KEY POINTS:
The 15 British naval personnel taken captive by Iran have been released as a gesture, says Iran, to Easter. Christians everywhere will be happy to accept that excuse, even as they suspect that a more prosaic explanation lies in Iranian politics. The Easter reference is more apposite than possibly Iran knows.
This has been a story of commendable - dare we say Christian - restraint by Britain in the face of severe provocation and rank injustice.
When the 14 men and one woman were seized three weeks ago, on the pretext that they had entered Iranian waters, Britain's passive response might have been seen as a sign of weakness. Certainly, the United States might have reacted more aggressively if one of its ship inspection parties had been taken at gunpoint in the Shatt al Arab waterway between Iran and Iraq. But Britain's response has proved to be right.
It remains a matter of conjecture why the sailors and marines were seized. The claim that they were in Iranian territory, let alone spying there, was quickly dismissed by the British Government. Indeed, the Foreign Office might have wished the contingent had strayed across the sea border so it might settle the issue with the apology Iran demanded.
But when it knew the incident was contrived, a concession would have been ill advised. If the real reason for this act of antagonism lay in Iranian politics, an apology would have played into the wrong hands.
The capture was probably the work of hardline supporters of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who announced their release on Wednesday. His position has become shaky lately. The presidency is not the most powerful office in theocratic Iran. The Supreme Leader is the leading mullah, currently Ayatullah Ali Khamenei, whose blessing the elected leader needs to govern the country.
Ahmadinejad is extremely deferential to the ayatullah, and needs to be. He came from outside Tehran's political establishment to narrowly win the presidency two years ago and his unorthodox rule, in domestic as well as foreign affairs, has not endeared him to the Parliament.
He has faced powerful internal criticism of his handling of the nuclear row and his inability to avoid United Nations sanctions on Iran. Students demonstrated against him when he spoke at a Tehran university last month. But he is close to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corp, the elite military force answerable directly to the ayatullah and a power in its own right. The Revolutionary Guard is closely involved in the nuclear programme, and its leaders have been targeted by UN sanctions.
Possibly the Britons were taken in retaliation for the capture of five Iranians by US forces in Iraq in January, but more likely it was as pawns in the nuclear stand-off that is becoming increasingly difficult and divisive for Iran. An attempt to escalate tension with the Anglo-American occupiers of Iraq would be a classic device to unify a divided country against a common threat - provided the offended foe played its part.
The Blair Government did not play ball. It refused to escalate the crisis, even when pictures of the hostages were shown and unconvincing confessions extracted. The UN also refused to play the game. Its refusal to leap to Britain's aid ensured the Security Council kept its eye on the main game, Iran's nuclear plans.
The seizure of the sailors was a clear admission Iran is losing that contest. Now that it realises the world is not intimidated or impressed by a stunt like this, the incident should strengthen the hand of moderates who want their ancient land to be better than a rogue state.
