What Judge Gates said - Part 1

33IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI

AT LAUTOKA

CIVIL JURISDICTION

ACTION NO. HBC0217.00L



BETWEEN: CHANDRIKA PRASAD APPLICANT

AND: THE REPUBLIC OF FIJI 1ST RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF FIJI 2ND RESPONDENT

Dr. George Williams with Mr. Anu Patel for the Applicant

Mr. J.J. Udit & Mr. A. Tuilevuka for the Respondents

Date of Hearing: 23rd August 2000

Date of Judgment: 15th November 2000


JUDGMENT

This is a case about the status of the Constitution in Fiji today following an armed invasion of Parliament on 19th May 2000, a hostage crisis, a military takeover, and latterly the installation of an interim administration. The Applicant, an indigent farmer, claims he has been adversely affected as a result. Presently he is a refugee staying at the Girmit Centre in Lautoka.

On 4 July 2000 he filed an originating summons in the High Court, with an affidavit in support, seeking certain declaratory orders. He did so in person. He appears to have received a modicum of assistance along the way. But before this court he was ably represented by Dr. George Williams and Mr. Anu Patel both of counsel whom I permitted to appear for him at the hearing as advocates to argue his case. Subsequently Messrs. S.B. Patel came on the record as his solicitors. At the hearing objection had been taken to such appearance since no Notice of Appointment of solicitors had been filed and served pursuant to the High Court Rules Order 67 rule 3. In view of the complexity of the constitutional arguments to be presented to the court, the objection had no merit. This case demanded the assistance of able counsel. There could be no valid basis therefore for refusing representation to the Applicant, on a minor technical ground, the soundness of which objection was questionable. The Applicant deserved any services that the Bar could render him, and the court will invariably be assisted by counsel, as it was here.

The matter was first called before the court on 14th July 2000. I indicated to Dr. Shameem, who first appeared for the Applicant to assist him, and to Mr. Udit for the Respondents that there was a need for the affidavit material to provide evidence of the acceptance or non-acceptance of the military takeover and of the consequent government. Time was allowed for the Applicant and the Respondents, to place such evidence before the court. The Applicant availed himself of this opportunity by filing 2 further affidavits. The Respondents, elected not to do so.

Instead the Respondents filed a summons to strike out the claim, which was returnable on the date fixed for the hearing of the originating summons. I shall revert to that later.

Mr. Udit also objected to my hearing both summons on the same day. I gave a short ruling on this objection and said I would proceed to hear both summons together. The Applicant was represented by overseas counsel who had attended on the day fixed for the hearing ready to present his arguments and there was no good reason to put the matter off to another date. This was a constitutional case requiring expeditious treatment in the national interest. The Attorney's office seemed to have taken the matter lightly by not compiling necessary factual material in affidavit form as they had been ordered to do for the hearing. I was not prepared to adjourn the hearing and I have already provided the foundation for that decision in my ruling given on that day. The onus of proving that the Constitution had been abrogated lay on the Respondents. They should have come prepared with their material, to prove the major issue in this important and far-reaching summons.

The interlocutory rulings, to allow Dr. Williams and Mr. Anu Patel to appear for the Applicant without the prior filing and serving of notice of the appointment of solicitors on record, and to hear the substantive originating summons together with the striking out application, resulted in an application to this court by the Respondents for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal and to stay the interlocutory orders. I refused that application for reasons set out in a further ruling delivered a short while ago.

The Material filed by the Parties

The orders sought in the originating summons were perhaps not well phrased. Later I allowed an amendment, this being made in order to deal with changed circumstances which had arisen at the end of the hostage crisis.

The affidavit of the Applicant sworn on 30 June 2000 dealing with the facts of the constitutional crisis was somewhat sparse and did not say how events had affected the Applicant. His second affidavit sworn on 21 July 2000 stated that the poll survey could not be conducted by the research company since it could not guarantee the safety of its field staff at that time. However a good deal of material consisting of press stories, comments, advertisements and letters was exhibited, supportive of the Applicant's case. The third affidavit was sworn by one Peter Sipeli on 20th July 2000. He stated he represented the Sexual Minorities Group, who he believed would and were suffering as a consequence of the events succeeding 19th May 2000 by acts of violence and discrimination towards that group. The court was left to deduct in what way these events impinged upon such rights.

