Editorial: Intervention only way to rid Libya of tyrant

Twelve years ago, a Nato air offensive designed to protect the people of Kosovo brought Serbia to its knees. Emboldened by that success, the air forces of the United States, Britain and France are spearheading a similar assault on the forces of the Libyan despot, Muammar Gaddafi.

The Western intervention, based on a United Nations Security Council resolution and bolstered, initially at least, by the support of the Arab League, is belated, but is hardly the less commendable for that.

Another Rwanda-style situation, in which Gaddafi was left free to enact his policy of "no mercy" on the inhabitants of the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, was unthinkable.

There can, however, be no guarantees about what will emerge after the air assault runs its course.

A best-case scenario would see the quick dissolution of the Libyan forces and the flight of Gaddafi, as happened in Iraq in 2003. But in the latter instance, air power was backed by a ground offensive.

The enforcement of a no-fly zone in Libya does not promise the same rapid reward.

In Kosovo, it took 78 days of aerial bombardment, underpinned by the threat of ground forces, to secure a Serbian withdrawal. During this period, the Serbs tried to make much of the number of their civilians killed by Nato bombs.

A policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo meant there was little international sympathy.

Already, however, Gaddafi has gained some traction with the same ploy, even though his claims have not been verified.

The Arab League Secretary-General, Amr Moussa, has condemned what he called "the bombardment of civilians". The aerial campaign, he said, was different from what the Arab body had envisaged when it called for a no-fly zone.

Mr Moussa's criticism was probably meant largely for domestic political consumption. But whatever the intention, it was hopelessly unrealistic.

The UN resolution, with good reason, authorised all necessary military action against Libyan forces short of invasion.

The rebels are weak militarily and will be overrun if the Western air forces cannot check the advance on Benghazi and neutralise the threat posed by Gaddafi's army.

If his forces infiltrate rebel areas, aerial intervention will lose much of its potency, and the nature of the offensive will have to be reassessed.

Indeed, flexibility will be the key for the Western military coalition. As much was inevitable from the outset, given the eleventh-hour nature of the intervention and the imminent threat to Benghazi.

Much is having to be done in an ad hoc fashion, and the objectives of the exercise are unclear.

The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, indicated as much when she said that although ousting Gaddafi was not an explicit goal of the campaign, his departure might be hastened as the conflict continued.

It is conceivable a stalemate will be reached. Bringing down Gaddafi by pounding Libya's infrastructure and exhausting his supporters' will to fight, as was done in the stepped-up campaign in Serbia, appears off the agenda at the moment because of Arab sensibilities.

It could be, therefore, that, while Benghazi is saved for the rebels, Gaddafi will retain the strength to control the rest of Libya.

In any event, it will, finally, be up to the Libyan people to organise themselves politically and get rid of the tyrant.

If that does not happen, the outcome will be unsatisfactory, but it will not mean the Western intervention has been a mistake.

Thousands of people will have been spared Gaddafi's pitiless revenge, and popular movements in other Arab nations will have taken heart.

The plight of the anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya has not passed unnoticed and their pleas have not gone unanswered.