KEY POINTS:
So the watchdog did growl after all. A pity then that no one could hear him doing so when it mattered.
Thanks to Don Hunn's exhaustive report on the Madeleine Setchell affair, we now know that State Services Commissioner Mark Prebble made strong overtures to Hugh Logan, the chief executive of the Ministry for the Environment, not to turf Setchell out of her job.
However, after the news broke back in July that Setchell had effectively been fired because of a perceived conflict of interest just days after starting work as the ministry's communications manager, Prebble looked anything but the self-described "guardian" of the strict boundary lines separating politicians from the operations of Government departments.
Logan was seen to have meekly kowtowed to his minister, David Benson-Pope, who had made it patently clear he would have difficulty working with the partner of the Leader of the Opposition's chief press secretary, Kevin Taylor.
Logan's decision to shift Setchell sent a shudder through the Wellington bureaucracy. This was a potential career-limiting precedent for other public servants who might be seen to have similar conflicts of interest.
Those waiting for the "guardian" to step in and uphold public service neutrality and remind Benson-Pope that he was barred from involving himself in departmental staffing were to be disappointed.
The State Services Commission instead struggled to put what Hunn calls its "imprint" on unfolding events.
That in large part was down to two things: it was too late to save Setchell's job; and Prebble, meanwhile, had gone overseas without passing on crucial information to his deputy, Iain Rennie.
Prebble then incurred a memory lapse of staggering proportions which deprived Rennie of the most vital piece of information of all - that Benson-Pope had told Logan he would be less free and frank in his discussions when Setchell was in the same room as him.
Had that emerged earlier, Benson-Pope would not have continued to issue denials that he had expressed concerns about Setchell's appointment.
With hindsight, it is also possible to discern that Prebble was indicating Setchell should not have been forced out of her job when he responded to mounting criticism in a self-penned newspaper article.
However, the opaque language and his defence of both Setchell and Logan left the impression the commissioner was sitting on the fence.
In fact - as Hunn's report reveals - Prebble had earlier firmly advised Logan not to buckle to his minister's wish and that the perceived conflict of interest could be managed successfully without Setchell having to go. But those discussions were conducted in private. The public were none the wiser.
While the State Sector Act upholds the commissioner's independence, the delicate sensitivities of patrolling the line between ministers and departmental chief executives make it difficult for the commissioner to publicly voice concerns about political interference.
Prebble is an experienced civil servant who speaks his mind in private but is not in the business of embarrassing his political masters publicly.
If there is a problem with a minister, he would likely take it up with the Prime Minister and ask her to sort it out. That he did not do so in Setchell's case may be serious cause for regret on his part.
Despite the blunders, Prebble can take a lot of credit for upholding the commission's responsibility to protect the political neutrality of the public service.
Setchell's dismissal in part flowed from the Environment Ministry being told it would be pushing the sustainability message in election year. As communications manager, Setchell would have had a key role in one of the Government's principal policy drives.
But Prebble told Logan that if the Government was planning a politically-oriented environmental communications programme then the ministry should not be doing one. If it was not, Setchell should stay.
Benson-Pope was entitled to bar someone from meetings in his office, but he could not interfere with individual employment matters.
However, Prebble could not direct Logan's actions. Logan ignored his advice and is thus taking the rap from all quarters.
Even so, Hunn criticises the State Services Commission for providing insufficient leadership and guidance, when a more assertive stance might have persuaded Logan to stand firm.
The question now is whether the whole episode is indicative of a weakening of public service political neutrality. Or, paradoxically, whether it might actually strengthen it.
The State Services Commission acknowledges there is increased exposure of public servants to criticism from ministers and increased pressures on public servants to advocate and explain on behalf of ministers.
The National Party argues such politicisation has seen the public service shielding itself under a risk-averse, no-surprises mentality. Why stick your neck out just to have a Cabinet minister lop your head off.
For proof, National points to the decision by Murray Sherwyn, the chief executive of the Ministry of Agriculture, to seek the opinion of his minister, Jim Anderton, before deciding against hiring Setchell after she lost her position at Environment.
Hunn's report indicates Prebble was more troubled by that decision than Logan's, perhaps because it made a nonsense of his assurance that Setchell was not barred from working in the public service ever again. However, had she been hired by Sherwyn then Logan's decision would have looked to have been even more politically-driven.
The Beehive view is that Logan should have taken Rennie's advice when Benson-Pope displayed concern - "just tell him to get over it". Chief executives are paid large salaries so they correspondingly are expected to have stiff backbones.
That Logan didn't show much spine may end up enhancing political neutrality, however. The casualty list offers some deterrent to ministers thinking of interfering in departmental operations. Benson-Pope got booted from the Cabinet. Logan lost his performance bonus and has a major blot on his record.
Then there is Hunn's report. The former State Services Commissioner, whose understanding of the niceties of minister-chief executive relations is second to none, did not make any recommendations, presumably because his terms of reference did not ask for them.
Hunn has instead written his report in a fashion which makes it one big recommendation on how things should be handled. It will have substantial and lasting relevance.
Finally, there is Prebble. Crucially, his insistence that Setchell's potential conflict of interest could have been managed successfully sets the new standard both for chief executives and ministers - and one likely to stretch beyond employment matters.
Prebble intends reminding all chief executives of the lessons to be drawn from Hunn's report.
Perhaps there is a lesson he might draw for himself: bark a bit louder next time. Either that or get his staff to buy him a megaphone for Christmas.