As I have said the Respondents elected not to file any affidavits. Subsequently when seeking to appeal the interlocutory orders after the hearing they filed the affidavit of Anare Tuilevuka sworn on 19th September 2000. Leaving aside the irregularities of that affidavit, there were two affidavits exhibited to it, which had been filed in a separate but similar constitutional case. These no doubt were exhibited to show the evidence that the Respondents would have adduced in this case. They were the affidavit of Commodore Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama the Commander of the Fiji Military Forces and for a time the Head of the Interim Military Government. This was sworn on 14 September 2000, and filed on 15 September 2000 [in effect 1½ months late for these proceedings]. The other was of Alipate Qetaki, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice in both the Interim Military Government and the interim civilian government thereafter. This too was sworn on 14 September 2000 and filed on 15 September 2000.

The papers filed were much more remiss in the case of Uganda v. Commissioner of Prisons Ex parte Matovu [1966] EA 514. In that case 2 affidavits were filed with defective intitulment, impermissible prayers, without a Respondent named for the subsequent execution of habeas corpus orders, and without a Notice of Motion or motion paper setting out grounds entitling or relief sought, this last error was said by the court to be "so fundamental a defect as to be almost incurable." The second affidavit had been filed by the Applicant's counsel which was wrong on so many counts that the court said it "should have been struck out."

Sir Udo Udoma CJ commented at 519 :

"Indeed but for the fact that the application concerns the liberty of a citizen, the court would have been justified in holding that there was no application properly before it."

And the court came to the following opinion as to what to do in the circumstances at
521 :
"On reflection, however, bearing in mind the facts that the application as presented in the first instance was not objected to by counsel who had appeared for the state; that the liberty of a citizen of Uganda was involved; and that considerable importance was attached to the questions of law under reference since they involved the interpretation of the Constitution of Uganda; we decided, in the interests of justice, to jettison formalism to the winds and overlook the several deficiencies in the application and thereupon proceeded to the determination of the issues referred to us."

In dealing with defective applications, breaches of procedure and insufficiency of material in important constitutional cases the courts have taken an enabling rather than a technical approach. In Mokotso and Others v. HM King Moshoeshoe II and Others [1989] LRC (Const.) 24 Cullinan CJ, happily also formerly of the Lautoka High Court, at 148 said: "In this respect I consider that but a technicality precludes the court from conducting the necessary inquiry and that in all the circumstances of this case it is in the interests of justice that this court should be seen to be a court of justice rather than procedure. On that basis therefore I proceed to consider the matter."

In the concluding paragraphs of his judgment which ran to 169 pages in all, his Lordship at 168-169 said:

"These proceedings have been troubled from the start by defective pleadings. Much against my better judgment, I acceded to requests by both parties to over- look such defects. I have consequently been at pains to construe the pleadings liberally. I have done so in the interests of justice; for the want of such construction, the pleadings could in any event have been amended, entirely without prejudice to the respondents.

I have dealt at length with some aspects which, to the legal mind, might appear beyond argument. The first applicant, however, would not seek legal assistance, and I considered myself in fairness obligated therefore to deal with all submissions made. Further, due to the constitutional aspect of the issues raised and the troubled history involved, I thought it best, in the national interest to fully ventilate all grievances, imagined or otherwise."

I favour the approach adopted by both of these Chief Justices. I overlook defects in the papers, which are largely minor, in the greater interests of the justice of the matter.

I also propose to consider the two affidavits of the Respondents, though the Applicant's counsel will be deprived thereby of an opportunity to address the court on them, since they were not made available at the right time to the Applicant's counsel or to the court for the hearing. In the wider national interest and in that of justice it is better that I consider them and I have done so.

Notorious Facts

Inevitably the affidavits will not present all of the facts before the court. The wide ranging history of the matter and of its numerous events and the logistical difficulty in presenting opinions and views representative of the people of Fiji and of its various groups, religious and ethnic, mean that I have to take a more generous approach as to what are notorious facts than might be appropriate in an ordinary case, and a more generous approach than that urged by the Applicant's counsel.

