A team of soldiers at the Method of Entry house where Lance Corporal Nicholas Kahotea lost his life. Photo / Mike Scott
A team of soldiers at the Method of Entry house where Lance Corporal Nicholas Kahotea lost his life. Photo / Mike Scott
The family of an NZSAS soldier killed in training has blamed the United States special forces aviators flying the helicopter from which he fatally fell, saying a lack of visible remorse has made it seem as if their loved one was “expendable”.
The act of shining the spotlight on those crewing the Blackhawk helicopter when Lance Corporal Nicholas Kahotea was killed in May 2019 is at odds with NZ Defence Force’s (NZDF) formal inquiry, which found the aircraft to be stable.
But it is a position that lines up with one taken by Chief of Army Major General John Boswell, who put the inquiry together.
Kahotea was killed during a counter-terrorism exercise with United States specialist helicopter crews at the Ardmore military training facility in South Auckland.
At the time of his death, Kahotea and others from the NZSAS were practicing a “bump” insertion in which special forces troops move from a helicopter to a rooftop as the aircraft’s front wheel nudges the edge of the building.
It was a technique that hadn’t been anticipated in the year-long build-up to the training exercise, hadn’t been prepared for and wasn’t actually approved until after it was under way.
Kahotea was carrying out the “bump” insertion technique for the first time in the dark when he fell about 10 metres to his death. He was found to have died with “catastrophic head injuries and multiple bone fractures” caused by hitting the ground head-first.
Lance Corporal Nicholas Kahotea, who died while training with fellow NZSAS troopers in 2019.
In a statement from Kahotea’s mum Lois Pamment, made on behalf of his partner Sophie and step-father Trevor Duncan, the whānau said the Court of Inquiry report “downplayed the role of the US contingent in Nik’s death”.
Based on details in the inquiry report, the whānau’s statement took issue with the findings that the helicopter on which Kahotea was travelling was “stable”.
The statement recounted details in the inquiry report it believed showed the aircraft was moving. “This lack of stability almost certainly contributed to Nik’s death,” it said.
The statement took issue with US safety practices which failed to provide “checks and balances to ensure NZ personnel were properly trained”. It said the late arrival of the US contingent saw training “rushed” in a way that was contrary to NZDF’s own processes.
“While we are of the opinion the US contingent holds substantive blame in Nik’s death, NZDF cannot be recused,” the whānau said. It pointed to “bump” landings not being an authorised activity at the time of Kahotea’s death.
“The undertaking of a bump landing remains an activity that contravened all processes put in place to mitigate risk. This is an inexcusable failure on behalf of NZDF.”
The whānau said “no one has been held accountable for Nik’s death” after the High Court threw out a WorkSafe prosecution of NZDF having found it had a legal waiver from health and safety rules because of the nature of the training.
The statement said the whānau had approached the US for its own investigation report, a public apology and restitution in line with that received when US service personnel are killed.
“Our requests remain unanswered. To us, it seems as though he was expendable simply because he was a Kiwi. It seems we are too irrelevant because we are New Zealanders.”
Boswell - who convened the Court of Inquiry - said his interpretation of evidence showed the Blackhawk helicopter had moved away from the building as NZSAS troopers disembarked.
The Court of Inquiry report ruled out movement by the helicopter as having a role in Kahotea’s death.
Boswell disagreed, saying “it is more likely than not that the gap between the aircraft and the roof of the building had quickly widened to one metre by the time Nik exited or while he was exiting the helicopter”.
Boswell also said there was CCTV footage showing the helicopter’s tail moving downwards immediately before or during Kahotea leaving it.
NZSAS troopers leaving a Chinook helicopter in Afghanistan.
He said the movement of the helicopter “may have hindered Nik’s ability to establish secure footing on the rooftop”.
Boswell said he believed Kahotea was unaware of the helicopter’s shift in position as he was working in low light with night vision goggles and with an awareness others had left the aircraft without issue.
Boswell said it reinforced the need for robust safety measures “such as the [United States] crew member observing at all times the gap between the helicopter and the building”.
The training exercise was intended to build the ability of the NZSAS to work with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Unit, an elite and specialist branch of the US Army that provides helicopter support for special forces troops.
Instead, it saw the introduction of the unfamiliar “bump” technique, which was introduced in an “impromptu” fashion.
In the training scenario, the NZSAS were meant to disembark the helicopter on to the roof of a two-storey building called the Method Of Entry (MOE) house, so named for its use training soldiers to use explosives, ladders and other techniques to gain entry.
The inquiry found the “bump” deployment was included in the day’s training after the lead pilot of one Blackhawk asked if it could be “and came away from the conversation with the impression that approval had been given”.
