KEY POINTS:
History has a great habit of repeating itself, let's hope it does this time.
Following the failure of 1992, the lessons learned set up the philosophy for Team New Zealand's success in 1995. Hopefully, similar lessons have been learned at Emirates Team New Zealand after the failure of 2003.
The failings of 1992 and 2003 have many similarities. Both campaigns lacked leadership, were designer-driven and had crew problems.
The 1992 campaign was very much led by designer Bruce Farr. As a consequence, Team New Zealand headed to the start line with NZL20 - a radical red boat that sported a bowsprit, a twin keel and no rudder.
NZL20 performed well, making it through to the final against Paul Cayard's Il Moro de Venezia.
Then it all turned pear-shaped. Team New Zealand had a 4-1 lead in the best of nine series when the Italians protested at their use of the bowsprit. The bowsprit was not illegal, it was how they used it that was the issue. In the end the Kiwis were deemed guilty, docked a race win and had to change how they sailed the boat.
At the same time a reshuffle of the crew took place. Skipper and helmsman Rod Davis and David Barnes were ousted in favour of Russell Coutts and Brad Butterworth.
The New Zealanders lost 5-3.
Throughout the campaign it was never clear who was in charge - Sir Michael Fay, Bruce Farr, Rod Davis or David Barnes. There was a lack of accountability.
In 2003 the situation was similar. Was the leader Tom Schnackenberg, Dean Barker or Ross Blackman?
In 1995 it was clear the leader was Sir Peter Blake and in 2007 it is absolutely clear who the leader is, and that is Grant Dalton.
In 2003 Team New Zealand also headed to the startline with a radical boat. Like the bowsprit in 1992, the hula [hull appendage] wasn't illegal. Getting it to comply with the rules was the difficulty.
In 2003 the crew was also changed with tactician Hamish Pepper taken off the boat and replaced with Bertrand Pace. In 1992 and 2003 there was a lot of crew rotation, while in 1995, and in this campaign, the crew are a lot more settled, especially in the back of the boat, the afterguard.
Barker looked uncomfortable behind the wheel in the last cup, much like Coutts did in 1992 stepping on to a boat he had hardly sailed. In 1995, it was Coutts' boat. They built a mock deck and used it as a template for their final boat, making sure all the bits and pieces, like the steering position, fitted.
Having seen NZL84, and I assume NZL92 is the same, the yacht is fitted for Barker. It looks to me like NZL84 has had the steering position custom built for Barker so he feels comfortable in the boat.
The current Team New Zealand campaign is clearly sailor-driven. Dalton has also been keen for his sailors to go out and compete in a variety of sailing regattas, which is something that Coutts has always advocated.
Blake sailed on the boat in 1995 and Dalton will be on board in this cup, which is good. It means they can see for themselves what is going on.
There are various ways that teams operate. Some have been very skipper-driven, almost autonomous. An example is Chris Dickson. You look at when he was at Tag Heuer, when he was at Nippon and now at Oracle. It is Chris' way or the highway. There is no doubting who is the leader. Paul Cayard is another one. With Il Moro and when he came here with America One, he was very autonomous. Likewise Dennis Conner.
That doesn't seem to be the Team New Zealand way. If you look at 1995, the campaign was team-driven with a strong skipper in Coutts. It operated like a family where everyone was encouraged to contribute as opposed to being told to just get on with it. This team operates in the same way. I think Barker has really developed from 2003. He was either going to develop to where he is now or crash and burn.