There is also a further reason for looking at the affidavits exhibited by the Respondents. To do so would be in accord with the approach taken in supra constitutional cases where events are numerous, fast flowing and fluid. It is an approach that is necessary in such cases in order to see justice is done both to the litigants and also to the wider public who have a proper interest in their outcome.

However in relation to proof of the popular acceptance of the abrogation of the constitution or to the overthrow of the elected Parliament or the forcing out of office of the President, the court would require full and proper proof.

In Mitchell & Others v. Director of Public Prosecutions & Another [1986] LRC (Const.) 35, a case dealing with a similar extra-constitutional situation in Grenada, Haynes P in the Court of Appeal at 72f set out the approach of the courts to such issues:

"A revolutionary regime should not be accorded legitimacy by this Court unless it is satisfied that, on the whole, the regime had the people behind it and with it. Legality should be achieved only if and when the people accept and approve for in them lies political sovereignty, and the Court so finds. This approval they may give ab initio or subsequently. Length of time might or might not be sufficient to infer it. It might be expressed or tacit approval.

But it is that which should give legitimacy to a successful and effective revolutionary regime. The support of a real majority is sufficient. This could be shown by its majority vote at a general election or a referendum or a majority percentage at polls. In court it can be proved by agreed statements of fact (as in Valabhaji) or by affidavits (as in Matovu). And these modes are not exhaustive. If a Constitution was abrogated, a new one should be substituted forthwith as happened in both of those cases."

Such an onus cannot be discharged without proper affidavits or an agreed statement of facts. It is insufficient for a court to have to rely solely in deciding such an issue on the taking of judicial notice of notorious facts. Haynes P concluded at 73g:

"I do not think this Court can properly act on a bare statement of fact or opinion of popular support, however credible and knowledgeable the source is and whatever is the basis of it. Proof of the fact by judicial notice may be admissible. But the weight to be given to it is another matter. I would hold that what is needed here is proof of particular facts or circumstances from which the court itself can infer popular support. In my view the proof here was insufficient."

In Mokotso (supra) Cullinan CJ was prepared to accept an affidavit from the Acting Attorney-General deposing that the laws promulgated by the government were enforced and obeyed throughout the Kingdom and that the decisions of the courts were enforced by the government. The efficacy of the change was marked by the acceptance of the people, which acceptance was spontaneously popular, unqualified and widespread. The matter was not seriously challenged. However in the present case those issues are seriously challenged, and the deponent Mr. Qetaki, the present Attorney-General, can hardly put himself forward as a neutral witness or independent observer. However I shall consider and evaluate the contents of the affidavits later.

The Summons to Strike Out the Action

On 7th August 2000 the Respondents issued a summons to strike out (the summons), seeking orders that :

a) the Applicant has no locus standi to institute these proceedings

b) the application discloses no reasonable cause of action

c) the application is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious

d) the application is otherwise an abuse of process.


The Applicant's originating summons had sought the following orders :

a) That the attempted coup of May 19 was unsuccessful.

b) That the declaration of a state of emergency under the doctrine of necessity by the President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara was unconstitutional.

c) That the revocation of the 1997 Constitution by decree by the Interim Militay Government was unconstitutional.

d) That the 1997 Constitution still remains in force.

e) That the elected government is still a legally constituted government in view of the inability of the interim Military government and Speight's Group to reach an agreement on governing the country.

f) That the elected government (The People's Coalition) is still the legitimate government.

g) Any relief that the Court considers just and fair.


In Bavadra v. Attorney-General [1987] SPLR 95 the plaintiff had sought to challenge certain decisions of the Governor-General. On 14 May 1987 the plaintiff had been Prime Minister of Fiji. On that morning a detachment of the Royal Fiji Military Forces led by Lt. Colonel Rabuka invaded Parliament. They arrested and detained the Prime Minister, members of his Cabinet, and members of the House of Representatives who formed the plaintiff's majority in the House. The Governor-General declared a State of Emergency and by proclamation dissolved Parliament. His Excellency also declared the office of Prime Minister and certain offices in the Executive and Legislature to be vacant. By originating summons, the plaintiff came to the High Court and sought 10 declaratory orders. The case arose out of Fiji's first military coup which had startled the nation and intruded upon its easy-going tranquillity. That coup gave birth to various incidents of legal, factual and constitutional complexity.

