She wrote to the police officer, who she only knows as Officer A 84, two years ago but had not heard anything back.
"Officer 84, I really want to know your name. I don't want to know you as a number. I wish we could have some time to come out and meet me so we could sit down and talk, please,'' she said.
The mother of 11 said she still wept for her son, three years after he was shot, and photos of the teenager are displayed in her living room.
"I gave birth to Halatau. Officer A 84 took his life.''
She said she received the IPCA's report - released publicly today - last Wednesday but had yet to read all of it.
"It was very difficult to read it. I would read two pages at a time, go for a walk, I went for a coffee, go for a break and then come back and read it again.''
She said the report did give her some details of her son's last moments and she hoped police received better training in using guns.
Among its recommendations, the IPCA said AOS weapons training should be reviewed.
The IPCA criticised police for lacking "effective command and control'', while concluding that Mr Naitoko's death was the "tragic outcome of a rare combination of events''.
The AOS member who fired the shot, who has his identity protected and was referred to in a 116-page IPCA report released today simply as Officer 84, also wounded another innocent driver, Richard Stephen Neville, while also managing to hit McDonald.
McDonald was later convicted and sentenced to 13 years in jail after he admitted to 23 charges, including firing at police, possessing a firearm, aggravated robbery and unlawfully getting into a motor vehicle.
The authority concluded that Officer 84 and another colleague, Officer 81 who was also firing at the armed offender, were "justified'' in shooting at McDonald, but ruled their aim was "not accurate or safe, as demonstrated by the outcomes''.
While backing the officers' actions as "reasonable" in the "high-stress circumstances", even praising their actions which placed them in danger without concern for their personal safety, the report criticises the actions of the Northern Communications Centre during the one-hour pursuit.
"The overall operation lacked effective command and control," it states.
The report says the responsibility for communicating clear tactical decisions rested with the shift commander at NorthComms, who was under "significant pressure".
The lack of tactical control was highlighted when police missed a "potential opportunity" to contain McDonald.
"This opportunity was not taken because NorthComms was not aware of the resources available, nobody was clearly in command, and there was an expectation of an ultimate AOS resolution."
There was also a breakdown in radio protocols, with radio ill-discipline, and even patrols joining the chase without NorthComms' knowledge.
Confusion also reigned over how the police helicopter Eagle was to be used in the operation, while scrambling just seven AOS officers, including the commander and a dog handler, was "insufficient for an incident of this nature".
"Given the intensity of the situation, those problems were to be expected and should have been anticipated and better managed. Nevertheless, with those reservations, the pursuit phases were adequately handled," the IPCA says.
The report also said it was "undesirable" that the AOS commander dismantled the officers' weapons after the incident, while the "post-incident process was neither well co-ordinated nor sufficiently robust".
In its conclusions, the IPCA says that while the actions of Officers 81 and 84 in firing at McDonald were justified, the failure to shoot accurately and to "identify the risk beyond the target", raised concerns over their weapons training, including experience in 'shoot, don't shoot' decision-making.
"The officers had a responsibility not only to hit the target but to ensure that the line of fire beyond the target was clear when their shots were fired," the report says.
"Given the environment in which AOS officers may be required to perform, there is an onus on police to ensure that the selection and training of AOS members is such that the risks of their failing to perform to the highest standard when under stress are negated as far as practicable."
The IPCA recommends that New Zealand Police improves its communications, especially its radio protocols and pursuit policy, while reviewing the command training for communications centre shift commanders, and support for them during "critical incidents".
It also called for a review of Auckland AOS planning, with regard to the number of members available to respond to incidents, and clarifying the role of police chopper Eagle.
AOS weapons training should also be reviewed, while police should develop a more structured, transparent and comprehensive post critical incident policy.
IPCA chair Justice Lowell Goddard said the investigation was one of the most intricate and complex ever undertaken, and acknowledged: "The loss of Halatau Naitoko remains a source of huge grief for his family."
Police: recommendations already implemented
The seven recommendations for improvements to procedure after the independent investigation have already been implemented, police say.
Assistant Commissioner Allan Boreham today said the police "deeply and sincerely'' regretted Mr Naitoko's death.
"The officers involved, and wider police staff, remain deeply affected by his death. It is something no police officer ever wants to happen,'' Mr Boreham said.
"Our hearts go out to the Naitoko family. They have had to endure intense scrutiny since their son's tragic death and despite the many investigations and recommendations nothing will ever be able to put right that day for them.
"They have conducted themselves dignity throughout this ordeal and we are truly sorry for their devastating loss.''
Mr Boreham said police had already implemented changes to address all seven IPCA recommendations:
* A system has been implemented to ensure all staff logged on to the communications system, and that all vehicles were monitored;
* the command training for communications centre shift commanders had been reviewed, and the way staff were deployed in the centres during such incidents changed, with more trained staff at higher ranks and we have more training around complex, dynamic situations;
* it was not technically feasible to provide communications centre staff with AOS radio communications but new systems ensured communication occurred between incident commanders and AOS commanders;
* Auckland AOS planning had been reviewed so sufficient staff were available at all times;
* the role of the police helicopter Eagle had been clarified, and it was primarily used for observation;
* AOS weapons training had been reviewed, with simulator for training staff in a range of scenarios involving armed incidents, including an ``active shooter policy'', and all staff had greater access to firearms; and
* the interviewing procedures and policy for staff post critical incidents had been reviewed, and police also relied on medical experts to advise when staff were ready to return to such duties.
Mr Boreham said police also wanted to acknowledge Richard Neville, who was injured during the incident and had worked with police to resolve it.
"It has been a life-changing event for him,'' he said.
The incident had been investigated by the courts, the coroner and the IPCA, and all had said it was a rare set of events that resulted in tragic outcome.
"... nobody could have been harder on us than we have been on ourselves,'' Mr Boreham said.
"This was a unique situation. Confronting an armed and dangerous offender, no matter the level of training or experience will cause considerable stress. A moving gunman in a heavily populated area will always present risks.
"The officers had no control over these factors but were nonetheless called upon to carry out their duty. And they did resolve the situation.''
