KEY POINTS:
The international community has responded to recent events in Myanmar with a predictable sense of outrage.
President George W. Bush expanded the United States' already punitive regime of economic sanctions. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown warned the junta that "the world was watching" and called for action by the United Nations Security Council. French President Nicolas Sarkozy received exiled opposition figures and called for a freeze on new investment in Myanmar.
But for all the impressive rhetoric coming out of Western capitals, the eyes of the diplomatic world are fixed firmly on Beijing.
Over the past two decades China has become Myanmar's patron and protector. It is its biggest military supplier, a huge consumer of its energy, minerals and timber and, most importantly, its chief defender in the UN. Just last January China vetoed a Security Council resolution that would have criticised Myanmar's despicable human rights record.
In some respects Beijing's approach to this latest crisis looks like business as usual.
China and Russia defended Myanmar in the Security Council on Wednesday last week. Chinese ambassador Wang Guangya said the threat of sanctions was "not helpful". Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu expressed some concerns about "instability" but declared that China "always adopts a policy of non-interference".
But despite the lack of public action so far, there are three reasons why Beijing may yet decide to turn up the heat on the generals.
First, it does not want to hand any more ammunition to its critics in the human rights community. The Chinese leadership wants the 2008 Olympics to be a celebration of the country's re-emergence as an influential and respected world power.
Beijing will do almost anything to avoid any disruption to the Games. If the Burmese junta kills many peaceful protesters with Chinese weapons and is perceived to do so with the tacit support of Beijing, the repercussions could be enormous.
Second, there has been a subtle, cautious shift in Chinese attitudes to sovereignty and non-intervention over the past few years. According to leading China scholar Allen Carlson, "many Chinese elites have now come to accept the general legitimacy of multilateral intervention to resolve particularly prominent humanitarian crises."
That doesn't mean China is going to approve an intervention in Myanmar any time soon, but Beijing may be more pragmatic in dealing with the crisis than some of its rhetoric might indicate.
The third factor is a growing awareness of the importance of reputation in international politics. Chinese leaders and officials have worked tirelessly over the past decade to cultivate a positive international image in Asia and on the global stage. Beijing knows it can buy military might, but it also wants "soft power" - the influence that comes with international legitimacy and respect.
Soft power can't be bought or seized. It needs to be earned. But if China is to become a respected great power, it needs to shed its image as the best friend of the worst regimes.
There is some evidence its leaders have woken up to this fact.
Beijing has realised its once-close relationship with Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe has become far more of a curse than a blessing. When Mugabe boasted about his close ties with China last December, Zimbabwe's ambassador in Beijing was called in and hauled over the coals. China dismissed talk it was going to provide Zimbabwe with a $2 billion soft loan. In February, President Hu Jintao's tour of Africa notably sidestepped Harare.
China has also recently increased its pressure on the Government of Sudan. It supported a Security Council resolution to deploy a force of 26,000 troops into Darfur and has privately pressured the Government in Khartoum to be more flexible.
Even with North Korea, formally still a Chinese ally and a country of enormous strategic importance, Beijing has been prepared to flex its muscle. As host of the Six Party Talks, China staked its reputation on working out a peaceful compromise to the nuclear issue. When Pyongyang conducted a surprise missile test last September, Beijing turned off North Korea's oil supplies. When it tested a nuclear device in October, Beijing joined the US in voting for a Security Council resolution and froze North Korean bank accounts.
Pyongyang got the message.
Ditching an absolute notion of non-interference in these cases did not signal a new Chinese idealism. Each decision was based on a hard-headed assessment of the costs and benefits to China's national interest. But in a globalised world, China's leaders increasingly understand that national interests are not just about dollars and cents, they are also about reputation and image.
That's why it's important for New Zealand to speak up loudly and clearly on Myanmar. We have no sway over the junta and little direct influence in Beijing or other Asian capitals. But we need to be part of an international chorus expressing revulsion at what is going on in Yangon. We need to help convince Beijing that propping up the generals not only hurts the people of Myanmar, but also undermines China's claims to be a responsible and constructive international player.
* David Capie is a senior lecturer in international relations at Victoria University. He is currently a visiting scholar at Harvard.
