Government whose image was further degraded by August's sham election.

This is why President Obama has declared no decision on sending troop reinforcements would be made until the election crisis is resolved. Afghanistan must have a legitimate and credible Government before further support is provided. It is also why, no matter the inconvenience, the White House insisted Mr Karzai agree to an election run-off with his chief rival, former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, on November 7.

Strictly speaking, there was no choice once Mr Karzai's tally of the August election vote had been cut to below the 50 per cent he needed for an outright win. But a new poll even in such quick order - necessary to beat the onset of winter snow - creates further delays in arriving at a legitimate Government, and raises the issue of whether President Obama can afford to wait before announcing a new strategy. In reality, he has little option. The sending of further troops must be conditional on the presence of a credible partner in Kabul.

One way of accelerating matters that may still be pursued is a power-sharing agreement between Mr Karzai and Dr Abdullah. It has some appeal although the enmity between the two men will only have been hardened by the way in which Mr Karzai's camp sought to steal the election through voter coercion and ballot-box stuffing. A unity Government is also likely to be ineffective, and there would be an unsightly spectacle if it were to come apart at the seams.

The hastily arranged run-off may not deliver what many in the West would consider true democracy. The August election was notable not only for massive fraud but for fewer than half the eligible voters going to polling stations. Four years earlier, the turnout was 70 per cent. The run-off could also be tainted by a low turnout, further vote rigging and intimidation. But the West's ambitions in Afghanistan have diminished. The Taleban was ousted mainly to deny a haven to al Qaeda. That aim remains valid. Democracy was always a secondary objective, and it has become less significant as the Taleban resurgence has gathered pace.

Many Afghans are undoubtedly disillusioned by a process that has delivered only corrupt and ineffectual government. Mr Karzai's likely victory in the run-off will do little to cure their disenchantment. But his Administration seems likely to possess enough legitimacy to allow the US and its allies to retain or expand troop numbers in Afghanistan. Whatever the many doubts, that, at least, would be a step forward from Vietnam.