Editorial: Let's help get the best for Afghanistan

The Government's inclination will be to send Special Air Service troops to Afghanistan for a fourth tour of duty, as requested by the United States Secretary of State. First, though, it is taking time to ponder the potential pitfalls. These include calls on the Army closer to home, the possibility of becoming ensnared in an unwinnable war, and the very real prospect of casualties. Having considered these, it should follow its instinct. The motives that spurred an array of nations to join the United States in 2001 to oust al Qaeda and its protector, the Taleban, from Afghanistan remain. New Zealand, now as then, should be involved.

The Prime Minister is predicating the SAS's return on the existence of an "exit strategy". That is a reference to President Barack Obama's plan to replicate the US approach in Iraq, where a surge in troop numbers has stabilised matters sufficiently for a measured pullout to take place. To that end, the SAS deployment would be part of a strategy that sees the US sending an additional 17,000 troops to reinforce the 70,000-strong international contingent in Afghanistan.

That increased military power will be accompanied by direct talks between US commanders and members of the Taleban to try to persuade them to abandon their struggle and join local militias. The US hopes this new approach will extinguish the Taleban threat. If successful, it will allow the international forces to exit with their heads held high, rather than in humiliation. Nobody should imagine, however, that it will leave Afghanistan in the state envisaged in 2001, when it seemed ripe for reconstruction and democracy after its liberation from Taleban fundamentalism.

The strategy will do nothing to break the power of the warlords and militia leaders, who continue to wield significant power. Indeed, neutralisation of their opponents, the Taleban, would only strengthen their hand. This would make matters even more difficult for the Afghan Government, which has limited authority outside Kabul. Equally, it does not help perceptions of President Hamid Karzai that his Administration is being sidelined as the US negotiates with the Taleban. As much as anything, that exclusion signals American impatience with Mr Karzai's failure to govern effectively, especially the absence of a meaningful crackdown on corruption. Pointedly, the US is supporting no candidate in presidential elections scheduled for August 20.

A best-case exit strategy would, therefore, see the Taleban rendered inoperative in Afghanistan, if not in Pakistan, warlords ruling vast tracts of country, and an ill-equipped Government in Kabul unable to offer coherent administration in what is one of the world's poorest nations. Much of the blame for this doleful prospect can be sheeted home to President George W. Bush, who squandered a golden opportunity to reconstruct Afghanistan by becoming distracted by Iraq. It was Afghanistan that provided the haven for the al Qaeda terrorists who plotted the September 11 attacks, but it was Iraq that, by dint of monumental miscalculation, became his focus in the war on terror. In Afghanistan, military, redevelopment and political issues were allowed to drift.

Over the past three years, the Taleban has gathered strength and come back to haunt the international community. If there is no concerted effort to remove the threat posed by the fundamentalists, Afghanistan will again become a bolt-hole for terrorists. The opportunity to transform it into a prosperous, functioning democracy has been missed. Now, second best will have to suffice. It is in this country's interests to help deliver the best outcome possible.