The report said the technique was “not an approved NZDF insertion technique” that “was not included in the exercise documentation … was not a planned activity, nor was it included in the related training documents”.
It said the “bump” was “not formally approved” by the NZSAS commanding officer or by the special operations commander.
However, it said special forces training with elite soldiers from other nations often led to new training opportunities. It said the change to “bump” insertions was supported by the troop commander - the senior person present - “once he became aware they were occurring”.
NZSAS troopers fast-roping from an NH90 helicopter to the Method of Entry house at the Ardmore military training facility.
The exercise had been planned for a year and the NZSAS troopers taking part prepared training skills that would be used during the engagement weeks ahead. Those included preparing to quickly descend from helicopters on ropes and breaching doorways with explosives.
When the US helicopters arrived for the exercise, crew from each talked the NZSAS through the helicopters and the training techniques that would be used. The inquiry report said some team members and a troop sergeant did not recall the “bump” technique being discussed and that it raised questions over whether the briefings differed between crews.
The lack of certainty over references to “bump” training continued into interviews about the training intent on the day of the fatal incident, with the US flight lead’s recollection at odds with the NZSAS troop commander’s and troop sergeant’s, who “did not recall this activity being agreed to at that time”.
“Throughout the interviews the court conducted, there were conflicting accounts as to exactly how and when the “bump” deployment was inserted into the training.”
By late afternoon, fast-roping training had given way to “bump” insertions, with only three of five training carrying out the technique in daylight before the helicopters stopped to refuel and troops sought out dinner.
In that period, feedback heard positive support for the “bump” technique and all ground commanders approved “bump” training by night.
Kahotea’s team was one of two who had not carried out a daytime insertion before training resumed after dark.
Before doing so, the troop commander debriefed those who had been training and was told the “bump” technique seemed safer than fast-roping to the rooftop. Those overseeing the troops met and planned night training with three fast-rope and three “bump” insertions onto the MOE house.
When Kahotea’s troop prepared to carry out its rooftop assault, there was a last-minute change of plans in which the Blackhawk pilot lined up with a different side of the building so as to reduce ambient light interfering with night vision goggles.
Kahotea briefed his team that they would disembark on the left-hand side of the helicopter rather than the right-hand side as planned.
On the MOE house below, a medic positioned as part of the safety plan remained stationed on the one-storey intermediate roof, with the safety officer not realising the NZSAS troops were now being landed in a new place.
“This change in deployment location increased the fall height from approximately five metres to 10m and negated the extant safety plan,” said the report.
The Blackhawk moved towards the MOE house, with a witness telling the inquiry the helicopter settled about 30 centimetres away from the roof and 45cm above.
Chief of Army Major General John Boswell.
The first pair out of the helicopter were an NZSAS trooper and a military dog handler, with Kahotea and another trooper expected to follow.
Even though there were five others on the aircraft at the time Kahotea fell, the inquiry report found no one saw the moment he exited the aircraft. He was last seen before his fatal fall on one knee in the centre of the helicopter preparing to make his exit, the inquiry found, then next when he was falling.
The inquiry found the “bump” training was not carried out in line with Defence Force orders and that no dispensation was sought, largely due to it being an impromptu move made in a short time with “inadequate appreciation of the associated risks”.
The “bump” training was also not part of the training programme or exercise instruction because it was a late addition to training on that day. If it had been, the inquiry described a graduated approach to how it could have been learned and adopted.
The inquiry also found that the “bump” training was not included in the hazard register on which risks were recorded. If so, it would have recommended steps to reduce risk.
The inquiry said it believed witnesses wrongly perceived “bump” training as a variation on a normal landing or leaping from a hovering helicopter, rather than a new technique. It said it meant commanders “did not fully appreciate the risk profile” and a “general level of over-confidence existed”.
The inquiry couldn’t find a reason for Kahotea’s fall, although it ruled out movement by the Blackhawk or interference by the military dog. It could not rule out a “snag or trip” inside the aircraft but found it “most likely” the fall was due to a “misstep” by Kahotea.
The inquiry’s findings led to recommendations that orders managing integration with other nation’s militaries be reviewed, for the RNZAF and NZSAS to further develop airborne infiltration techniques including the “bump”, and for a safety review of the MOE house.
Kahotea had served 13 years at the point of his death, having enlisted as a sapper in the Royal New Zealand Engineers. From 2008 to 2013, he worked in a support role for the NZSAS before passing the selection course and undertaking basic special forces training to become a badged member of the regiment in 2014.
At the time of Kahotea’s death, his commanding officer described the trooper as making the “transition from mastery of their skills to starting to give back as an assistant instructor”.
