At the end of August, Waitangi Tribunal hearings will open in Gisborne for the latest Mangatu remedies claims, in which the tribunal is under immense pressure from the courts to issue binding recommendations. But how did we get here? And what does this mean for our relatively politically stable Treaty settlement process?
Just under 30 years ago, the Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit (ToWPU) was established within the Department of Justice to co-ordinate and control the Crown's position on the resolution of Treaty claims. Over the three decades the Crown has negotiated dozens of agreements with Māori claimants around the country, it has been a distinctly political process.
Nonetheless, at the same time that ToWPU was set up, Parliament also provided the Waitangi Tribunal with legal binding powers to provide remedies to claimants. The tribunal has generally neglected to use those powers as a political process was seen as being more acceptable to the public. The tribunal sought to focus on its key task — reporting on the validity of claims — and leaving the settlement negotiations to the Crown.
Despite issuing one report on remedies in 1998, the tribunal has been able to suppress its use of binding powers — until now. Ever since a seminal Supreme Court decision in 2011 (Haronga v. Waitangi Tribunal and others) the courts have persistently pushed the tribunal to issue binding recommendations for remedies.
Before the first precedent-setting settlements were negotiated over sea fisheries, the Waikato-Tainui raupatu (confiscation), and the Ngāi Tahu claim in the 1990s, it was unclear how Treaty breaches would be resolved. Even in the late 1980s the Crown did not seem very keen to engage in a process.