A masterclass in how to crush dissent

The Iranian theocracy's suppression of dissent was executed with such textbook precision that the likes of Robert Mugabe should have been taking notes.

Thanks to its reaction to the protests against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election, the hardline faction of the ruling regime appears to have been strengthened rather than diminished.

Save for a catastrophic reversal, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stands with his preferred candidate in the presidency, with his opponents exposed and their energies expended.

It had looked so different in mid-June, as protests at Ahmadinejad's re-election threatened to destabilise the regime.

Hundreds of thousands marched in the name of the defeated candidate, Mir-Hossein Mousavi. Rumours of schisms abounded within the Guardian Council and the growing clerical opposition to Khamenei. Not since 1979 had there been such an outpouring of dissent.

However, while the regime appeared weak and threatened, a series of masterstrokes enabled it to reassert its power:

* Allow protest, but retain control. With the use of armed police and the Basiji militia - including thugs hired for the day and given batons - the marches are impressive but ineffective. After the initial marches, warnings from police and the Revolutionary Guard of strong responses to further action intimidate waverers and reduce the number of participants . A "controlled" number of casualties and the intimidation of activists in university campuses reinforces the power of the state. For a regime that marched tens of thousands of its people into minefields during the Iran-Iraq war, the shooting dead of a few dozen protesters would seem an almost trivial price to pay for domination.

* Show "conciliatory" move of a partial recount, and allow submissions from presidential candidates. A purely tactical consideration. With Ahmadinejad officially winning two-thirds of the vote, a sizeable reduction in a recount would show some consideration of the people's demands while still delivering the preferred leader.

* Silence the press. Mousavi's newspaper is shut down, reporters arrested and foreign journalists banned from the streets. While such innovations as blog site Twitter provide an outlet, they carry little of the motiv-ating power of the main-stream media, and the voice of the people is diminished.

* Allow protests to lose natural energy while interning ringleaders. The momentum of the protests slowed as they were repeated, especially with the regime unmoved. Even the worldwide exposure of the death of Neda Soltan, a woman protester, fails to enrage the country into open rebellion and the more time the regime has to pick off those who it feels are influential on the streets, robbing the movement of its fire.

* Arrest foreign "agitators" and deflect attention outwards towards "enemies". With the protests now dragging, the regime shifts attention to external bogeymen. "Little Satan" Britain, the focus of much Iranian ire with a embassy in Tehran to target, is once again blamed for fomenting dissent. Allegations of foreign interference - especially by the ally of "Great Satan" America with a pedigree for meddling in Iranian affairs - can do wonders to turn the population against internal dissenters.

* Declare original result valid. Once safe to do so, the partial recount is announced as being held, with Ahmadinejad reconfirmed President. The status quo prevails, and the protests have achieved nothing in the immediate term.

* Pursue the enemies of the state. Attention turns to silencing Mousavi, who has continued to pour scorn on the election result and call for more protests. The Basiji militia - responsible for the beating and shooting of Iranian citizens - calls for the arrest of Mousavi for fomenting post-election unrest and "disturbing the nation's security", while others within the establishment accuse him of treason.

The most pressing concern for the establishment are the opponents in the ranks of the Guardian Council. However, while former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani gathered those seemingly discontented with the backers of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, he himself is no great democratising force in Iran and would do very little to change the status quo - it would be merely a change within the old guard. And with the schism exposed, the rulers know who to monitor.

So what has been achieved? Certainly many people in Iran have expressed outrage at what they feel was a stolen election. But the regime prevails and is slowly tightening its grip on those it sees as a threat.

There may be power games being played within the ruling elite, but they have yet to change the minds of those at the very top. The most the marchers can hope for is a shift to a more reformist leadership.

But the longer the reprisals continue, the less likely it is to happen.