Editorial: Power-sharing the answer for Afghanistan

The best-possible interpretations are being applied as developments in Afghanistan begin increasingly to resemble a very bad dream. According to United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the decision by presidential challenger Abdullah Abdullah not to participate in next weekend's runoff election is not "unprecedented" and will not affect the legitimacy of the vote. David Axelrod, a senior adviser to President Barack Obama, says most polls show Dr Abdullah would have lost anyway, "so we are going to deal with the government that is there". Both statements represent a flight from the reality of the US being consigned to work for the next five years with a discredited, corrupt and unpopular Kabul administration. In one step, Afghanistan has begun to look much more like Vietnam.

It is hardly surprising that Dr Abdullah withdrew from the runoff. Last week, an election monitor reported that Hamid Karzai's Government had begun fixing the poll. A repeat of the August election, which saw massive voter coercion and ballot-box stuffing on behalf of Mr Karzai, seemed highly probable. United Nations-backed fraud investigators threw out nearly a third of the President's votes, reducing his tally to 48 per cent and necessitating a runoff. Dr Abdullah had, quite reasonably, sought the sacking of the chief electoral organiser and closer scrutiny of polling and counting. His conditions were not met. Nor was a UN request for fewer, better-observed polling stations.

The runoff may still be held in an attempt to manufacture a veneer of credibility for Mr Karzai's second term. But by any yardstick a poll with just one candidate is a farce, and will be recognised as such worldwide. And that creates still bigger problems for Mr Obama as he ponders a request from General Stanley McChrystal to send an extra 40,000 troops to Afghanistan to combat an increasingly assertive Taleban. The President has insisted that such support would be provided only to a government whose legitimacy and democratic mandate was unquestioned. This condition is now unlikely to be met.

The one sliver of light for the White House was Dr Abdullah's decision not to tell his supporters to "boycott" the runoff. That was taken as confirmation that he was open to further talks on a power-sharing agreement with Mr Karzai. Negotiations to form a unity government have been held. They appear to have broken down over Mr Karzai's refusal to accept a formula for dividing Cabinet posts. Pressure must be applied to make him recognise that power-sharing would be the best outcome for Afghanistan, even if in the short term it means a loss of some of his authority. Dr Abdullah has garnered considerable respect in the past few weeks, not least for urging his supporters away from violence, and, now, for stepping away from what had all the appearances of a sham poll.

A more broadly based and less corrupt Kabul government, backed by an increased American military presence, might just provide an effective counter to the Taleban threat. A second term of the Karzai Government would be dogged by a head of state lacking acceptance and credibility at home and abroad. There would be only uncertainty. This is not a scenario that President Obama can relish as he considers a decision that will be pivotal to the outcome of the conflict.

He knows parallels with the unpopular Vietnam War, during which the US propped up several illegitimate regimes, are being made increasingly. A repeat of that experience is unthinkable. A unity government in Kabul may not work and is certainly not the ideal solution in the long term. But it is now essential to deliver some legitimacy to the struggle against the Taleban.