The bitter battle for Wellington

A report has cleared the Army of conspiracy but finds officers lied and showed poor judgment. ANDREW LAXON examines its findings.

In hindsight, Ian Gordon looks like a military prophet. From his posting in London, he wrote a letter five years ago, calling for a military-style political campaign which would extend the influence of the Army.

Many of his suggestions, couched in cynical, aggressive language, have since been realised.

The Army has won huge gains in equipment and status among the armed forces, and Gordon's throwaway suggestion that the Air Force's strike capability looked vulnerable turned out to be spot on.

When the Gordon letter became public last year, the Army's critics saw it as confirmation of a conspiracy.

The Government appointed Colin Carruthers, QC, to hold an inquiry, which reported yesterday. These are its main findings.

The Gordon letter

The report revolves around a letter called "Influence in the Centre - opening the second front". It was written in March 1997 by Lieutenant Colonel Ian Gordon from London to his superior officer and longtime colleague Brigadier Rick Ottaway.

The letter calls for the Army to campaign against the Navy and the Air Force for greater influence and Government money.

It suggests using a variety of "external pathways" - Maori MPs (many Army recruits are Maori), Parliament's foreign affairs and defence select committee, friendly staff in the other two Services, the Ministry of Defence, academic institutions and the public.

Gordon wrote the letter because he was concerned about the state of the Army. He was particularly frustrated by its embarrassing experiences with equipment failure in front of other forces in Bosnia.

He also conceded to Carruthers that writing it was a way to raise his profile in Wellington while he was overseas.

What the letter says

The letter is full of military-management jargon, which some senior Army officers interviewed by Carruthers said was typical of the Service at the time.

It argues that the Army has repeatedly lost out to the Navy and the Air Force in the battle for power at Defence Force headquarters (described as "the centre").

"Army appears to lack influence in the centre and a different approach is now required to regain this influence. It is contended that to gain the requisite influence, Army must now open a 'second front' in it's [sic] war with the centre."

The letter uses military language to map out a strategy for achieving this goal. It calls for campaigns to control the "pathways", such as politicians and the public, needed to gain control over the Defence Force.

The letter says the aim is to attain a level of control over Defence Force policy that will protect the Army's capabilities.

Gordon's letter identifies five campaigns - intelligence, personnel, public relations, cost and capability development - and says the Army should use the Government's defence policy statement to advance its case.

The letter says that at first, the Navy seems to be the main beneficiary of the new policy, which concentrates on maritime strategy. But the Army will be the next major beneficiary.

"When comparing the requirements of New Zealand's maritime strategy with the current capability of the three main Services, those that stand out as most vulnerable belong to Air, in particular the air strike capability.

"Therefore ... the vulnerability of the air strike capability needs to be exploited to the Army's advantage."

The letter also says Army officers should be put into key positions as political decisions are made on the defence policy.

"In this way the Army 'view' stands a better chance of survival and opposing views can be challenged and destroyed before they are set in policy."

Some of Gordon's aims were later realised. The Army succeeded in getting the Government to spend $677 million on expensive light armoured vehicles - despite warnings from its policy advisers - and the Air Force lost its fighter aircraft.

Critics said these events showed the letter became a blueprint for the Army in a war of attrition against its rival Services.

Gordon's view

Gordon told the inquiry his letter had been taken out of context. He acknowledged that lobbying individual MPs or a select committee was improper. He admitted that the term "campaigns" could be seen as overly aggressive and controversial, but said it was not intended this way.

"To me, 'campaign' just means coordinating, tying up loose ends and having a plan," he told Carruthers.

"To me, 'exploitation' is an area to move into, an area that needs to be looked at."

Gordon felt it was ridiculous to blame him for the Air Force's loss of its air strike capability or to give him credit for the Army's gains at the expense of the other two Services. The letter had been written in the context of the Government's defence policy.

The Army's view

Ottaway did not reply to the letter, and told the inquiry he could not remember what he did with it. But the report says it is clear that copies were distributed.