In his judgment Rooney J. at 98 line 158 et seq. observed: "This is probably the most significant and important action ever brought before any court in Fiji. To claim that it is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the Court is entirely inappropriate. Mr. Newman, who argued the application, made no submission in favour of these propositions and confined his argument to the only pertinent issue, namely, whether the plaintiff has a reasonable cause of action."

The present case before me therefore may be the second most significant and important action ever brought before a Fiji court, and Rooney J's comments are equally apposite. As it turned out, Mr. Udit did not submit in his address that the Applicant's claim was "scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or that it was otherwise an abuse of process." The striking out orders sought under paragraph (c) and (d) should not have been included in the summons. They are challenges that can be included in appropriate cases but not otherwise.

Such inclusion, made nonchalantly and unthinkingly, is itself an abuse of process. Summons to strike out should be confined to allegations against pleadings which are relevant and capable of argument.

Dr. Williams suggested the following amendment should be read into prayer (e) of the Applicant's originating summons : (e) that the elected parliament is still the legally constituted parliament of Fiji.

Prayer (f) was therefore little different from (e). (a) (c) and (d) amount to saying that the 1997 Constitution still remains in force. Such a question is not a merely hypothetical or academic one in the present circumstances, as was suggested. No argument was directed at the Applicant's summons to cover "no reasonable cause of action." The only argument taken up seriously by the Respondents was that relating to the locus standi or standing of the Applicant before the court to permit him to bring such an action.

Standing of Applicant

The Applicant brings these constitutional issues before the High Court which has original jurisdiction in such matters. Section 120(2) of the 1997 Constitution provides: "120(2) The High Court also has original jurisdiction in any matter arising under this Constitution or involving its interpretation"

The High Court (Amendment) Act No. 27 of 1998 also repeats that jurisdiction in its Section 18(1): "18(1) The High Court has the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Constitution Amendment Act 1997 and by any other written law and all other jurisdiction necessary for the administration of justice in the Fiji Islands."

An appeal path is provided from a final judgment of the High Court to the Court of Appeal in any matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation [Constitution s. 121(2)]. Further appeal lies to the Supreme Court [s.122(1)] and the Supreme Court has advisory jurisdiction if a question is referred to that court by the President acting in the public interest and on the advice of the Cabinet [s.123].

In addition and without prejudice to a litigant's rights of appeal a power is given to a judge of the High Court to reserve for consideration by the Court of Appeal on a case stated, any question of law which might arise, and to seek the Court of Appeal's opinion, (see Section 15 Court of Appeal Act Cap. 12).

If the Respondents accept that this is not an application in which an argument could be raised that the Applicant was bringing an application that was "scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process" or that the Applicant was in Lord Denning's phrase in R. v. Greater London Council Ex p. Blackburn [1976] 1 WLR 550 at 555 "a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him", then his standing before the court would be largely established. His claims of course would have to be litigated and arguments heard. This is not simply an issue of special loss occurring to a private citizen as a result of a public law matter. If that had to be established first, the Constitution in seeking to protect all of the inhabitants of Fiji would be but a paper tiger.

The 1997 Constitution brought into being through the Constitution Amendment Act 1997 Act [No. 13 of 1997] received the Presidential assent on 25 July 1997 and commenced as law on 27 July 1998. In Chapter 1, after the preamble, it states :

1. The Republic of the Fiji Islands is a sovereign democratic state.

2. (1) This Constitution is the supreme law of the State.
(2) Any law inconsistent with this Constitution is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency."

The loss therefore of democratic rights enshrined in the Supreme law would appear to suggest that any citizen of Fiji would be able to argue:

(a) that he had suffered a grave loss of rights and freedoms

(b) that to approach the courts would be a rightful path to redress such grievances (indeed it may be, as here, the only remedy open to him)

(c) and that to bring such proceedings could not be considered an abuse of process or the work of a mere busybody.


