Police were justified in fatally shooting the LynnMall terrorist but an extensive multi-agency review has found several shortcomings in the way Ahamed Aathil Mohamed Samsudeen was managed in the years prior to his knife attack.
The review, authored by the respective oversight bodies of police, Corrections and intelligence agencies, stressed those involved in Samsudeen’s surveillance did their best in an unprecedented situation, but it has recommended changes to future approaches to radicalised individuals who pose a threat to New Zealanders.
The shortfalls identified included missed opportunities to provide rehabilitation, insufficient coordination between agencies, a reluctance to share information about the risk Samsudeen posed and placing Samsudeen in custody on remand for an “unacceptably long” period which “greatly exacerbated his risk of causing harm”.
The Government has accepted all of the findings and has committed to adding to existing legislative and agency change with the aim of addressing signs of people’s radicalisation to violent extremism earlier.
Samsudeen, originally from Sri Lanka, had been released from prison in July, 2021 after being convicted of two charges of possessing objectionable material relating to ISIS, and one charge of failing to assist a police officer exercising a search power.
In 2017, he had reportedly expressed a desire to fight for ISIS in Syria, and that if he was prevented from travelling there, he would commit a knife attack in New Zealand.
On September 3, Samsudeen entered a supermarket within New Lynn’s LynnMall shopping centre in Auckland and eight people were injured as Samsudeen carried out a mass stabbing.
Police officers, who had been tasked with surveilling Samsudeen following his release from prison, shot and killed him in the supermarket.
The Independent Police Conduct Authority, one of three bodies included in the joint review, found the officers were justified in their response to the threat posed by Samsudeen.
“[Officers] believed Mr Samsudeen had advanced on them with the knife, posed an immediate threat of serious harm or death to them at the time they fired the shots, and posed a continuing serious threat to supermarket shoppers if they were unable to stop him,” authority chairman Judge Colin Doherty said.
“They were justified in shooting at Mr Samsudeen in self-defence under section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961.”
Alongside police, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) and Corrections were the chief agencies responsible for Samsudeen’s management and as such, their respective oversight bodies were involved in compiling the review - the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, and the Office of the Inspectorate.
It was acknowledged early in the report individuals and agencies were doing their best to deal with an “extremely difficult situation.
“Mr Samsudeen was a very challenging person for them to engage with, and we were told that they faced problems they had never before experienced to that degree.”
While the authors stated it was not intended to direct criticism or suggest solutions, four primary deficiencies were identified.
The first concerned how a strong focus on Samsudeen’s arrest and prosecution led to missed opportunities to develop a rehabilitative and reintegrative plan prior to and after his imprisonment.
“Overall, not enough effort was made at an early stage to provide Mr Samsudeen with wraparound support to address his complex needs and reduce his susceptibility to violent extremist ideology,” the report said.
“Although the agencies said disengagement (withdrawal from violent extremism) was the preferred outcome, very little was done to achieve this.”
The lack of an inter-agency process to determine when intervention was needed and “ad hoc” preventative measures run mainly by police limited the capacity for timely and effective means to steer Samsudeen away from violent extremism.
The second deficiency referenced issues in how the National Security System was run, under the leadership of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC).
The report cited discussions with DPMC that indicated DPMC officials did not see their role as “marking other agencies’ homework”.
Report authors believed that was necessary and advised the establishment of an independent and operationally-focused oversight mechanism with a mandate to “provide leadership and facilitate the application of resources”.
The third spoke of how highly relevant information to the management of Samsudeen’s risk was not shared due to a “very restrictive interpretation” of who needed to be informed.
One example concerned how information known about Samsudeen was withheld from police’s Māori, Pacific and ethnic services, even when they were asked to convene a meeting with the Muslim community to discuss the matter.
The final shortcoming in Samsudeen’s management was the “unduly lengthy period” he spent in custody on remand that was extended by approximately 18 months through several factors including Covid-19 lockdowns.
“We believe this magnified Mr Samsudeen’s sense of grievance against the system, greatly increased his alienation, hostility and risk of increased radicalisation, and precluded agencies from properly considering other options for addressing the problem that he undoubtedly presented.
“We cannot say whether his attack would have occurred anyway, but his period in custody without the appropriate and necessary interventions and support enhanced the risk that it would.”
Andrew Little, the lead minister for the Government’s response to the Royal Commission’s Report into the Christchurch terror attack, acknowledged the survivors of the LynnMall attack in his welcoming of the report’s findings.
“While no recommendations were made in the review report, we’re committed to working through the findings to ensure improvements can continue to be delivered across the system,” Little said.
“The Government’s commitment is to learn from the two terrorist attacks we have experienced in recent years and to take all possible steps to ensure a safe, secure and resilient Aotearoa New Zealand.”
He referenced legislative changes to the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Act and the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act to enable faster interventions for individuals and to prevent harm from objectionable publications.
Police Commissioner Andrew Coster acknowledged the report’s findings but also stood by the actions of police, indicating the limitations of interventions in this case.
“Our view was that this individual was already radicalised before he first came to the attention of the authorities and was taking preparatory steps towards undertaking a terrorism offence,” Coster said.
“Ultimately, despite our attempts, the individual chose not to engage with any party.”
NZSIS Director General of Security Rebecca Kitteridge said the report proved her agency had acted appropriately with respect to information sharing and its inability to inform rehabilitative measures.
“No intelligence was found to be withheld and information was supplied at the lowest classification settings possible, to ensure the right people had the right information at the right time,” she said.
“There may be times when our intelligence and expertise can help to inform a rehabilitative approach, but NZSIS does not have any legislative function or capability to provide or facilitate rehabilitation programmes or social services.”