The report makes comparisons between the letter and a speech given earlier that year by the head of the Army Major General Piers Reid.

Reid told an Army seminar that for too long the Service had adopted the view that real soldiering took place out in the bases and units and Wellington was to be avoided.

"Let me assure you that the battles over the future of the Army, the battles over equipment, are fought and won in Stout St [Defence Force headquarters] and the Beehive, with several buildings on The Terrace thrown in.

"If Army is to succeed in preserving its future it must send its best and brightest into the cauldron of the defence debates. The other Services have long known this and benefited from it."

The Carruthers report says Reid was adamant in his two interviews that his sole objective was to promote the Army's position, not to interfere with the aims and objectives of the Navy and the Air Force.

Reid told Carruthers that Gordon's letter was "hopelessly out of line" and appeared to have picked up on his expressions and contorted them, possibly to get the writer noticed.

The report says the strongest response to the Gordon letter came from Brigadier Jerry Mateparae, who is now Chief of General Staff.

Mateparae says he had "real problems" with the letter and planned to rebut it. In the end he did not, although he cannot remember why.

How the letter leaked

Brigadier Ian Marshall, who worked at defence headquarters, sent a copy of the letter to his friend and colleague Robin Johansen, who had recently retired as deputy defence secretary.

Johansen passed it to former Defence Minister Max Bradford. Then National Party leader Jenny Shipley produced it in Parliament in August last year.

The Gordon letter, described as "seditious" by Shipley, encouraged Bradford and NZ First MP Ron Mark in their calls for an inquiry into the Army's conduct.

In January this year, a report on Army leaks to the media described an "A team" and a "B team" within the Service.

The "A team" of senior officers leaked damaging information about the Navy and Air Force, designed to further the aims of the Army.

The furious "B team", which included Ian Marshall and other officers passed over for promotion, responded by leaking embarrassing details about the Army - from a critical audit into the purchasing process for the light armoured vehicles to the amount of golf played on overseas trips by Chief of General Staff Major General Maurice Dodson.

The leakers' view

Marshall told the inquiry that before the Gordon letter arrived, he had spent four years seeing the Government being fed information that was not balanced or complete.

"That made me angry. I despise seeing process circumvented."

Marshall - who Carruthers says in the report "lied to me deliberately" about his role in leaking the letter - said he passed the letter on to Johansen as a friend, as they had held similar suspicions about the Army's tactics.

He said he never intended Johansen to make the letter public.

Johansen said he had left his job feeling "pretty wounded".

"When I read this letter, suddenly all the pieces fell into place. I've never been a political activist. It's not my nature.

"But I looked at this and thought it to be the most incredible display of unethical behaviour.

"I asked myself whether I should make a stand or let it go. I decided to get counted. So I spoke with Max [Bradford]."

Johansen said he often had to turn down Army projects because they did not have good engineers and did not get technical specifications right.

He believed the Army saw him as obstructive, especially because he objected that the tendering process for the light armoured vehicles was set up to get the Army's preferred choice.

Bradford said that several changes in defence policy since 1997 - including more money for the Army and the downgrading of the Air Force - seemed to relate directly back to Gordon's letter.

Carruthers' view

Carruthers says views that the Gordon letter fashioned an Army strategy which was carried out over the next few years are genuinely held.

But he believes the letter did not create the Army's approach, which already existed because of long-term inter-Service feuding.

"What has emerged from my investigations is that the Gordon letter has had meanings and interpretations attributed to it which were not intended.

"The positions taken by readers in many instances can be traced to tensions arising from events occurring in or dealings with the Army.

"The theme of their experience has then been associated with the Gordon letter."

Carruthers says the evidence from officers in relevant policy areas points clearly to the letter not being acted on.

He also says that arguing for limited funding between Services must involve building the case which favours one Service's plans ahead of the others.

He says Gordon showed a significant lack of judgment in writing the letter.

His use of words such as "exploit", "campaign" and "attack" was divisive and antagonistic, with "an element of brutality".

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