Solomon, a promising trainee navigator, was the first Navy sailor to die on active service in 37 years and his death prompted a thorough overhaul of the Navy's approach to safety.
Nearly four years on, Coroner Brandt Shortland has linked the drowning to the haste with which the $177 million ship was rushed into service.
His report notes that "huge amounts" have since been spent to fix the multi-role transport vessel's defects.
The victims's father, Bill Solomon, today said then Minister of Defence Phil Goff had questions to answer after maintaining the ship was safe, when clearly that was not the case.
"By rushing it into service, it clearly put people in harm's way," he told Newstalk ZB.
"From that point of view I think the buck stops with the Minister of Defence of the day Phil Goff, and in my view Goff has blood on his hands."
Mr Solomon says the coroner has clearly left the door open for this to escalate to another level, and that may well have to be driven by him.
He said he was yet to decide whether to take the matter further.
Coroner's findings back the Solomon family's long-held verdict
The inquest heard evidence that pressure was coming "from the Government down" to commission the Canterbury and the project director, Gary Collier, had expressed concern that delay could demoralise staff.
Evidence was given that the Navy chose to live with recognised problems, including a quick release shackle which was prone to unscheduled release. Mr Shortland found this stemmed from "an issue of cost and the ability of the Navy to get the safest and most cost efficient system."
The Coroner's findings back the Solomon family's long-held verdict that the incident was forseeable and avoidable.
The early release of the shackle securing the boat rope - which held the RHIB alongside the Canterbury until crew unhooked its lifting strops from the hoisting wire - triggered a sequence of events resulting in capsize.
Premature release of the shackle was a known hazard but incidents, including one the previous day, had gone under-reported in the Navy. On other ships, the risk was mitigated by an automatic release from the davit hook. But manual release on the Canterbury's RHIBs was proving problematic because an oversized O-ring was jamming in the hook.
Mr Shortland found the Canterbury was commissioned on May 31, 2007 without the Navy having the opportunity to familiarise itself with the boat.
While individual components had been certified as fit for purpose, safety and reliability for the ship as a whole remained a significant issue.
Mr Shortland said the Navy legitimately expected the ship and its systems to be fit for purpose when they received the ship. But "acceptance of certifications ... does not equate to a fully safe functioning vessel".
Evidence was given of errors and omissions in the certification by Lloyd's Register but Mr Shortland last August "ring-fenced" acquisition and design issues for another legal forum. He said the inquest's purpose was to establish the circumstances surrounding Solomon's death.
His key recommendation: "No naval ship or major military asset should be accepted into service until proper and credible trials are completed and have been critically reviewed.
"... There should be a proper and full safety certification process upon completion of the vessel.
"The haste shown to rush the HMNZS Canterbury into service has only contributed to the unnecessary and preventable death of Byron Solomon. In an environment where fiscal responsibility and restraint tends to dominate major decisions this by no means should be a factor that compromises features of safety for sailors and their working conditions.
"All military personnel [are] entitled to perform their duties in a situation that is as safe as it possibly can be. It is incumbent upon procurement authorities and government to ensure they provide an asset that has had appropriate safety audits before seeing action.
"There is no room for unnecessary deaths. ... No expense should be spared in establishing good safe and reliable systems."
