A few months ago I was invited by an embassy to meet a delegation to discuss European policies toward Hamas and Hizbollah.
"Before I decide," I asked, "tell me what you think about this issue."
"Oh," replied the diplomat, "we've already decided to deal with them."
"If you already have made up your minds," I answered, "why should I come to talk about it?"
The European Union is preparing to do business with Hamas despite being on its list of banned terrorist groups because it worries that "heavy handed actions by the EU could prove counterproductive, pushing Hamas further from the political mainstream".
In other words, if the EU is tough on Hamas it might become radical. Why, it might even demand Israel's destruction, dispatch suicide bombers, and be anti-semitic. A lot of people have made up their mind based on some principle of inevitable moderation: if Hamas gains power it will forget about terrorism and settle down to creating jobs and building a peaceful Palestinian state. And if this does not happen, the naive of the world will ignore that fact.
Every time Hamas stages a terrorist attack, calls Jews the offspring of pigs and monkeys, or demands Israel's extinction, these naive people - Lenin called them "useful idiots" - will use this as proof that more must be done to persuade it to be moderate.
The fault is always with the West and Israel, not the extremists and murderers.
Haven't they learned anything from saying the same stuff about the PLO, Fatah, and Yasser Arafat and then seeing it didn't happen?
Ah, but the New York Times has already answered that question in a December 22, 2005 editorial: "Letting Hamas run is the lesser evil because any movement, once in power, is compelled to supplement its bluster with deeds. That's what happened to the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which once seemed even less acceptable than Hamas."
There are two bizarre notions in this. First, it is certain that a movement in power must perform well rather than stir up people with talk of revolution and destroying one's enemies.
It is hard to believe that in a world which has seen communist and Nazi regimes - or those of Saddam, Islamist Iran, or the Taleban - that a sane person could say such things.
Second, to use the PLO as one's example passes into the realm of satire. In fact, a dozen years after the Palestinian Authority was formed, experience shows the exact opposite: a regime more interested in carrying on violent struggle than serving its people's needs.
Indeed, the PLO stayed in power because it combined bluster with deeds of incitement, intransigence, and terrorism. It may be ousted now only by those whose bluster is louder and whose deeds are more terrible. Why should we believe that Hamas will behave otherwise?
There's wishful thinking. Or in the Times' words: "We can only hope that if Hamas wins a share of power, Palestinians will expect the same of it as they did of the PLO. If the Islamic militants persist in provoking Israeli incursions, roadblocks and assassinations, their welcome will soon wear thin."
I hope so, too. But I wouldn't risk the lives of millions of people on that hope. Perhaps we should hope that Osama bin Laden comes to power in Saudi Arabia as the most effective way of defeating international terrorism.
Perhaps the Times' editorialists don't read their own newspaper. On January 8, Steven Erlanger reported the statement of Khaled Duzdar, a Palestinian analyst at the Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information: "Anyone who thinks Hamas will become pragmatic if they win and it will be easier to settle the conflict is unrealistic. Hamas will never change its charter or agenda."
The International Crisis Group in Brussels says of Hamas that since Palestinian nationalists cannot make peace, "The international community's best remaining option is to maximise the Islamist movement's incentives to move in a political direction through a policy of gradual, conditional engagement."
The report explains, "There are risks, but the West needs to adopt a policy of gradual, conditional engagement to encourage Hamas to choose politics over violence by giving it a stake in stability and emphasising the political costs of a breakdown."
Somehow I don't think the risks are going to be borne by the analysts sitting in Belgium.
How do you prove that the assertions about a moderate Hamas are false? You can quote a ton of Hamas statements and documents that they will continue terrorism and never accept Israel. You can look at their daily violent acts. You can examine precedents- the PLO, communist regimes, fascist parties-which prove that moderation is not inevitable.
You can do a sophisticated analysis to show that Hamas has become strong precisely because of its militancy and promises of total victory. You can suggest that extremists may believe their ideology, mean what they say, and cannot be bought off.
Is it really so hard to understand that a group which calls for genocide against Jews, extols terrorism and demands a Taleban-style regime for Palestinians is not about to become moderate? Apparently it is.
* Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs Centre. His latest book is The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East.
<EM>Barry Rubin:</EM> Naive to expect a softer Hamas
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