Chapter 4 of the Constitution deals with the Bill of Rights [Sections 21-40]. Section 36 states: "36. Every person who has a right to vote in an election of a member of the House of Representative has the right to do so in secret."

The Chapter extends protection to many matters including those of privacy, equality, religion and belief, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and the right to form or to join a trade union.

The courts, if they have any role at all to play, must always be involved in the business of upholding justice and the rule of law. On being told the courts had no powers to intervene in a matter Salmon LJ in Nagle v. Feilden [1966] 2 QB 633 at 654 said this : "This is a familiar argument on behalf of anyone seeking to exercise arbitrary powers free from any control by the courts. It was eg. recently advanced in this court on behalf of the Crown in In re Grosvenor Hotel (London) (No.2) when the question of Crown privilege was under consideration. I must confess that I do not find this argument attractive. One of the principal functions of our courts is, whenever possible, to protect the individual from injustice and oppression. It is important, perhaps today more than ever, that we should not abdicate that function." (my underlining)

It has been said that: "The English courts have converted the standing requirement into a right of access to the courts for those with standing, and a merely prima facie or discretionary barrier to access for those who lack it." [Aronson and Dyer: Judicial Review of Administrative Action 1996 p.697].

An Applicant who has no personal connection with a dispute will nevertheless be allowed to sue by being granted standing as a matter of discretion.

Mr. Udit cited Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435 but this case on the standing issue has largely been explained and distinguished by subsequent cases. Of greater bearing now on the issue of standing is R v. IRC ex parte National Federation of Self-employed and Small Business Ltd. [1982] AC 617 (the Fleet Street Casuals case). This was a decision of the House of Lords in which their Lordships adopted a simple test for standing in all public law cases and that is "sufficient interest." It is interesting also that all of the judges in their speeches to the House said that the issue of standing should usually be left for the main hearing; another argument rendering the necessity for holding a separate hearing on the limited issue in this striking out summons otiose.

In R v. Greater London Council : ex parte Blackburn (supra) Lord Denning at 559 said: "I regard it as a matter of high constitutional principle that if there is good ground for supposing that a government or department or a public authority is transgressing the law, or is about to transgress it, in a way which offends or injures thousands of Her Majesty's subjects, then any one of those offended or injured can draw it to the attention of the courts of law and seek to have the law enforced, and the courts in their discretion can grant whatever remedy is appropriate."

With this concept of "high constitutional principle" Lords Diplock and Scarman [in Fleet Street Casuals (supra)] were in agreement. Whilst stating that ultimately it was a matter of some discretion, Lords Wilberforce and Roskill foresaw the possibility of a complete stranger with no personal stake in the matter being allowed to litigate. This they said could occur "in a case of sufficient gravity". No one is suggesting that the issues here before this court, as similarly observed by Rooney J. in Bavadra, are not otherwise than "grave". Even in cases which do not fit the traditional criteria for standing an applicant will be allowed to sue if the court in its discretion thinks that the case is of sufficient public importance (see Fleet Street Casuals case supra).

Dr. Williams referred me to further examples of the modern approach to standing and it is worthwhile to set them out shortly. In R v. H M Treasury ex parte Smedley [1985] 1 QB 657 a taxpayer was allowed to challenge the Treasury's proposal to pay a large sum of money to the EEC; in Gillick v. West Norfolk Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112 a mother of 5 underage daughters challenged the legality of Government funded contraceptive advice to underage girls; in R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; ex parte Rees-Mogg [1994] QB 552 (DC) at 562 a life peer and former editor of The Times of London sought judicial review to challenge the government's ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, even though "his only stake in the dispute was his sincere concern for constitutional issues".

In R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex parte World Development Movement Ltd. [1995] 1 WLR 386 Rose LJ at 395f said: "The authorities referred to seem to me to indicate an increasingly liberal approach to standing on the part of the courts during the last 12 years. It is also clear from Ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd. that standing should not be treated as a preliminary issue, but must be taken in the legal and factual context of the whole case; see per Lord Wilberforce, at p. 630D, Lord Fraser at p. 645D and Lord Scarman, at p.653F."

