Paul Buchanan: Good reason for coalition troops to pull out of Iraq

COMMENT

Defections from the coalition occupying Iraq are mounting. This is more of a diplomatic problem than a military one, since allied forces contribute 15,000 troops, whereas the United States investment numbers 130,000.

Boots on the ground are mostly American, and given the total number of boots needed to ensure security is calculated at more than 300,000, a loss of the entire allied contingent would mean only a slightly larger call-up from the US side or increased reliance on private security.

Although election-year politics in the US has seen forces opposed to President George W. Bush raise the spectre of universal conscription, the 2.5 major regional war scenario around which conventional war strategy is formulated allows for the United States to assume the full burden of conflict in Iraq.

It may be stretched thin in doing so, and may even have to resort to the draft to maintain force levels (which could spell electoral defeat for the President if it is ordered this year), but the US can, at some risk, accomplish the mission of pacifying Iraq, if only by bringing the peace of the dead to those who oppose it.

The US cannot pull out of Iraq at this point without losing more credibility as a world leader. For junior partners of the coalition of the willing, the issue is not so dire. Thus, the withdrawal of forces such as those of Spain, which has prompted accusations that the new Socialist Government is cutting and running, thereby encouraging terrorism.

Yet it is prudent and rational for junior partners to rethink their positions (and pull out of Iraq if necessary) because the bottom line is spelled out by two concepts at the core of any use of force: mission definition and rules of engagement.

The rules of engagement depend on the definition of the mission. For most of the coalition, the mission is defined as peacekeeping and nation-building, something that involves a mix of police functions and infrastructure reconstruction, such as that undertaken by New Zealand engineers in Basra.

The rules of engagement for such operations are not governed as much by the laws of war as by peacekeeping protocols. This means these forces have a purely defensive stance, cannot engage in offensive operations and must keep the lethal force employed to a minimum. The welfare of the local population is their main concern.

This would be the situation if things had panned out the way the US, British and Australian Governments predicted: liberated Iraq would welcome foreign forces as a source of security in the transition to elected authority, and coalition troops would cement goodwill through peacekeeping and nation-building operations.

As in the case of pre-emptive war being built on the existence of weapons of mass destruction and charges that Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden were allies, the claims of welcome and gratitude were based on false premises and assumptions.

Instead, what the junior members of the coalition have found themselves confronted with is a war of resistance in which they are viewed as the enemy. This was not part of the original mission definition under which they were deployed, and for which their rules of engagement are ill-suited. So they are now travelling on the slippery slope known as "mission creep".

This is a situation in which the original reason and rules of engagement governing the deployment begins to shift because of changing circumstances on the ground, the product of unforeseen political evolutions. The US incursion in Somalia in the early 1990s is emblematic in that regard.

As that mission painfully showed, troops confronted by mission creep did not sign up for this sort of fight and, more importantly, neither did the civilian populations of their home countries. In democracies, popular support for combat operations is essential for political survival.

The options for junior coalition commanders are consequently decreasing. Unless the original deployment orders included contingency plans for engaging in combat operations, the original reason for their presence in Iraq has been obviated by the changing strategic landscape.

That places them at a disadvantage when confronted by well-armed and organised guerrillas, who can blend into the population because of their local support and who can seize the initiative with hit-and-run attacks.

Hunkered down in their bases, some with orders to not engage fire under any circumstances, often at some distance from reinforcements by the larger coalition partners, the smaller coalition forces have become hot-lead magnets rather than symbols of peace and security.

Under such conditions, because the original mission definition and rules of engagement governing them no longer apply to the situation on the ground, it is reasonable for junior coalition forces to disengage and return home.

After they are recalled, their home governments can review their commitment to the coalition, vote on any new rules of engagement and mission definition and if the public and political approval for such is evident, return to Iraq under new terms.

The question coalition partners must address is whether the electorate sees Iraq as their fight and if so why and what benefits accrue as a result of involvement in it.

If the answer is, as Osama bin Laden mentioned with reference to the Madrid train bombings, "your merchandise being returned to you", the debate between continued military participation and diplomatic compromise assumes sharper focus.

At its heart, this retreat and pause approach recognises mistakes and seeks to correct them. From defeat often come better lessons than from victory, especially victories that seem easy at first.

Given the need for reassessment driven by coalition troop withdrawals and the upcoming presidential election, there is a window of opportunity for the United Nations and Nato to reassert their influence over the Iraq transition at a time when US legitimacy is open to question.

Thus there could be a new approach to stabilising Iraq under different external guidance, with a different mission definition and rules of engagement governing the use of force by foreign troops.

Things will not go according to that plan and will deviate from the Western democratic ideal for Iraq, but certainly at this juncture and for the foreseeable future they cannot get much worse.

* Paul Buchanan is a senior lecturer in politics at Auckland University.

Herald Feature: Iraq