WikiLeaks cable: NZ asks about access to TSA's no fly list

This is one of the diplomatic cables about New Zealand held by Wikileaks.

30 September, 2005
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND ASKS ABOUT ACCESS TO TSA'S NO FLY LIST

This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.

Classified by: Charge d'Affaires David R. Burnett. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S) Summary: New Zealand Immigration is interested in
possible access to the Transportation Security
Administration's "no fly" list as a way to improve the
country's border security. New Zealand law enforcement
agencies already work closely with U.S. counterparts, and New
Zealand Immigration views possible access to the no-fly list
as an extension of that cooperation. Immigration's interest
in the list is further evidence that the New Zealand
government would be receptive to participation in the HSPD-6
pilot project on terrorist lookout information sharing (ref
B). End summary.

2. (C) As requested in ref A, Embassy econoff met September
29 with Arron Baker of New Zealand Immigration to discuss a
message he sent to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
seeking information on the no-fly list. Baker, national
manager of border security and compliance operations, said
that Immigration proposed to use the list to screen
passengers flying to New Zealand. Any individual who
appeared on the list and was trying to enter New Zealand
under a visa-waiver program would be told to apply for a
visa.

3. (C) Baker would like to know more about the list,
particularly what criteria are used to place a person on it.
If a passenger were identified as on the list, he asked
whether New Zealand Immigration could immediately contact TSA
or a relevant U.S. office to discuss how to proceed and the
reasons why the passenger was on the list. Baker would like
to open formal discussions with the U.S. government on
whether access to the list would be allowed and how it could
be used by New Zealand.

4. (C) New Zealand wants to keep out individuals on the
no-fly list for obvious reasons, Baker said. "If the U.S.
considers them to be risks, then why are we letting them fly
to New Zealand," he asked. His agency's interest in the list
stems from a case in 2004, when Air New Zealand told
Immigration that it had identified one of the passengers it
had carried to New Zealand as on the no-fly list. After
investigation, Immigration determined that the individual was
a member of Hamas and had applied for permanent residency in
New Zealand on the basis of what turned out to be a sham
marriage. If Immigration had known about the individual's
inclusion in the list, it would have denied him entry. Baker
did not know whether the individual still is in New Zealand.

5. (C) Baker noted that New Zealand and U.S. law enforcement
officials already cooperate well in enhancing transnational
security. As an example, he said that under the APEC
Regional Movement Alert List, Australia, New Zealand and the
United States will be sharing data on lost and stolen
passports. Immigration's border security officials and DHS
contact each other directly on individual cases.

6. (U) Baker also pointed out that New Zealand uses a system
similar to the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS)
that connects airline counters to New Zealand Immigration and
allows for passenger screening at the time of check-in.
(Note: The New Zealand Ministry of Transport has offered
information and a demonstration on its Advanced Passenger
Processing system to the U.S. government, per ref D.)

7. (S) Comment: Post recommends that we pursue discussions
with the New Zealand government on access to the no-fly list,
because we believe it would enhance NZ border security. New
Zealand Immigration recognizes that important details would
have to be worked out, including how to proceed when an
individual is identified as on the list. Post also believes
this interest in the no-fly list could be used to advance
discussions with the New Zealand government on sharing
screening information on known and suspected terrorist
lookouts (ref C and E). Post awaits instructions on how the
interagency would like to proceed on these issues.

Burnett