RWC 2007 Campaign
2.2 In our view, winning the RWC was over emphasised by NZRU, primarily because of the handling of the conditioning programme - future planning should be lower key in terms of player and public awareness.
2.3 The RWC 2007 off-field planning and preparation was exemplary, ensuring that there were no distractions or barriers to performance. The approach should be continued in future campaigns.
2.4 In terms of on-field preparation, the dominant theme was that the team were lacking in quality "game time". The combination of conditioning, weakened in-bound competition and poor quality pool opposition, meant that there was insufficient top-level game time. In hindsight, the games arranged before departure were not adequate preparation given the combination of circumstances discussed.
2.5 In our view there were too many All Blacks management in full time attendance at the RWC 2007. That view was repeated in interviews and in the 360 degree feedback.
2.6 NZRU, including the current coaches and management, have ensured the All Blacks brand continues to be one of the most successful in world sport (despite lack of world cup success).
Conditioning Programme
2.7 The conditioning programme was based on a sound premise but consultation and implementation were not optimal. In particular, there was a lack of proper consultation with Franchises ( ). Implementation was hindered by a "one-size fits all" approach to the length of the programme. Major initiatives such as this require testing and proper consultation.
2.8 All Blacks participation in the existing competition structure is in need of immediate review to ensure that the All Blacks have sufficient time to prepare, perform, recover and rest (as with other professional rugby players and sports people).
2.9 Re-integration of the players into the Rebel Sport Super 14 competition was not effectively managed which resulted in mismatched expectations between the players, the All Blacks management team and the Franchise coaches.
2.10 One impact of the conditioning programme that was under estimated was the effectiveness of the players returning to rugby and the dent in confidence that some experienced from not having played.
2.11 The conditioning programme delivered significant improvements in speed, repeated speed, lower body power and strength, upper body strength and body composition. The All Blacks of 2007 became better athletes as a result of the conditioning programme.
2.12 The conditioning programme did influence at least two leading All Blacks to re-sign with the NZRU following the RWC. They both stated that without the conditioning programme they would not be playing rugby in New Zealand post the 2007 RWC.
Selection
2.13 The All Blacks selectors have a mature and effective selection process that has player welfare front of mind and a simple objective of selecting the best available team to win the next test match. Consistency of selection in the lead-up to the finals was agreed to be important, with the bulk of the 22 players in the quarter final having played in eight of the 11 tests leading into that match. On average 17 of the 22 selected for the quarter final played in each of the eight tests.
Leadership
2.14 The leadership programme implemented by the All Blacks management team has contributed to the growth of leadership capabilities within the players and to the on-field success of the All Blacks.
2.15 The programme should continue and be adapted to provide an increased focus on on-field leadership and mental preparedness.
2.16 The leadership and mental preparedness approach by the All Blacks must be part of an overarching framework that provides a common and systematic approach to holistic player development. It must be integrated across all levels of professional rugby - All Blacks, Rebel Sport Super 14 Franchises and age grade national sides.
2.17 The effectiveness of the leadership development and mental preparedness strategies should be measured objectively.
Quarter Final
2.18 We were not required to reach a conclusion on the factors immediately relevant to the loss in Cardiff but we comment briefly on them to ensure we do not give an incomplete impression.
2.19 Factors outside the control of the All Blacks contributed to the loss of the quarter final. The performance of the referee and touch judges had a significant adverse impact on the All Blacks. An unusual combination of injuries was also a critical contributor.
2.20 The officials, the combination of injuries, along with the performance of the French placed huge pressure on the All Blacks leadership model. The leadership model failed to deliver what was its most important objective - decisions which give the best chance of winning the game. The team failed to ensure that the right decisions were taken at critical moments.
High Performance
2.21 The All Blacks environment and the high performance plan need to be part of an integrated plan. Consideration should be given to aligning the All Blacks and the NZRU high performance team structurally to ensure the long term sustained success of the All Blacks.
2.22 NZRU should measure the impact of the initiatives delivered through the high performance plan and the effectiveness of the service delivered by specialist providers.
Commercial
2.23 The commercial aspects of the RWC were very well managed. Key relationships were well handled. Budgeting and management of the commercial relationships were in general sound. The financial results of the RWC to NZRU were not material, a small loss on an incremental analysis of $0.243 million.
2.24 (SECTION EDITED OUT BEFORE PUBLICATION). The conditioning programme was a contributing factor to a significant decline in viewership of Rebel Sport Super 14 in New Zealand. The flow-on effect to the value of the competition brand was significant and underestimated in planning.
Source: Independent Review Of The 2007 Rugby World Cup Campaign by Mike Heron
