Editorial: Coalition will safeguard Iraq's future

The elections in Iraq have delivered a sliver of light into what was becoming an all-pervasive gloom. Cleric-backed Shiites of the United Iraqi Alliance have failed to meet their own expectation of clearly dominating the national assembly, which, most importantly, will draft a permanent constitution. Having secured just 48 per cent of the vote, they will have to form a coalition government - and make compromises. The White House nightmare of a religious regime closely aligned to Iran holding complete control in Baghdad has, for the moment at least, been averted.

The importance of the result lies not just in the way the alliance will have to temper its strict religious principles to reach arrangements with secular parties. It also suggests a more measured approach to the assembly's array of tasks during this year of transition. Decision-making would doubtless have been quicker if the alliance had won the two-thirds of votes needed to control the assembly. But that would not have been truly representative of the fractured - and fractious - nature of Iraqi society.

If the new constitution is to have legitimacy, there will need to be input from the Sunni minority. That will not come from the assembly benches. The Sunnis, who controlled Iraq for generations until the removal of Saddam Hussein, barely participated in the elections, either through fear or contempt for the process. Many see the insurgency as the best means of securing the exit of American forces - and of enhancing their own seriously devalued position. Of late they have directed their attacks as much at the Shiite-manned Army and police as at the Americans, heightening the prospect of a civil war.

The Shiites, to their credit, have so far failed to react. They appreciated that their numerical strength - 60 per cent of the population - guaranteed success at the ballot box. The United Iraqi Alliance now says it will attempt to remedy the Sunnis' election no-show by including them in the constitution process, possibly as members of advisory committees.

Achieving that satisfactorily will be a considerable task. The latest statements from Sunnis involved in the insurgency have been anything but conciliatory and it would be pointless to appoint people who are estranged from ordinary Sunni thinking. That would merely heap discredit on the constitution.

The election result has, however, probably averted a strong-arm Shiite reaction to the increasing sectarian violence. Iraqis have shown they do not want the religious extremism that might encourage such a response. Indeed, the immediate focus of the United Iraqi Alliance will be on wheeling and dealing, both within its own ranks and with outside parties. Logically, it will seek accommodations with Iraqi Kurds, who secured 25 per cent of the vote and whose ambition is autonomous rule in the north.

Such an arrangement would exclude the interim Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi, a secular Shiite, from a large say in the assembly. His ticket finished a distant third, polling just 14 per cent of the vote. That result said much about Iraqis' disdain for his links with the Americans. It was also a reminder of the one thing that unites Shiites and Sunnis - the desire to see the US Army out of the country as soon as possible.

That shared sentiment also suggests that the new Government's best chance of appealing to ordinary Sunnis, and luring them from the insurgency, is to make tangible progress towards a withdrawal. It will not be easy. The Americans are still to the fore in the fight against insurgency, and are finding it difficult to train Iraqi security troops to a proficient standard. Until those forces are ready, a US presence remains essential. The transitional Government must, however, place an emphasis on drawing up the timetable for a withdrawal. That, as much as a new constitution, is the key to a united Iraq.