John Armstrong: SAS role a thorny issue for Cabinet

Whether or not to send soldiers from New Zealand's elite Special Air Service to Afghanistan is the toughest decision John Key and his Cabinet colleagues have faced in their eight months in power.

It may be the toughest decision they face this parliamentary term.

Saying "yes" to the United States' request for special forces could - to put it bluntly - result in some troops returning home in body bags.

So far, no member of the New Zealand Defence Force has been killed during the nearly eight years of operations in various guises in the unstable, strife-torn, terrorist-breeding ground that is Afghanistan.

Before Washington even made the request, however, a high ranking defence chief warned the death of a New Zealand soldier serving in Afghanistan was inevitable.

The prediction by the commander of New Zealand's Joint Forces, Major General Rees Jones, was prompted by increased insurgency which has seen the Bamiyan-based, New Zealand provincial reconstruction team of 140 being targeted in what had previously been considered one of the safest parts of the country.

Cabinet ministers likewise shudder at the lowering odds on fatalities as Taleban fighters dig in and refuse to budge from large portions of the country.

Saying "no", however, would mean seriously disappointing Washington and the new Obama Administration. That would jar badly with the relatively recent normalising of New Zealand-United States relations.

Turning down the request would also run counter to the National Government's efforts to realign New Zealand's overall foreign policy more closely to positions taken by other traditional allies, notably Britain, Canada and Australia.

Complicating things is the stance of the Labour Opposition, which does not support such a deployment despite sending the SAS to Afghanistan for three tours of duty between 2001 and 2005.

Phil Goff argues the front-line role that the Americans have earmarked for the SAS is counter-productive as it does not win hearts and minds of local Afghans. The Labour leader argues it would be better for New Zealand to offer personnel to provide standard training of Afghan security forces back in the barracks.

If the SAS does go then the consensus that has seen overseas military deployments enjoying the backing of both main parties would be broken for the first time since the Vietnam War in the 1960s. If there are casualties, National's worry is that opinion could turn against the "forgotten war", leaving the governing party isolated and copping a public backlash.

Labour, however, has to be careful about playing politics with soldiers' corpses. Goff says for obvious personal reasons - his nephew was killed in Afghanistan while serving with the United States Army - he won't be going down that track.

Vietnam hangs heavy in the background to decision-making on Afghanistan by America and its Nato and other assorted allies, however.

Barack Obama's new multi-pronged Afghanistan policy has seen a doubling in American troops to secure parts of the country against a return by al Qaeda, while Afghan security forces will be expanded so they can take the lead in counter-insurgency operations so America and its allies can ultimately wind down their military presence. Simultaneously, efforts will be made to strengthen the Kabul Government, whose legitimacy has been eroded by rampant corruption and a failure to deliver basic services.

With one important difference - an acceptance that the war cannot be won without convincing the numerous, but less militant members of the Taleban to lay down their arms - the strategy bears marked similarities to the propping-up of the doomed South Vietnamese regime for long enough to to enable the Americans to exit.

It could take years - if ever - for Obama's strategy to reach the stage when the Americans and their allies can start withdrawing without gifting Afghanistan back to the Taleban.

The National Government can consequently foresee itself getting bogged down in a Vietnam War-like quagmire. The Prime Minister is flagging the need for an exit strategy which gets the bulk of New Zealand's various contingents out of Afghanistan, while possibly leaving a handful of training or other specialist personnel in Kabul to avoid the impression New Zealand has cut and run.

And sooner rather than later. It looks more and more the case that the SAS may be deployed for a shortish period as the diplomatic price for gaining American acceptance that New Zealand's days in Afghanistan are numbered.

Although the Cabinet is said to have not yet reached any firm position in advance of receiving the report of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs-led review of New Zealand's Afghanistan policy, the decision on the SAS may effectively already have been made.

The request for troops was formally made by American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Such public requests are only made on the prior understanding that they will be accepted.

It is highly unlikely State Department officials would have allowed Clinton to put herself in a position where she could have been embarrassed by rejection of that request.

In that vein, the Prime Minister has engaged in a classic public softening-up exercise in recent weeks to the point that he is now "somewhat sympathetic" to the SAS going.

Key is carefully pitching the argument for sending the SAS as being in New Zealand's interests - rather than as some symbolic adjunct to America's huge presence in the central Asian country.

This softly-softly approach was almost derailed by the new United States ambassador to Nato, Ivo Daalder, who told the Herald that New Zealand should make a military contribution to fighting the war against the Taleban because one day it might need to call on the United States for help.

The Americans have lobbied hard for the SAS to go, but Daalder's remarks gave every impression of New Zealand being heavied.

His outburst is understood to have caused palpitations in the American Embassy in Wellington, while prompting what have been described as "strong messages" from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the State Department.

The unwitting intervention means any Cabinet decision to send the troops will now be viewed more widely as the Government succumbing to American pressure.

The gaffe might end up helping Key, however. To appease New Zealand for the blunder, the Americans may have to accept more conditions on the deployment.

Likewise comments by Vice-Admiral William Sullivan, the US Military Representative to Nato. The latter had envisaged using the SAS to train Afghan army units in the front-line of the fight against the Taleban.

No doubt aware of the death of an Australian soldier after such an Afghan unit failed to return enemy fire, Key rejected such a role as too dangerous and indicated caveats would be placed on the tasks that the SAS would do.

However, if the SAS do go to Afghanistan, they will not be spending their time twiddling their thumbs in Kabul. The Government cannot eliminate the risk of casualties. But it can put a limit on how long the deployment lasts. The separate contingent in Bamiyan is due to wind up in September next year. Given previous tours of duty have lasted as little as six months, the SAS could come out earlier.

Key has not put a date on it, but it is understood the Government wants out of Afghanistan by early 2011.