COMMENT
It is said we live in an age of terror. Certainly, the news carries a steady stream of dreary, grim images of death and carnage caused by terrorists across the globe.
Some are massive, such as September 11; others are individualised but highly symbolic, such as the beheading of hostages in Iraq; others still are both brazen and seemingly senseless (the hostage sieges by Chechens in Moscow and Beslan).
Experts say more is on the way, politicians say we should not give in to such tactics, and everywhere people are afraid to fly, visit shopping malls, take trains or visit countries at risk. But there is more at play than meets the eye.
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been an integral part of warfare and statecraft from time immemorial.
In the 20th century, the greatest acts of terrorism have been committed by the state - that is, state terror - as opposed to non-state groups like al Qaeda.
Most analysts agree that the nuclear-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the fire-bombing of Dresden, had more psychological than military objectives.
Since the object of terrorism is to weaken the will of the subject population, rather than weaken an opponent's military capacity as such, many analysts conclude these acts were, in fact, acts of state terror undertaken during wartime.
From the standpoint of the perpetrators, they were justifiable on the basis of a means-ends rationale.
State terror was the stock in trade of Latin American dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s, where the objective was to discipline restive populations and alter the historical memories of the collective subject.
If one were to look at Argentina or Chile today, as compared to the late 1960s, it can be argued that the exercise worked quite well.
It should, therefore, not be surprising that in an age of overwhelming military superiority by one country, and growing ideological disenchantment with the less-heralded aspects of capitalist globalisation, militarily weak actors like the Tamil Tigers, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the Moro Liberation Front, Abu Sayef, Hamas and Hizbollah all see terrorism as their main weapons of redress.
Be it by suicide bomber in car or on foot (as the ultimate guided missile), or by remote control detonation, or by anthrax or cyanide letter, or by kidnap and televised execution, terrorism continues to be the weapon of choice of the militarily and ideologically disadvantaged for one reason: it works.
After all, if states can use it effectively - and often with impunity, as the events in Darfur demonstrate - then it should come as no surprise that others would take up the example, and add their own flavourings.
The larger issue, though, is that more and more aggrieved groups are using the politics of direct action rather than pursuing their grievances via established institutional channels.
This is ominous, not because of the proliferation of direct-action events, or the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the causes espoused. It is ominous because it speaks to institutional sclerosis and decay, much of which has got to the point of being terminal.
Be it anti-GM crop-pullers, animal rights blood-throwers, Greenpeace banner-hangers, fox-hunting and angry mum Parliament invaders, fathers' rights structure-climbers, anti-globalisation street mobs, anti-foreshore legislation hikoi-spitters, tree, flagpole and tower-sitters of various stripes, nipple-waving breast-feeding advocates or a host of others, the common denominator is disenchantment with the "establishment".
These are not the lunatic fringe elements of old, or some communist subversives working as third columns (although some may still be around).
More and more, the politics of direct action are being embraced by mainstream elements of society - young and old, rich and poor - out of a lack of faith in, and the perceived lack of responsiveness and accountability of, established political institutions.
This is as true for the United States, Britain and Germany as it is for Israel, India and Indonesia. It is seen in Brazil and Mexico as much as it is seen in Italy and Spain. And it is seen in New Zealand.
Take away a means for voicing moderate demands through institutional channels and people get anxious.
Feeling they have no voice and are not being listened to by the powers-that-be, many get desperate as they see their cause dismissed or rights trampled on.
In the measure that they get desperate, some get violent. In the measure that their violence succeeds, even briefly, they and others are encouraged to do so again. The more violence they mete out, the more the political landscape gets altered, seldom for the better.
The problem is not terror, and neither is it milder forms of direct action. The problem is non-responsive established political institutions.
The issue, therefore, is not so much how to deal with terrorism. Terrorism is a symptom, not a cause, of the current state of institutional affairs around the world.
The proliferation of direct action is another reflection of the malaise.
Perhaps, then, it is worth the political and economic elite taking a hint from all this and reconsidering, if not reforming, some of the institutional means by which others have redress.
After all, you can pay now or pay later, and you can pay more or you can pay less. But in the end, the absence of institutional changes that addresses causes rather than symptoms of mass discontent will mean the "establishment" will pay - perhaps with their jobs, if not their heads.
* Paul Buchanan is a visiting fellow at the Portuguese Institute of International and Strategic Studies in Lisbon. He teaches at Auckland University.
Herald Feature: Terrorism
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