The Australian Collins-class submarines will be replaced by nuclear-powered subs with technology provided by the US under Aukus. Photo / Australian Defence Force
The Australian Collins-class submarines will be replaced by nuclear-powered subs with technology provided by the US under Aukus. Photo / Australian Defence Force
OPINION
Recent debate about the Aukus security pact has focused on whether New Zealand should or should not join the deal, but it is also worth asking “how can we?”
This is not simply a question of pearl-clutching morality but rather of important legal principle.
Minister of Defence Andrew Littlehas been clear any deal “could not compromise our legal obligations and our moral commitment to nuclear-free”. In reality, the interaction between the two is unclear.
Section 11 of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987 (NZNFZDAC) prohibits nuclear-propelled ships from entering New Zealand’s nuclear-free zone.
This is why any talk of New Zealand joining Aukus relates only to the pact’s second “pillar”, which provides only for information and technology sharing in fields like quantum computing or AI. Nothing in the NZNFZDAC would prevent New Zealand from joining Aukus on this basis.
Good law must always rest on a clear principled basis by which to interpret it and this is where confusion arises. The long title of NZNFZDAC suggests that its purpose is “to promote and encourage an active and effective contribution by New Zealand to the essential process of disarmament and international arms control”.
Similarly, section 16 establishes a Public Advisory Committee with the power to grant funds for the purpose of “promoting greater public understanding of disarmament and arms control matters”.
The principled basis of the Act seems clear; New Zealand means to prohibit nuclear activity not just for our own good but because it is something we ought actively to oppose.
This is where the uncertainty becomes clear. New Zealand intends to actively oppose nuclear activity but is considering joining a nuclear security pact.
Regardless of whether New Zealand joins the nuclear aspect of this pact, our security apparatus presumably still has something to offer the existing members and thus the pact on the whole is strengthened.
So, actively anti-nuclear New Zealand is indeed actively strengthening a nuclear security pact. Australia has been quick to clarify that it will not be obtaining nuclear arms, so it might be said that Aukus does not violate any legal principle in New Zealand.
Yet the Act prohibits submarines just as it would missiles and makes no principled distinction between the two. It is not a far cry to suggest then that the very organisations which the Public Advisory Committee might fund to promote the anti-nuclear agenda would be the same organisations actively opposing Aukus.
What is certain is that if New Zealand is serious about keeping the waters of the South Pacific nuclear-free, a line must be drawn in the sand to define the true nature of this commitment. What does active opposition look like and how much weight does that principle hold against more pragmatic security concerns?
Perhaps the more concerning issue is that this same question could be asked more broadly of New Zealand’s “independent foreign policy”. Aukus alarmists raise concerns that Australia’s new security position indicates that it is taking the side of the US in conflict with China, while those on the other side worry that New Zealand is at risk of getting kicked off the team.
The reality is that Australia’s approach simply demonstrates the different coercive means that states employ in pursuit of cooperation, and comparing the two approaches highlights important shortcomings in New Zealand’s foreign policy agenda.
Cooperation cannot exist without conflict and the most effective way to achieve cooperation is to employ both positive and negative means of coercion. Australia’s defensive re-positioning is best viewed as one such negative means of coercion, restoring a “balanced distance” from China similar to the policy employed by states such as Vietnam.
China remains Australia’s biggest trading partner and it seems unlikely that Australia truly intends to jeopardise that relationship, but international trade relations are not without their risks. Growing concern over Chinese political influence in Australia has already led to a reform in Australian national security laws and Aukus can be seen as part of an equivalent response to China’s military build-up.
As China’s rise creates a see-saw of international bi-polarity for smaller states to balance upon, Australia cannot yet be said to have thrown its weight on the side of the US but rather to have stepped back into surer footing between the two.
New Zealand, in comparison, enjoys far less mobility in these situations. Andrew Little has been clear that “independence is not isolationism” but New Zealand’s historical brand of independent foreign policy has rendered us less agile when rebalancing our position between superpowers.
During her final trip to China as Prime Minister in 2022, Jacinda Ardern sought to downplay the need for military alliances, and it is this reluctance to use the sharper instruments in the foreign policy toolbox that has limited our foreign policy options.
Paddy Hantler
Faced with the same issues of Chinese influence in the South Pacific, New Zealand faces a hard choice. It might be time to compromise on the soft-line foreign policy approach aptly (if unwittingly) defined by Ardern as “diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy ... dialogue, dialogue, dialogue”.
Alternatively, if we intend to stick to our independent, pacifist flower-guns with passion, we must accept that the practical security benefits of Aukus or any similar pact will be sacrificed. If we are to truly abide by the principles behind our nuclear-free position, we must recognise that this means actively opposing nuclear activity, regardless of the actor.
Paddy Hantler is a student in law and politics at the University of Otago
