Editorial: Outlook dire after Lebanon

The gaps and potential glitches in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 suggest it will deliver only the most brittle of truces to Lebanon. Viewing it as the harbinger of a lasting settlement is to disregard the odds stacked against it. Nonetheless, it marks a significant juncture in Middle East politics, and the occasion to assess the ramifications of the month-long conflict. Three things are immediately apparent: Israel has lost far more than it has gained; Hizbollah has strengthened its hand; and the outlook in the Middle East has rarely been so dire.

The war was, first and foremost, an unprecedented setback for the Israeli Defence Force. Its plans to eradicate Hizbollah's military capability, first by air strikes and then, during the final days of the fighting, through a concentrated ground operation, failed. The Israelis made the mistake of underestimating Hizbollah. Missiles, even if mainly antiquated Katyushas, kept falling on northern Israel, and the Israeli Army struck stern resistance when its broad intervention was finally sanctioned.

That failure spelled severe problems for the Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert. A career politician keen to prove his spurs in matters military, he initially appeared stern and unyielding in the face of widespread international condemnation. But as a strategy based on aerial bombardment faltered, he vacillated. Only belatedly did a massive ground invasion begin.

Mr Olmert's unease was the trigger for the re-emergence of the hawkish Opposition Likud Party leader Benjamin Netanyahu. His was the voice that, increasingly, rallied Israelis. Mr Netanyahu, soundly defeated in the general election this year, is now poised to challenge Mr Olmert's hold on power.

Hizbollah, for its part, not only survived Israel's assault but gained kudos from some Christian, as well as Muslim, Lebanese in the process. The UN resolution imposes an embargo on the delivery of weapons to it, but enforcing this will be all but impossible. Hizbollah's governance structures, including welfare agencies and the like, are also largely intact. As with Hamas, its civil branch is building a reputation for efficiency and probity in a region where such characteristics are often in short supply.

Hizbollah's future lies ultimately in the hands of the Lebanese people. It may be embraced as a nationalistic cause, or, in a calmer climate, it may be shunned as the catalyst for death and destruction. Certainly, Israel's bombing of civilians delayed the onset of an equanimity that would shape the latter response.

In this year's general election, Hizbollah's strength was confined largely to Shiite-based southern Lebanon. But its voice in the national assembly will now have added resonance. The next election is not scheduled until 2011, but a potential long-term scenario would see Israel confronted by legitimately elected Hamas and Hizbollah-influenced governments.

In the short term, Israel must ponder a loosely worded ceasefire agreement, in which even the disarming of Hizbollah fighters is not spelled out, and the degree to which its ambitions have come unstuck. Rather than delivering a decisive blow against Hizbollah, and its Iranian and Syrian backers, it has promoted instability. One casualty will be Mr Olmert's plan for a peace settlement based on Israel unilaterally setting its final border. That would involve the resettlement of 80,000 Israelis. The Prime Minister is now in no position to grant Mr Netanyahu the ammunition of another enforced withdrawal of settlers.

The international community's focus will be on a negotiated peace settlement. But standing in the way is a more strident Israel and adversaries emboldened by Hizbollah's struggle. Therein lies the ultimate casualty of the Lebanon conflict.