KEY POINTS:
Whatever his public utterances, President George W. Bush's inclination will be to take little notice of the report of the Iraq Study Group. How can it be otherwise when its conclusions so brutally discredit his policies in Iraq and the Middle East? The group has seen straight through the White House's deluded concept of victory to a "grave and deteriorating" situation. And however much President Bush rails, he will not be able to undermine the tone this documents sets for the United States' future policy in, and disengagement from, Iraq.
There are several reasons for this. First, this is a cross-party report that echoes the misgivings of the American people, as expressed in the mid-term congressional elections. Second, it provides the groundwork for a US-initiated response, not one orchestrated by its adversaries in the Middle East. Finally, it is a reasonably cogent, if not flawless, statement.
The nub of the study group's conclusions is that the US should start withdrawing its combat forces and devote itself to training Iraqi forces, while beginning a diplomatic push, including Iran and Syria, to deal with the problems in Iraq and the region.
The group's conclusions are as important for what they rule out as for what they propose. A large-scale build-up of US troops in Iraq, considered, probably accurately, by many in the military as the only way to win the war, is now impossible. Instead, it will be up to Iraq's security forces, advised by American troops, to prevail. The flaw there is that the Iraqis have shown little sign of being capable of assuming responsibility and stopping the bloodshed. Equally problematic is the recommendation that continuing US support should be based on Iraqi progress on national reconciliation, security and governance. The weakness of Nouri Maliki's Government, its reliance on US backing, and the shortage of options make this seem an empty threat.
In many ways, what is being proposed amounts to a Vietnamisation of American policy. It is not difficult to see the vast majority of US troops being withdrawn quickly if the situation continues to deteriorate. In that event, Iraq will come to be mentioned in the same breath as Vietnam as an American foreign policy disaster. The country itself will probably not exist, having fractured along sectarian lines.
Ways of avoiding this must include closing the rifts among the Iraqi people. Therein lies the importance of the second plank of the study group's conclusions - negotiating with Iran and Syria. It is a recommendation President Bush will find particularly hard to stomach. Already, the White House has ruled out one-on-one talks with Tehran unless Iran suspends nuclear activities. This is not only arrogant, but ignores successes such as that involving Libya's Colonel Gaddafi as well as the lessons of the nuclear dispute with North Korea. It also disregards Iran's much-increased regional sway and the fact that its Shiite leaders might see gain in a strongly united but Shiite-dominated Iraq.
President Bush needs to see the intertwining nature of the study group's recommendations if he wishes to salvage America's power to influence events, and his own reputation. Nothing will be solved unless the US talks to its adversaries. If he refuses to do that, he will become increasingly isolated, and the slender chance of stabilising Iraq will vanish. With his own policy in tatters, this is advice the President must heed. Expect him to do so, grudgingly.
