“Perhaps it speaks to the uniquely close and intimate nature of the Australia-New Zealand relationship that it’s only now that a 2+2 has been seen to be an important addition to all the other connections that routinely connect the two allies across politics, security and economic issues,” he said.
The big defence and foreign affairs question is whether New Zealand will associate itself in some way with the non-nuclear pillar ii part of the Aukus deal. There is more than a little evidence New Zealand might be getting a bit ahead of itself here. It was Kurt Campbell, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific czar who effectively put pillar ii on the table for New Zealand, mentioning the possibility that New Zealand could find some way of joining the pact when he visited New Zealand, but beyond that there has been little unprobed encouragement from the Aukus partners.
The Australians have been somewhat less forthcoming than Campbell, partly because they have their hands full dealing with what pillar i (the part involving the submarines) is like and how much it will cost. It will require hundreds of billions of dollars from Australia and a long-term commitment from the United States.
Labour’s foreign affairs spokesman David Parker doesn’t think Aukus offers New Zealand anything it couldn’t already get through existing relationships with the three Aukus partners.
The new Government disagrees, and is keen to explore the idea. There could be positive economic spill-over effects, which could see local firms do business with Aukus partners
Otago University professor of international relations Robert Patman urged caution and said that Aukus would come at a “diplomatic cost”.
“One of the great benefits New Zealand has enjoyed has been able to show that it believes in unity rather than uniformity.
“If we move into a position where we go for a pillar ii participation in Aukus, that could I think upset quite a few of our Pacific Island neighbours.
“It’s interesting that a number of Pacific island states actually criticised Australia’s participation in Aukus.”
There are areas of defence cooperation that do not involve Aukus. Collins’ Labour predecessor Andrew Little said he was keen to explore greater interoperability with Australia, particularly as both countries embark on reviewing the state of their equipment.
There is a frustration at the relatively low level of defence spending on the New Zealand side of the Tasman, despite the former Government increasing defence budgets. There is a desire for New Zealand to lift that spending and pull its own weight.
The new Government is in the middle of its first budget cycle, and Collins has publicly said she would like to boost defence spending. It’s no secret NZ First is on her side, having driven large increases to the defence budget in 2017-2020, when its MP Ron Mark held the portfolio.
A tension here is that Defence is also currently being asked to look for savings as part of the Government’s public sector cost-cutting drive.
Ukraine is the other issue. New Zealand has so far escaped without providing Ukraine with significant aid, beyond a few minor donations when the conflict broke out. As it drags into its third year, Australia, New Zealand and many like-minded countries have turned their thinking to long-term spending commitments for what looks to be a long conflict.
Peters has confirmed he has sought advice on Ukraine aid options, but we do not know what it says.
Thomas Coughlan is Deputy Political Editor and covers politics from Parliament. He has worked for the Herald since 2021 and has worked in the press gallery since 2018.
