Some 190,000 Russian soldiers spilled over the border into the Ukraine on February 24. American intelligence suggests that by the end of July, perhaps 15,000 Russians had died and an estimated 45,000 had been wounded, meaning about one in three at the outset of the invasion were now casualties.
Thesenumbers have probably grown. Such attrition is unsustainable.
Even if the Russians pour in an additional 300,000 soldiers, current trajectories will continue and possibly even increase, as the supporters of Ukraine express their anger about the potential annexations and the Europeans endure a hard winter due to the Russian gas cuts.
The displeasure will be shown in the supply of even more effective forms of weaponry that has so far been denied to Kiev.
President Vladimir Putin is not used to losing. Before this current war, his forces achieved victories in Chechnya, Georgia and Syria. The first invasion of 2014 of the Ukraine was so successful, Moscow not only annexed Crimea, they never answered for their involvement in the shooting down of the civilian airliner, MH17.
Now Putin is on the back foot. The risk is that if the increasing hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers thrown into the front lines, coupled with the existing technologies, cannot change the outcome on the battlefield, the temptation will be to try something new.
World War I saw such thinking with the use of chemical weapons against soldiers, as a way to break the trench stalemates. World War II, with the bombing by air of cities full of civilians, as a way to break the morale of the enemy.
Neither innovation worked. Rather, all sides responded in reciprocal ways.
The weapon everyone is watching as a possible game-changer is a small nuclear device, a so-called tactical weapon. Anything under 15 kilotons, the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima and 140,000 people within it, is considered tactical. It took two such bombs to force Japan to surrender.
If Ukraine fought alone, such logic might work but it would depend on how big the bomb was, where it was detonated and how many were used. With a military front over 2000 kilometres long, it is unlikely a solitary device would make Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky surrender.
The fact that Putin has earlier agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought is being offset by his most recent statement that his country had "various weapons of destruction" and would "use all the means available to us", adding, "I'm not bluffing".
The sleight of hand turning Ukrainian territory into Russian, makes a defensive war to protect Russia, justifiable to some in Moscow. The fact that unilateral annexations are illegal in international law - as are nuclear devices which, by nature cause impacts which are disproportionate, indiscriminate and will have long-term impacts - will mean very little to Putin.
The entire war is in contravention of the International Court of Justice. The practice so far, by which war crimes have been committed, is illegal; and he has earlier shown a willingness to violate other norms around prohibited weapons, using them for assassination purposes in England.
The fear of Mutually Assured Destruction is now what is holding Putin back. This is the nub of the direct American warning that if Russia crosses this line, there will be catastrophic consequences for Russia.
The United States will respond decisively. This means if the Ukrainians are nuked, the Russian forces in the Ukraine will receive a direct reply. This is the kind of brinkmanship we have not seen since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Putin's gamble is that the United States and Nato would not risk a nuclear war over Ukraine.
Betting that America will not respond, or if it did it would be a symmetrical way or the process could be controlled is pure folly. There were about 900 nuclear weapons kept on high-alert or hair-trigger status, before the conflict began, and probably more now. These weapons can be dispatched within 15 minutes of receiving a warning, in a period when there is no time to think or pause as the risk of mass destruction gathers its own momentum.
The speed is justified because of a fear that if they are not released quickly, they could lose the ability to strike back. Further, neither Nato nor Russia have a no-first use policy, meaning that both are not committed to letting the other side throw the first punch.
This is a nightmare scenario in which battlefield tensions, lack of trust, paranoia and no time to think, may all spill in the wrong direction. Putin might think one small nuke will solve his problems in the Ukraine, but he could easily spark the Third World War if he so acts.
This insanity has to stop. It is time to hit pause. A truce should be the first step, coupled with the sincere offer of peace talks. As proof of good-will, all sides should publicly commit to no-first use of nuclear weapons and putting the safety-catches back on their nuclear weapons.
We have to step back from the precipice.
• Alexander Gillespie is a professor of law at Waikato University.