"I think the statement on page 19 that 'Saddam is prepared to use chemical and biological weapons if he believes is regime is under threat' is a bit of a problem," the email read. It pointed out that the claim would effectively back up an article by Donald MacIntrye, the Independent's chief political commentator, that Saddam Hussein was "bad" but not "mad" enough to launch a WMD strike against the West.
Mr Powell's email went on: "It backs up the Don McIntyre argument that there is no CBW threat and we will only create one if we attack him. I think you should redraft the para."
In the final version of the dossier, published five days later on September 24, the passage was changed to read: "Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons, including against his own Shia population."
Mr Powell's email was sent at 3.45pm on September 19 last year, after a deadline set by Mr Scarlett for MI6, MI5, GCHQ and Defence Intelligence Staff to send their comments on the dossier. The following day, it was finally approved by Mr Scarlett and sent to the printers. It was published on September 24 to coincide with a statement by Mr Blair to Parliament.
Under cross-examination by Andrew Caldecott QC, counsel for the BBC, Mr Scarlett admitted that the change had indeed been made only after Mr Powell had suggested it.
However, he insisted "it was not as a result of the intervention from Downing Street" and said that it simply meant he went back to his intelligence assessment staff to check the dossier. Recent intelligence suggested that Mr Powell was right and that wider issues such as Saddam's command and control capabilities and his intention to threaten his neighbours should be given more weight.
"This email did prompt me and the assessment staff to look again at that particular passage. We were prompted to look at it again. I was exercising my judgement as I was authorised to do entirely in line with the existing intelligence," Mr Scarlett said.
Recent intelligence "had indeed come in" and which was "not properly taken into account", he said. "In other words, the intelligence was more complex than the way this was phrased".
However, the change is highly embarassing as it appears to add substance to the central charge by the BBC's Andrew Gilligan that the dossier was "transformed" just before publication at the behest of Downing Street.
"The suggestion there is, is it not, that the dossier should be redrafted to remove the express suggestion that Saddam Hussein is a defensive threat and to leave the implication that in fact he is an offensive threat?" Mr Caldecott asked.
Mr Scarlett replied: "It is to take away the explicit limitations that it is a defensive threat or defensive point."
Mr Caldecott said "Do you accept you can transform a dossier by omission, Mr Scarlett?"
Mr Scarlett: "Of course it is important what you take out as well as what you put in."
Mr Scarlett also revealed that he was the person who decided, on the day that the dossier was printed on September 20, to change its title to refer to "Iraq's weapons of mass destruction" rather than "programme for weapons of mass destruction".
In a series of fierce exchanges with Mr Caldecott, the JIC chairman denied that he had taken on board anything other than "presentational" suggestions from Alastair Campbell, Mr Blair's director of communications.
He said that the crucial claim that Saddam could deploy chemical and biological weapons "within 45 minutes" was strengthened in the dossier to make it more consistent. When asked why the dossier did not reflect the fact that the 45 minute claim related only to tactical battlefield munitions and not strategic missiles, Mr Scarlett said the distinction was not so clear.
The most likely weapons system was a multiple rocket launcher with a range of 20 km or artillery with a range of 40 km as both had been used to kill 20,000 Iranians in the Iran-Iraq war. As a result the difference between "strategic" and "tactical" weapons was blurred.
Mr Scarlett also admitted that, despite earlier evidence that he had no idea about "unhappiness" within the intelligence services about the dossier, he had been aware on September 17 of concerns from a chemical expert about the claim that Saddam was continuing to produce chemical agents.
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INDEPENDENT
Hutton inquiry website
British Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee transcript:
Evidence of Dr David Kelly
Key players in the 'sexed-up dossier' affair
Herald Feature: Iraq
Iraq links and resources
