KEY POINTS:
Never has the myopia afflicting American policy in Iraq been more apparent than in the aftermath of the sentencing to death of Saddam Hussein. President George W. Bush declared it "a milestone in the Iraqi people's efforts to replace the rules of a tyrant with the rule of law". Never mind that the trial has been widely criticised as falling well outside the bounds of acceptable jurisprudence. Even more astonishingly, the United States ambassador in Baghdad, Zalmay Khalilzad, said "closing the book" on Saddam and his regime gave Iraqis a chance to unite. That opportunity disappeared some time ago.
Hanging Saddam for war crimes will only exacerbate the differences that have thrown Iraq into turmoil. This was indicated by the reaction to the verdict of the US-sponsored court. Shiites and Kurds, who were oppressed under his rule, were jubilant, but among Saddam's Sunni community there was anger and resentment. To it, this was a case of victor's justice. It is a moot point, however, whether this will worsen matters in Iraq. So unbridgeable is the sectarian rift and so extensive is the violence that the chances of creating even a federal state have become problematic.
To that extent, Saddam's fate is something of an irrelevance within the bounds of Iraq. His death at the scaffold is not even likely to make him a martyr in Iraqi eyes. Such was the tyrannical nature of his 35-year regime that only the tiny minority who benefited from its largesse would have reason to mourn his passing. The fact that the Sunni-led insurgency gathered pace, rather than wilted, after his capture in late 2003 spoke volumes about his diminished significance. To have enjoyed even a whiff of martyrdom, Saddam would have had to die in a blaze of American bullets, not surrender meekly and subject himself to trial.
Iraqis will also have few questions about the fairness of the court proceedings. They will be unconcerned about the finer points of jurisprudence, or the undeniable conclusion that an international court would have handled matters better. In any forum, and whether or not US complicity during periods of his regime was part of the evidence, Saddam would have been found guilty, such was the enormity of his crimes.
Outside Iraq, such matters have more influence. Arab nationalists who did not suffer directly at his hands may construe Saddam as a hero. Here was a man who defied the might of the United States and remained resolute, shouting, "God is greatest. Long live the nation", as the death sentence was announced. Here also was an Arab leader condemned after a badly flawed trial in which three defence lawyers were killed and a judge was replaced because he was thought to be too sympathetic to the defendant. For these reasons, as well as the insensate nature of eye-for-an-eye vengeance, it would be unwise to proceed with the death sentence.
Saddam should be left to rot in an inhospitable jail, where the last vestiges of self-aggrandisement would drain from him. Soon enough, there would be none of the conceit that allowed a man devoid of military pedigree to demand execution by firing squad, rather than hanging. In time, he may become nothing more than a common criminal, the classification correctly bestowed upon him by the Iraqi court.
Importantly, life imprisonment would avoid the awkward question of a body. There would be no grave at Tikrit to serve as a shrine for Arab nationalists. A shackled, mute Saddam would offer little in the way of inspiration to even the most hot-headed radical. Just as already, he seems almost an irrelevance to a nation plunging towards civil war.