(see too Richard Naidu v. Attorney-General of Fiji (unreported) Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. ABU0039 of 1998S 27 August 1999; Thorson v. A-G of Canada [1975] 1 SCR 138; Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeill [1976] 2 SCR 265; Minister of Justice of Canada v. Borowski [1981] 2 SCR 575 and [1989] 1 SCR 342; His Lordship cited also Lord Diplock's speech in the Fleet Street Casuals case (at 644): "It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure group, like the federation, or even a single public-spirited taxpayer, were prevented by outdated technical rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped. The Attorney-General, although he occasionally applies for prerogative orders against public authorities that do not form part of central government, in practice never does so against government departments. It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their functions. They are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that Parliament is the only judge; they are responsible to a court of justice for the lawfulness of what they do, and of that the court is the only judge." (my underlining)

Another factor in this case leading to the overwhelming conclusion that standing though going to jurisdiction was best left for the substantive hearing was the importance of the merits of the challenge, what Rose LJ considered (at 395a) "…an important, if not dominant factor when considering standing." "The real question", wrote Professor Wade in Administrative Law, 7th Edition (1994) p.712 "is whether the applicant can show some substantial default or abuse and not whether his personal rights or interests are involved."

We are concerned in the present case with the supposed abrogation of the Constitution, a supreme law passed by the people's democratically elected representatives for the good governance of the nation, and with an usurpation of power.

Lord Diplock in the Fleet Street Casuals case had emphasised the importance of vindicating the rule of law. Such aims were bound to provide the litigation foundation of "sufficient interest". Indeed by lodging human rights suits in the courts complaining of loss of rights an individual is in reality acting as an agent of public interest for all those who have also been deprived of their rights. (see Kokott J: The Burden of Proof in Comparative and International Human Rights Law. Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1998 at 210).

I find that this is not a frivolous application to the High Court. The Applicant is not a mere busybody. He claims to have lost rights by the purported abrogation and seeks to be re-assured that the Constitution is still in place so as to protect him and to maintain those rights. There is no alternative remedy open to him. The issues raised for decision are sufficiently grave. The issues are also of sufficient public importance. They involve high constitutional principle. I find the Applicant has the necessary standing to seek the court's intervention.

Procedure for bringing a Constitutional Case

Section 41 of the Constitution provides for enforcement where a person considers that any of the provisions of the Bill of Rights Chapter "has been or is likely to be contravened in relation to him or her…" The section refers to the right to make application to the High Court "and that it is without prejudice to any other action with respect to the matter that the person concerned may have" [Section 41(2)]. The High Court has original jurisdiction to hear and determine applications referred to it, and is empowered to make such orders and give such directions as it considers appropriate [Section 41(3)].

No set procedure for applying is provided in the Constitution. Pursuant to powers granted to him by Section 41(10) of the Constitution, the Chief Justice has made rules namely the High Court (Constitutional Redress) Rules 1998. These provide for application for redress to be made by motion and affidavit [Rule 3 (1)] giving at least 3 clear days prior notice to the parties affected by it, unless the High Court gives leave to the contrary. The notice of motion should state concisely the nature of the claim and the relief or remedy required [Rule 4(3)]. The practice and procedure to be exercised is to be in accordance with the normal practice and procedure of the High Court and its Rules "with any variations the circumstances require." I have already stated, as indicated by the cases, I consider that practice and procedure take second place to considerations of gravity, justice, public interest and the upholding of the rule of law in constitutional cases. Included in the concept of justice here will be that of ease of access for the litigant.

It is somewhat disappointing therefore to observe the Attorney's officers attempting to deny the Applicant jurisdiction to bring this important case, and to deny him that access to the courts. When the trend of the cases has been all in favour of permitting access, and since this applicant was obviously no frivolous busybody, there was no proper basis for attempting to stifle his litigation. As officers of the court those directing the litigation should have realised these were not objections to be taken at this time in Fiji's crisis. In the current tragic scale of things, technical objections of this kind could only weigh as buzzing gnats in comparison with events on the