He approved a revised plan to drop missiles and bombs on Afghanistan, followed by food aid - thousands of "culturally neutral" vitamin-fortified rice cakes stamped with the American flag and the words: "This food is a gift from the United States of America."
The timing of the strikes may have been influenced by several factors, including that American and Japanese sharemarkets were shut.
But the main reason Bush waited so long was the need to get backing for a military strike which could split the world into Muslim and non-Muslim camps if handled badly.
The US realised early on it could not attack Afghanistan without international support. From a military perspective, it needed cooperation from neighbouring Muslim countries and access to air bases in Oman and Uzbekistan, Pakistani intelligence on bin Laden and the use of Indian air space.
More importantly, it needed moderate Muslim governments for the long-term war against terrorism which involves sustained pressure at many levels - diplomatic, political, intelligence, law enforcement and financial.
For instance, much of bin Laden's money comes from wealthy Saudi backers and is sent through Pakistan's banking system. Pakistan's intelligence service remains one of the best ways of finding out where bin Laden is hiding, mainly because it is full of Taleban sympathisers who may still be passing on information to al Qaeda.
If the US wanted to go beyond a largely cosmetic strike on Afghanistan, it had to forge a long-term international coalition and cultivate links with countries it had not previously regarded as friends or allies.
In the first few days after the September 11 attacks, America's most important new ally looked to be Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan. In exchange for lifting US sanctions imposed after Pakistan's nuclear tests, President Pervez Musharraf offered to share intelligence, allow a multinational force within his country's borders and let American planes fly over its territory into Afghanistan.
Pakistan even sent delegates to Afghanistan to try to persuade the Taleban to hand over bin Laden.
But growing internal opposition to Musharraf's cooperation with the US persuaded Bush to search for other options.
He had early success with Russian president Vladimir Putin, who agreed to let America use air space and bases in the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikstan. But Uzbekistan warned last weekend that its bases could be used only for humanitarian and rescue missions - a sticking point the US is confident can be quietly overturned.
Elsewhere the global coalition was becoming bogged down. Saudia Arabia, a key US ally in the 1991 Gulf War, refused to let the US use its bases and Iran, which hates the Taleban and had made encouraging signals, said any military operation had to be under United Nations control.
A final round of shuttle diplomacy last week and over the weekend was more successful. US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld won promises of full cooperation, apparently including the use of bases, from Saudi Arabia, Oman and Uzbekistan. In a parallel mission, British Prime Minister Tony Blair shored up support in Russia, Pakistan and India.
The Rumsfeld-Blair trip was the last lap of diplomacy before military action. Everyone, including the Taleban, knew that while the two men were in the region, an attack was out of the question. Once they had left there was no reason to delay any longer.
Bush discussed the strikes with Blair on Sunday, a day before he and Vice-President Dick Cheney contacted leaders from Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan.
Military preparations for the attack were concluding to match the diplomatic manoeuvring. A few hours before the US strike began, about 30,000 troops, more than 300 warplanes, US and British aircraft carriers and ships armed with cruise missiles were within range of Afghanistan and there were signs that military preparations were complete.
The US aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk was approaching the Arabian Sea, close enough to be a launchpad for special forces operations.
The US had launched a spy satellite - capable of spotting small campfires and tracking Afghans on foot - which analysts believe could monitor damage caused by US and British bombs and missiles.
The two countries could have been ready to strike much earlier but the attack had to wait until the diplomatic coalition was as ready as it would ever be.
Another possible reason for delay was simply indecision and debate over what to do - summed up by a military source who told the New York Times last week that it was a case of "AOS - all options stink". The last-minute shift to a "bread and bombs" operation, mixing military muscle with humanitarian aid, shows how aware Bush and his advisers became of the need to minimise the backlash from the Arab world.
The final factor that decided the timing was the weather. The attack could not have been delayed much longer because heavy snow will soon make it almost impossible for ground troops to move. Snow is already falling in the Khyber Pass between Pakistan and Afghanistan and within a fortnight much of the area is likely to be covered in several metres of it, blocking main mountain passes.
Fighting between the Taleban and the Northern Alliance opposition in the mountains would normally stop during this time and restart in the spring.
Military experts say no army, no matter how well equipped, can cope with temperatures plunging to minus 40 degrees C, a wind-chill factor of formidable intensity, and the snow and blizzards.
