Editorial: US general's strategy still makes sense

Opinion

Tensions between generals in the field and their civilian masters are a fact of life. Armed forces chiefs are able to focus solely on battlefield strategy and having the necessary manpower and resources.

The purview of politicians must be wider, not least in considering the popular appetite for war.

Not surprisingly, generals often become impatient at what they consider interference in the prosecution of a war. In moments of candour, they might convey their annoyance to well-trusted aides. Otherwise, they keep their counsel.

They know that if such sentiments become public knowledge, their position becomes untenable. Such is now the case with General Stanley McChrystal, the United States commander in Afghanistan.

General McChrystal's frustrations are detailed in a Rolling Stone article, in which he and his military aides mock President Barack Obama and his top advisers.

The general makes belittling comments about Vice-President Joe Biden and the US special envoy to Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, and aides say he was unimpressed with President Obama.

If this was a deliberate attempt by General McChrystal to get a message across, it was badly misguided. He has admitted as much in confessing he was guilty of "poor judgment".

Such a misstep also suggests he may have succumbed to the sort of vaingloriousness that sometimes afflicts military leaders in outposts. That fate befell General Douglas MacArthur in postwar Japan before President Harry Truman relieved him of his Far East command in 1951.

President Obama is said to have become angry when he saw the Rolling Stone article. He had good reason. For the most part, he has provided strong support for General McChrystal since appointing him to replace the axed General David McKiernan in Kabul a year ago.

This included largely backing the request for a troop "surge", so a sharp campaign of counter-insurgency, such as worked in Iraq, could be mounted.

President Obama is also aware that this episode comes at a particularly bad time. Britain has just suffered its 300th fatality in the nine-year war, and its special envoy to Afghanistan, Sherard Cowper-Coles, is on extended leave after rifts with US diplomats.

There has also been an increase in Australian casualties and that country, like America's European allies, is increasingly questioning its commitment. This documenting of American disarray can only increase their unease.

General McChrystal's blunder is the more unfortunate in that his strategy is the best chance of achieving a stability in Afghanistan that will pave the way for an orderly exit.

His approach has eschewed lofty goals, such as embedding a model democracy, and concentrated on "Afghanising" the conflict through the rapid training and arming of Kabul's forces.

He also understands the importance of gaining a settlement with more pragmatic elements of the Taleban, thereby creating a political consensus. The present "surge", which has achieved mixed results, is an attempt to accelerate that outcome.

The eminent sense in General McChrystal's strategy means he has not been without his defenders. One of the more interesting was the much-maligned Afghan President.

A spokesman for Hamid Karzai said he believes General McChrystal is "the best commander the United States has sent to Afghanistan over the last nine years".

No convincing alternative approach for safeguarding Western security interests in the region has been advanced. The current strategy must, therefore, be pursued. Anything else will surely derail President Obama's July next year deadline for the start of troop withdrawals.