Editorial: Good options for Pakistan running out

Dire predictions uttered about Pakistan when General Pervez Musharraf stepped down have not been long in coming to fruition. If, as United States special representative Richard Holbrooke insists, the country is not yet a failed state, it is certainly on its knees. In failing to address a distressed economy or unite a polarised society in any meaningful way, a weak civilian Government has quickly squandered the goodwill associated with its election. Now, it faces the additional menace of Taleban forces that have advanced to within 100km of Islamabad. There would have been little other than straight talking last week when President Barack Obama met his Pakistani counterpart, Asif Ali Zardari, at the White House.

More than anything, the American leader wanted an indication that Mr Zardari's Government can deliver the strong leadership and effective policies that have eluded previous civilian Administrations. In particular, the United States needs a committed drive to eliminate Taleban havens in Pakistan. It will make only limited progress in the war in Afghanistan if that is not delivered. It also needs to be sure there is no risk of the extremists getting their hands on Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. For the most part, the US has had cause to be disappointed. Rather than confronting the Taleban, the Pakistani leaders' first impulse has been to seek non-violent solutions.

Most notably, this led to a peace deal three months ago in the Swat Valley, which delivered Sharia law to the area. This accommodation had barely been struck when the fundamentalists, having broken an agreement to lay down their arms, began intrusions into neighbouring Punjab. Yet even as fierce fighting began last week, Pakistani military leaders spoke of "exercising restraint to honour the peace agreement".

Therein lies the difficulty in trying to pressure Pakistan. Whatever the pledges made in Washington by the civilian Government, these may not be fully translated on the ground. In the first instance, it will take much to convince the Pakistani military that the insurgents pose a bigger threat than India. Equally, some Army and intelligence leaders undoubtedly harbour sympathy for the Taleban, having backed the one-time Government in Afghanistan as a Muslim ally against India. At the very least, there is a reluctance to fight fellow-Muslims. The upshot in previous campaigns has been limited confrontation and inconclusive results.

Two factors could conceivably draw a stauncher response. The first is a public backlash against the extremists. There is some evidence that may be occurring because of the harsh installation of Islamic rules in the Swat Valley. And for every Taleb wishing to impose an extreme religious vision, there was another intent on enriching himself by looting and extortion. That experience may have reinforced the moderate outlook of most Pakistanis; fundamentalist parties performed poorly in last year's elections.

The second factor is muscular leadership. The US, while expressing confidence in the present Administration, has begun talking to the Opposition leader, Nawaz Sharif. The implication is clear. If the Americans do not get the response they require, and a return on the US$1.5 billion ($2.5 billion) they will deliver to Pakistan in the next few weeks, they are ready to change horses.

Another, perhaps more likely, outcome is that yet another tilt at democracy will fail. The Army, despairing of the Government's incompetence, could reclaim control. This process elevated General Musharraf and several other military figures to power. It could easily recur if the Taleban threat grows and the economy becomes even more sickly. It will never be an acceptable alternative. But the good options for Pakistan's survival as a moderate, democratic nation are rapidly expiring.