On the beaches, the system largely worked.
In the Bay of Plenty, a man who hadn't heard about the tsunami in Samoa was at the beach with his children when a helicopter flew overhead and a broadcast message ordered people to leave.
Around the country, police and emergency staff were shepherding people back from beaches and in some areas communities were evacuated.
But the overall impression in the public mind was confusion.
National media were getting reports of devastation in Samoa, but couldn't get a clear idea from Civil Defence as to how concerned we should be about a possible tsunami, or what people in coastal areas should do.
The Government says the response was generally good, but not good enough and has ordered a review.
Scientists around the Pacific scrambled to action soon after the earthquake hit near Samoa at 6.48am, waiting to see what the sea would do.
In Hawaii, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre began sending warnings and alerts. In Wellington staff at GNS Science were analysing their data and they began sending information to the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.
The ministry analysed the information from both sources and sent out its own alerts; in this case a tsunami warning was sent to local civil defence groups.
The responsibility about what to do next lay with those groups who each had their own plans.
Where alerts were received local plans were activated - hence the man in the Bay of Plenty being ordered to leave the beach.
Still, John Hamilton, the man in charge of the Civil Defence headquarters in Wellington - and director of the civil defence ministry - gives the overall response only a C+.
The system passed its first big test since tsunami awareness was hugely increased by the disastrous Boxing Day tsunami of 2004 in south-east Asia Thailand - but only just.
What seems to have gone majorly wrong is communication, and that's no small problem.
The media is important in an emergency, yet national radio and television could not get through to the ministry and found spokespeople confusing.
Mr Hamilton yesterday said his department knew they could do better. In general, the right things were done and the right people activated for a response, he said. But the response was not fast enough.
Some of the information distributed to the public could have been clearer and messages better co-ordinated.
But when you plan for a crisis, he explains, you know you need to be prepared to be overwhelmed.
That is what a crisis is, he says.
Dealing with a disaster has periods of success and periods in which goals are not achieved.
"The initial stages of the crisis is never entirely successful as there is much confusion and uncertainty.
"It takes time to organise your resources and get on top of what's happening. That's what happened on Wednesday."
Some tsunami, such as those originating off South America, take 12 hours to reach New Zealand, giving time for analysis and warnings.
A regional tsunami, like this one, gives less time (one to three hours) and a local tsunami may give no warning at all - as happened in Samoa.
Regardless of which type, the common principle is that each regional civil defence group, within regional councils, has responsibility for implementing its plan to deal with the disaster or threat.
All the local groups, and the ministry, will now be looking at how well they did, he says.
For the Ministry, part of this will be to sift through the many reports of warnings and alerts that were or were not received.
One of Mr Hamilton's immediate actions after the stand down was to begin a review of the messages sent out, including their tone.
"I want them to be unambiguous and readily understood. We can certainly do better there.
"We also need to look at how best to meet media demands. We publish all we know in our formal warnings, but media want more - in some cases expecting us to know more than people in Samoa about conditions there."
Despite all the warnings to stay away from beaches, some people headed to the beaches to take a look.
One of the problems, Mr Hamilton says, is that people expect to get a very exact warning and that is not possible.
No one should risk being in the path of a tsunami, he says, nor should they assume a high vantage point near the sea will be safe, or that they will be able to escape by car.
WATCHING AND WAITING
Wednesday 06.48am
8.3 earthquake 205km south east of Samoa.
07.04
Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre warning email received in Wellington.
07.04
Duty team at Northern Communications Centre prepares initial message. Civil Defence duty officer liaises with Fire Service and calls GNS Science. Public information manager responds to media calls.
07.35
National warning message issued, saying "there is a threat of a damaging tsunami impacting on the New Zealand coastline. The tsunami warning will remain in effect until a cancellation message is issued by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency management."
08.43
Warning 2 estimates wave heights at 1m at the East Coast and Bay of Plenty.
09.58
Warning 3 - Confirming tsunami generated and 1m estimate. Specific warning for beach areas and small boats (the warnings alert regional groups to target those areas).
10. 25
Warning downgraded to national advisory. Noted wave 40cm at East Cape tidal gauge.
11.11
Advisory issued stating that although PTWC had cancelled its warning for New Zealand, a wave reading at Raoul Island indicated a second, larger wave was on its way, potentially arriving at 11.15am and saying there may be further waves.
12.16
Advisory of further waves possible over the next hour sent out.
13.25
Further advisory of more waves and strong currents.
16.10-16.18
Advisory cancelled, mention again of strong currents. Final media release issued.
Source: Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (Details subject to final confirmation).
Our tsunami warning system passes, but only just
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