Editorial: Al Qaeda in retreat, but terror persists

Opinion

Al Qaeda is in retreat and its influence is waning. So says the United States Treasury, which points to the choking off of funds to the terrorist network and the killing of many of its most able leaders by Predator drones. Clearly, events are moving in the right direction. It would be wrong, however, to assume that al Qaeda no longer poses a threat. Its power has always derived as much from ideology as organisational strength, and that endures.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, a misplaced mystique developed around al Qaeda. The sheer act of destroying the twin towers of the World Trade Centre with airliners prompted the idea that it must be a large, coherent and sophisticated group. Such was never the case. Al Qaeda was always a small group clustered around Osama bin Laden that provided training and expertise for loosely aligned fundamentalist organisations in troublespots such as Pakistan, Somalia and Iraq.

This activity required a steady supply of funding, much of which came from the Gulf kingdoms. The US Treasury is now enjoying considerable success in countering this flow. Equally, some of al Qaeda's normal funding is being directed to the Taleban, thanks to that group's perceived triumphs over Western forces in Afghanistan. The upshot has been four public appeals for cash from al Qaeda's leadership.

A further pointer to the group's dwindling power is the fact that it is more than four years since its last major attack, the bombing of the London transport system. Obviously, Western security measures, often painstakingly maintained, have played a part in this. But, at the same time, the terrorist group has suffered setbacks in wider conflicts. In Iraq, it fell out with insurgent Sunni leaders. In Pakistan, more recently, its occupation of the Swat Valley proved shortlived. In both cases, the ferocious enforcement of al Qaeda's fundamentalist doctrine cost it the support of many moderate Muslims.

Yet that militant ideology, together with anger over the Western invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and other perceived meddling, also remains the focus of al Qaeda's appeal. The exit of President George W. Bush has removed one particularly potent symbol of Western interference. Others are still in place, however. Unpopular pro-Western governments remain across much of the Muslim world. Also, moderates' hopes that President Barack Obama would bring a more even-handed US approach are starting to fade. Significantly, the White House has been unable to pressure Israel to halt settlement building. Emboldened, the Israeli Foreign Minister has even said that he does not believe peace in the Middle East is feasible. The Palestinians, for their part, have declared their hopes in the President have "evaporated".

Increasingly, the talk in the Middle East is of old wine in new bottles. For now, the major beneficiaries of this disappointment are the Taleban. The group is not only wealthy but in the process of being reinforced by thousands of foreign fighters from the likes of Chechnya and North Africa. Clearly, in the eyes of these insurgents, some of the gloss has gone from al Qaeda. Yet they still follow its ideology of resistance and its tactical template. These will endure even if bin Laden is killed.

Al Qaeda's financial and organisational weakness may be terminal. But terror is far from beaten. Affiliated groups remain intact, even if their links with al Qaeda have been eroded. Others may re-emerge. Most menacingly of all, bombings, such as those in Spain and London, require little organisation. Any security system can still be beaten. Al Qaeda may also feel the need to make a statement. Its time of desperation may be the cue for desperate measures.