Editorial: Chance to unite Iraq divides it

It was a close-run thing but Iraqi voters have ratified a new constitution, paving the way for parliamentary elections in mid-December. By then, however, it may well seem that it would have been better for the constitution to have been sent back to the drawing board. The referendum emphasised yet again how deeply Iraq is split along sectarian and ethnic lines. Worse, the outcome offered the dethroned Sunni minority every reason to lose faith in the political process. And every incentive to see armed resistance as the best means of securing at least some degree of power.

For the draft constitution to be defeated, at least two-thirds of voters in three of Iraq's 18 provinces needed to say "no". Sunni rejection in Anbar province and Saddam Hussein's home region of Salahaddin generated 97 per cent and 82 per cent opposition, respectively. But in the pivotal northern province of Nineveh, opposition stalled at 55 per cent. Last-minute concessions on constitutional amendments persuaded the Islamic Party, an influential Sunni group in the area, to support the charter.

The result is a bitter pill for the Sunnis. Their large-scale participation in the democratic process for the first time has confirmed only that any nationwide poll renders them impotent. Equally, it has left them subject to a constitution that makes them an unequal partner in what the Bush Administration hopes will be a stable ally.

The constitution divides the country into three regions and weakens central government. There will be high degrees of autonomy for the Kurds, in the north, and the Shiites, who comprise 60 per cent of the population. Most pertinently, new oil developments will come under regional control. As these are most likely to be in Kurdish and Shiite areas, most of the country's new wealth will pass the Sunnis by.

The Shiites and the Kurds, having suffered grievously under Sunni rule, undoubtedly see this as redress for past wrongs. But they have been short-sighted in offering nothing substantial to entice the Sunnis inside the democratic tent. Early attempts by the United States to wrench constitutional concessions from them came to nothing. Only when it appeared the draft document could be defeated in three provinces, and it became important to splinter the Sunni vote, were minor amendments made.

In time, all this will be seen as a missed opportunity. Democracy guarantees the more populous Shiites and Kurds the whip-hand in government. Yet a united, prosperous Iraq is impossible as long as the Sunnis feel they have been allocated no role, and no share of the country's future prosperity. Deprived of power by the constitutional process, they will feel little urge to participate in the parliamentary elections. More likely, they will be more inclined to believe that greater profit is likely to come from armed resistance.

That suggests, at least in the short term, that violence and lawlessness will become even more a staple of Iraqi life. This, and an official US death toll that has now passed 2000, will place renewed pressure on the White House. In the long run, however, the Shiite and Kurd-dominated security forces will hold the trump cards in any sectarian conflict, with or without American help.

Increased turmoil will, of course, make an even greater mockery of those who predicted the quick establishment of a stable, thriving democracy. Now it will require a good deal more give and take by all parties to avert that prospect. Federalism may be the best scenario for Iraq, but it will work only when all groups are largely content with their lot.