When opinion polls find that most Muslims think Westerners are selfish, immoral and violent, we have no idea of the real causes. And so we assume such opinions must be an expression of their culture rather than our politics.
US Republican presidential candidates Donald Trump and Ted Cruz have exploited these reactions with their appeals to Islamophobia. But most liberals also assume that religious extremism is the root cause of terrorism. US President Barack Obama, for example, has spoken of "a violent, radical, fanatical, nihilistic interpretation of Islam by a faction - a tiny faction - within the Muslim community that is our enemy, and that has to be defeated".
Based on this assumption, think-tanks, intelligence agencies and academic departments linked to the national security apparatus have spent millions of dollars since 9/11 conducting research on radicalisation. They hoped to find a correlation between having extremist religious ideas, however defined, and involvement in terrorism.
In fact, no such correlation exists, as empirical evidence demonstrates - witness the European Isis volunteers who arrive in Syria with copies of Islam for Dummies or the alleged leader of the November 2015 Paris attacks, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who was reported to have drunk whisky and smoked cannabis. But this has not stopped national security agencies, such as the FBI, from using radicalisation models that assume devout religious beliefs are an indicator of potential terrorism.
The process of radicalisation is easily understood if we imagine how we would respond to a foreign government dropping 22,000 bombs on us. Large numbers of patriots would be volunteering to fight the perpetrators. And nationalist and religious ideologies would compete with each other to lead that movement and give its adherents a sense of purpose.
Similarly, Isis does not primarily recruit through theological arguments but through a militarised identity politics. It says there is a global war between the West and Islam, a heroic struggle, with truth and justice on one side and lies, depravity and corruption on the other. It shows images of innocents victimised and battles gloriously waged. In other words, it recruits in the same way that any other armed group recruits, including the US military.
That means that when we also deploy our own militarised identity politics to narrate our response to terrorism, we inadvertently reinforce Isis' message to its potential recruits. When British Prime Minister David Cameron talks about a "generational struggle" between Western values and Islamic extremism, he is assisting the militants' own propaganda. When French President François Hollande talks of "a war which will be pitiless," he is doing the same.
What is distinctive about Isis' message is that it also offers a utopian and apocalyptic vision of an alternative society in the making. The reality of that alternative is, of course, oppression of women, enslavement of minorities and hatred of freedom.
But the message works, to some extent, because it claims to be an answer to real problems of poverty, authoritarian regimes and Western aggression. Significantly, it thrives in environments where other radical alternatives to a discredited status quo have been suppressed by government repression. What's corrupting Isis' volunteers is not ideology but by the end of ideology: They have grown up in an era with no alternatives to capitalist globalisation. The organisation has gained support, in part, because the Arab revolutions of 2011 were defeated, in many cases by regimes allied with and funded by the US.
The lesson of Isis is that war creates terrorism
After 14 years of the "war on terror," we are no closer to achieving peace. The fault does not lie with any one administration but with the assumption that war can defeat terrorism. The lesson of Isis is that war creates terrorism.
After all, the organisation was born in the chaos and carnage that followed the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Russia and Iran have also played their role, propping up Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime - responsible for far more civilian deaths than Isis - and prolonging the war in Syria that enables the militant group to thrive.
Meanwhile, the alliances that we consider crucial to the war on terror have worked in Isis' favour. The group's sectarianism and funding have come from the Saudi and Gulf ruling elites, the West's closest regional allies after Israel. And the groups that have been most effective in fighting Isis - the Kurdish militia - are designated as terrorists by Western governments because they are considered threats to our ally Turkey.
The incoherence of our response to Isis stems from our Islamophobia. Because we believe religious extremism is the underlying problem, we prop up Arab dictatorships that we think can help us contain this danger. Paradoxically, we support the very regimes that have enabled Isis' rise, such as the Saudis, the most reactionary influence in the region.
With our airstrikes, we continue the cycle of violence and reinforce the militants' narrative of a war by the West against Islam. Then, to top it all off, we turn away the refugees, whom we should be empowering to help transform the region. If we want to avoid another 14 years of failure, we need to try something else - and first, we need to radically rethink what we've been doing.
Kundnani is the author of The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror.
