Ahmed was then aged in his 50s while his victim was 12 years old.
At trial, the Crown alleged Ahmed groomed the boy with compliments and treats, introduced sexual behaviour by talking about pornography and exposing himself to the child before inviting him to join in masturbation.
While the boy declined, Ahmed later took him to the toilet and performed oral sex on him, which continued several times a week until the boy left for college.
However, he did continue to visit Ahmed at his old school during 2011 and 2012 where the abuse continued.
Convicted criminals are usually able to apply for parole after serving a third of their sentence and in 2020 Ahmed appealed his conviction, and the minimum non-parole period imposed, to the Court of Appeal.
His lawyer argued a minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) could not be imposed as a matter of routine.
She acknowledged the offending was serious and repeated but submitted Ahmed had previously led a blameless life and argued that a lengthy finite sentence suffices to meet the statutory purposes.
The Court of Appeal agreed the offending was predatory and extensive.
“It was also a grave breach of the trust of M and his family, and that of the school where Mr Ahmed was employed.”
It quashed the MPI but declined Ahmed’s appeal against his sentence, which he then took to the Supreme Court.
In its decision released last week, the Supreme Court ruled against Ahmed’s appeal which was made on two grounds.
He submitted the trial judge should have given a warning to the jury that there was no presumption in law that the age of a person means they cannot consent and further that there was no presumption in law that the act of grooming negates consent.
He also argued the judge failed to draw the jury’s attention to evidence relevant to the issue of consent.
The Supreme Court’s decision said both issues had already been considered by the Court of Appeal.
It noted on the second issue the Court of Appeal had accepted the trial judge failed to draw the jury’s attention to evidence that may have gone to the issue of consent but it did not result in a miscarriage of justice for the following reasons.
“Elaborate directions on consent were not necessary because the defence’s contention was that the offending never occurred,” the decision said.
“If the judge had been more specific, this could have conveyed the impression the judge thought there was no merit in the defence case.”
It ruled nothing raised suggested that the Court of Appeal’s analysis of the consent directions given may have been wrong.
“There is thus no risk of a miscarriage of justice.”
The appeal was dismissed.
