* December 1998
Intelligence suggested that Bin Laden was at a specific location in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and missile strikes were prepared. But President Bill Clinton's advisers decided not to recommend a strike because no one had seen Bin Laden in a couple of hours.
* February 1999
Intelligence reports put Bin Laden near a hunting camp in the Helmand province of Afghanistan used by visitors from the United Arab Emirates. Preparations were made for a possible strike but none was launched. CIA officials told the commission that policymakers were concerned that a strike might kill an Emirati prince or other senior officials who might be with Bin Laden or nearby. A CIA official said, "this was a lost opportunity to kill Bin Laden."
* May 1999
Sources reported in great detail about the location of Bin Laden over five nights in Kandahar. "At the time CIA working-level officials were told that strikes were not ordered because the military was concerned about the precision of the source's reporting and the risk of collateral damage."
* July 1999
Intelligence was too sketchy to support a cruise missile strike in Ghazni, Afghanistan.
* Late 2000
Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold, the director of operations for the military's Joint Chiefs , prepared a plan to use military, economic and political efforts to pressure the Taleban to expel Bin Laden. Senior military and civilian officials said much of the plan was outside the military's scope and sent it back for more work; it was never acted on.
Statements to the 9-11 Panel (Sept 23, US time):
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence
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